ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
EARL W. SMITH, Justice.On Motion for rehearing, Modesta, Palo Pinto, Trustees JOG (the partnership) and Judgment Oil and Gas Co., Inc. contend that this Court erred in six respects. We overrule the motion for rehearing.
In their first four assignments of error, Modesta, et al., contend that we erred in holding: that there was no evidence of legal acquisition of title to the equipment on the G.C. Walker lease; that plaintiffs failed to prove that OGMD owned the equipment on the G.C. Walker lease prior *754to acquisition of title to said equipment by Modesta through the United States Marshal’s bill of sale; that OGMD did not have legal title to the equipment located upon the G.C. Walker lease; and that Equico held no title in and to the equipment on the G.C. Walker lease at any time material to the controversy. Modesta, et al., argues that each of said holdings was not germane to any point of error raised by 3-C.
The judgment of the trial court reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Third Party Defendants (realigned as Plaintiffs) Modesta Partnership, Palo Pinto Limited Partnership, Judgment Oil & Gas Company, a partnership, Jim Burden, Lionel Aiken, and Jeffrey Mansuy, sued as Trustees, shall have and recover judgment of and from Third Party Plaintiffs (realigned as Defendants) 3-C Oil Company, Inc., 3-C Oil Company, John Cox, Woodson Cox and William Cox, jointly and severally, the sum of Two Hundred Eighty-Nine Thousand, Two Hundred Ninety-Nine Dollars and Forty Cents ($289,299.40), upon which sum interest shall accrue at a rate of 9% per annum from date of Judgment.
First, we note that Judgment Oil and Gas Co., Inc., was not awarded judgment. Its motion for rehearing is pursued without standing or merit.
Next, the judgment awards judgment to all realigned plaintiffs for $289,299.40. This figure is based upon three separate findings of the jury, that 3-C converted equipment on the G.C. Walker lease, the E.B. White lease, and the P.L. Walker lease with no jury finding as to ownership of the equipment or the date of the conversion. The amount awarded to all plaintiffs is based upon rental values of the equipment in the sum of $272,299.40 plus $17,000.00 in punitive damages.
We note again that the trial court did not make any findings of fact as to ownership of equipment on each of the three leases; nor did he find as a fact the date of any conversion by 3-C. Rather, as pointed out in our opinion, he decided these issues as a matter of law. In his conclusions of law as to ownership and date of conversion, we held that the court erred.
The assertion that our holdings were not germane to any point of error raised by 3-C is without merit. The judgment awards Modesta damages for rental value on all three leases. In its pleadings, Modesta claimed title to the G.C. Walker and E.B. White leases by virtue of purchase of the equipment evidenced by a U.S. Marshal’s bill of sale dated February 8, 1979, pursuant to a sale conducted by the Marshal on January 17, 1979.
In points of error 16, 17, and 18, 3-C makes it clear that it contends that the trial court erred in entering judgment that Modesta “owns all the equipment in question.” 3-C states correctly that Modesta made no claims to the P.L. Walker lease equipment. 3-C further argued that the U.S. Marshal’s sale was void because it was not held in compliance with the law and that there was no evidence that OGMD owned the equipment on the E.B. White lease. These points were grouped together for statement of facts, authorities and argument. In its argument 3-C definitely points out that “Modesta did not produce any evidence to prove that the equipment on the G.C. Walker lease was owned by OGMD on January 17, 1979.” (emphasis supplied).
Even if technical rules of briefing are not complied with, the appellate court will pass on both the sufficiency and merits of the point in light of statement and argument thereunder. Fambrough v. Wagley, 140 Tex. 577, 169 S.W.2d 478, 482 (1943); Crisp v. Southwest Bancshares Leasing Co., 586 S.W.2d 610, 614 (Tex.Civ.App.1978, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Lintz v. Dillon, 568 S.W.2d 147, 149 (Tex.Civ.App.1978), rev’d on other grounds, 582 S.W.2d 394 (1979); C.L. Cooke and Son v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 464 S.W.2d 493, 496 (Tex.Civ.App.1971), rev’d on other grounds, 469 S.W.2d 893 (1971).
It is clear that 3-C was challenging Modesta’s ownership of equipment on the *755G.C. Walker lease on several grounds, including the claim that Modesta did not prove ownership by OGMD, the judgment debtor, at the time of the sheriffs sale to Modesta. The contention of Modesta, et al., that this Court has raised “sua sponte” the validity of Modesta’s claim and the error of the trial court in awarding it judgment for rental value on more than the only equipment it could possibly claim legal title to (the G.C. Walker lease) is rejected as being unwarranted.
We pass now to Modesta’s four assignments of error all dealing with ownership of the equipment on the G.C. Walker lease. We have again reviewed the record. Plaintiff’s proof (Modesta, et al.) showed that the original dealings between the California investors (JOG) and OGMD were set out at length by Donald Raymond, an attorney and managing partner for JOG. According to him, JOG consists of a series of partnerships and individuals that had made investments in oil transactions in Caldwell and other counties through OGMD. In 1970 or early 1971 Raymond assisted in the formation of JOG to invest in the oil production business in Caldwell County through OGMD. JOG paid OGMD some three and one half million dollars to drill wells for them. Many of the partners loaned money for the completion of the wells, including the furnishing of necessary equipment.
Special arrangements were made between the partnership that Raymond was associated with and OGMD, for the financing of equipment to install on the wells. Raymond said “[w]e would buy the equipment originally from Oil, Gas and Minerals Development Corporation.” The partnership that was involved in organizing, funding and managing this (buying of equipment, etc.) was T-Vestco, who would then resell the equipment to IDS Leasing Corporation, and T-Vestco would then lease the equipment back from IDS Leasing. Raymond re-iterated that the equipment would start with OGMD, who would then sell it to JOG, who would in turn resell the equipment to IDS Leasing Corporation and then lease the equipment back to T-Vestco as a partner of JOG. During all these transactions, the equipment would remain located on the leases.
Equico became the successor in interest to IDS. T-Vestco was required to make quarterly payments on the leases. Production from the oil leases was next to none, so T-Vestco (of which Raymond was president) went into default on its equipment lease payments. It worked out an agreement with OGMD whereby OGMD would take over the equipment lease contracts. Plaintiffs introduced into evidence two instruments, dated May 14, 1973, signed by T-Vestco and OGMD, containing also the required approval of IDS Leasing Corporation, as proof that the equipment was now leased to OGMD, who therefore became liable to IDS on the leases. The whole thrust of Raymond’s testimony is that equipment on the leases was owned by IDS Leasing Corporation. The location of the equipment was not described in the transfer of the equipment leases to OGMD. This information was possibly in Raymond’s files in San Francisco, or in JOG’s office in Luling. It is clear, however, that there is no evidence excluding the G.C. Walker lease. It is further clear that it is through this entire arrangement of sale-leaseback that Trustees obtained title to equipment on at least two of the leases— the E.B. White and P.L. Walker leases, as will appear later.
OGMD did not make payment on the leases; there were other problems with investments made with OGMD, so several lawsuits were filed and judgments totalling in excess of $4,000,000.00 were taken. Several oil and gas leases (of OGMD) were levied upon; execution sales were held, and Raymond purchased several oil and gas leases, but no equipment. T-Vestco Financial Corporation acted as general partner in some limited partnerships. Money was invested in the drilling of particular wells in Caldwell County, using “OGMD to undertake those investments.”
As noted, IDS Leasing, the owner and lessor of the lease equipment; somehow *756was succeeded in interest by Equico; it was not established just how this occurred. At any rate, to trace chain of title to equipment on the leases, Modesta, et al., plaintiffs, introduced a bill of sale from Equico to E. Dale Hartley, dated August, 1978, in which Equico conveyed to Hartley:
Approximately fifty-four (54) each of the following: Floating Equipment, Casing, Tubing Rods, Electrical Line, Electrical Panel, Flow Line, Pump Unit, Insert Pump, Well head, Polish Rod, Tankage, Korkele.* (emphasis added).
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The bill of sale recites further that:
by acceptance of this document E. Dale Hartley acknowledges that said personal property has been in the possession and under the control of Oil, Gas and Mineral Development Corporation, Lockhart, Texas since 1973.
It is only through the numbered contracts that it could possibly be ascertained on what lease the personal property or equipment was located. Plaintiff did not offer the numbered contracts into evidence. The aforementioned lease equipment transfers from T-Vestco to OGMD do refer to two of the contract numbers mentioned in the bill of sale from Equico to Hartley. There is no evidence that property on the G.C. Walker lease was, or was not included (by reference to the nine contract numbers) in the bill of sale from Equico to Hartley.
Trustees in their pleadings claim title to the equipment only on the E.B. White and P.L. Walker leases by virtue of bill of sale from Hartley dated February 16, 1980. It is of more than passing interest that such bill of sale purports to convey, in addition, equipment located on the G. C. Walker lease, to-wit, on Wells Nos. 1A, 2A, 3A, 4A, 5A, as well as other property located on said leases without reference to Modesta’s bill of sale from the Marshal which purports to convey equipment located on the same wells. Aiken, one of the trustees, identified the bill of sale from Hartley to the Trustees. As to the property conveyed by such bill of sale, he testified as follows:
Q. Do they [triplicate copies of the Bill of Sale] have any type descriptions as to the property which is being conveyed?
A. Yes. It has an inventory that is incorporated.
Q. Could you look over that inventory and identify if there may be any property on there that is conveyed by Hartley and Associates other than the P.L. Walker equipment.
A. Yes.
Q. Which?
A. Property located on the E.B. White.
Q. What is that, to refresh your recollection?
A. G.C. Walker.
On cross-examination he testified that after Modesta’s judgment levy Hartley was claiming property located on the E.B. White lease and “G.C. Walker’s lease equipment,” and also made claim to equipment on the P.L. Walker lease, and that Hartley “claimed their ownership interest through a leasing company that had leased equipment to OGMD.”
Notwithstanding the above, Hartley’s original petition (later dismissed) claimed title only on the E.B. White and P.L. Walker leases; Lynn Kramer, a member of Hartley and Associates, in his testimony limited the claims of Hartley to equipment on the P.L. Walker and E.B. White leases; and Trustees, in their pleadings so limited their claims.
From what has been said, we conclude:
1. That though, through the financial arrangements between JOG and OGMD, the latter was the original common source of title to equipment on the three leases, it conveyed title to the investors, who in turn conveyed same to IDS Leasing.
2. IDS Leasing leased the equipment to T-Vestco.
3. T-Vestco transferred its interest, as lessee, to OGMD, who became lessee, not owner of the equipment.
*7574. Equico apparently purported to convey title to equipment on only E.B. White and P.L. Walker leases to Hartley. (Modesta, et al. concedes the correctness of this conclusion).
5. Hartley attempted to convey title to equipment on all the leases, including the G.C. Walker, to the Trustees.
6. Both Hartley and Trustees, by their pleadings made no claim to equipment on the G.C. Walker lease; Lynn Kramer, a partner with Hartley said they made no claim to G.C. Walker equipment.
7. If Equico did not convey title to the G.C. Walker equipment, then same was left in Equico.
8. There is no evidence that when OGMD conveyed the equipment to the investors (who in turn conveyed to IDS, Equico’s predecessor in title), that OGMD excluded the G.C. Walker equipment.
In order to recover on a theory of conversion, Modesta, et al. had the burden to obtain jury findings (there were none) or to establish by conclusive evidence that they were the owners of the property alleged to have been converted. Branham v. Prewitt, 686 S.W.2d 507, 512 (Tex.App.1982) writ ref’d n.r.e., 643 S.W.2d 122 (1983); Izaks v. National Bank of Commerce, 547 S.W.2d 345, 348 (Tex.Civ.App. 1977, no writ).
Plaintiffs Modesta, et al., failed to prove that OGMD owned the equipment on the G.C. Walker lease at the time Modesta attempted to acquire title through the execution sale by the United States Marshal. Trustees in their pleadings did not claim title to same. No other plaintiff than Modesta claims title to such equipment. The first four assignments of error of Modesta are overruled.
We remain convinced that our holding as to insufficiency of evidence on rental value, and the error in computing same, was correct. Assignment of error number 5 is overruled.
In assignment of error number 6 it is argued that we erred in holding that all plaintiffs were not entitled to judgment. For the reasons stated in our original opinion, assignment of error number 6 is overruled.
The motion for rehearing of Modesta, et al. is overruled.
PHILLIPS, C.J., not participating.
As scheduled on contracts numbered [then follows the number of nine contracts].