dissenting.
As the opinion of the Court states, the failure of the Commonwealth to file a timely answer to appellant’s pre-trial motion to suppress required, in the absence of a showing of a “good cause” for the failure, that the suppression court accept as true all well-pleaded facts averred in the appellant’s motion to suppress. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 308. The Court *451is of the opinion that, when this is done, there is insufficient evidence to support the conclusion of the suppression court that the statements of the defendant were properly obtained and should be admitted into evidence. I believe, however, that the conclusions of the suppression court were amply supported and would affirm the judgment below. Hence this dissent.
In support of appellant’s argument that he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his constitutional rights, Pugh alleged in his motion to suppress that on the “day of the interrogation by the police, [he] had taken an unknown quantity of prescriptive drugs.” The majority, purporting to rely on Commonwealth v. Cornish, 471 Pa. 256, 370 A.2d 291 (1976) holds that before such a claim may be resolved, a court must determine all the attending circumstances including the “type and quantity of drug, the exact time or times the drug was consumed, and whether an impairment of the faculties ensued.” [Ante, at p. 450]. It therefore remands for a new suppression hearing. I think this disposition of the matter is in error.
First, the majority misinterprets what I understand to be our holding in Cornish, supra. In that case, this Court stated:
Cornish, in a related argument would have us rule, analogous to guilty plea situations, that the police should have inquired as to the extent of Cornish’s drug intake once they were aware he used narcotics. We decline to create such a per se rule. The issue is one to be resolved by examining the totality of the circumstances, and the circumstances instantly established Cornish was in full control of his will. This is not to say that such an inquiry would not have been a preferable way for the police to have proceeded, but their not having done so does not automatically render the statement involuntary. Cf. Commonwealth v. McKinney, 453 Pa. 10, 306 A.2d 305 (1973). 471 Pa. at 268-69, 370 A.2d at 297.
Rather than lending support to appellant’s position, therefore, Cornish expressly rejects the adoption of a per se rule *452as to what is required of the police where the suspect claims to be under the influence of drugs.
Second, and more importantly, I believe the critical inquiry in cases such as the present is whether the alleged consumption of drugs in any way impaired the ability of the appellant knowingly and intelligently to waive his rights. This is the task of the suppression judge. Thus, in Commonwealth v. Moore, 454 Pa. 337, 341, 311 A.2d 620, 622-23 (1973), we stated:
A constitutional burden is upon the Commonwealth to show voluntariness of a confession by a preponderance of the credible evidence. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 92 S.Ct. 619, 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972); Commonwealth v. Smith, 447 Pa. 457, 291 A.2d 103 (1972); Commonwealth ex rel. Butler v. Rundle, 429 Pa. 141, 239 A.2d 426 (1968). Here the suppression judge obviously chose to believe the testimony of the two police officers as to appellant’s condition and ability at the time the challenged statements were given, and not that of appellant. His findings of fact were categorical that appellant, in giving his two statements, was not affected by drugs or narcotics, or by withdrawal therefrom; and that they were “freely, intelligently and voluntarily made.” As we observed in Commonwealth v. Smith, supra: “An appellate court does not weigh evidence or pass upon the credibility of witnesses, and there is no basis for us to hold as a matter of law that the court’s finding of voluntariness of the confession was not adequately supported and well within the court’s discretion.”
In the case at bar, Judge Ivins, presiding over the suppression hearing, made similar categorical findings:
From all the testimony, thisrCourt concludes the defendant did have sufficient capacity to understand what was being said to him and the meaning of any statements.
Accordingly, it is quite clear that when a defendant, as here, has been fully informed of his rights, any reasonable acknowledgment of understanding or a willingness to speak is acceptable; see U. S. v. Boykin [C.A.Pa.], 398 *453F.2d 483, to which certiorari was denied, 393 U.S. 1032 [89 S.Ct. 645, 21 L.Ed.2d 575].
The Court has examined in detail all the circumstances surrounding defendant’s admission. We’ve weighed all the evidence produced concerning this defendant. We conclude that the defendant was sufficiently cognizant of all that was taking place and made the inculpatory statement here involved without counsel and indeed aware, as I see it, of the consequences of an admission or a confession.
Since the suppression court has concluded that Pugh was in possession of his faculties at the time of the waiver of his rights, and since the evidence in the record is sufficient to support such a conclusion,* I see nothing to be gained by remanding the record for the taking of additional evidence which is not critical to the legal conclusion of voluntariness which is here challenged. I would affirm the judgment of sentence.
The record discloses that the interrogating police officers testified at the suppression hearing that appellant was in no way coerced, that he was responsive and seemed to understand both his rights and their questions, and that he did not appear to be under the influence of drugs. Thus, as in Commonwealth v. Moore, supra, we have a case where the suppression court simply choose to believe the testimony of the Commonwealth witnesses that appellant was in sufficient possession of his faculties so as to knowingly and intelligently waive his constitutional rights, regardless of the fact that he may have taken a quantity of prescriptive drugs. It should also be borne in mind that the question of the voluntariness of the confession, in addition to being raised before the suppression court, was also presented to the jury under proper instructions. See Commonwealth v. Green, 464 Pa. 557, 347 A.2d 682 (1975), and Commonwealth v. Camm, 443 Pa. 253, 277 A.2d 325 (1971).
Mr. Justice ROBERTS has argued that Commonwealth v. Blair, 460 Pa. 31, 331 A.2d 213 (1975) should apply not from the date of *454decision, but from March 1,1975, the date it was first reported in the Atlantic Reporter. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 468 Pa. 375, 362 A.2d 990 (1976) (dissenting opinion by Roberts, J., joined by Manderino, J.). However, in this case the post-verdict motions were filed on March 4, 1975, after both the date of decision and the date the case was first reported.