OPINION ON APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR REHEARING ON PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
CAMPBELL, Judge.Appellant was convicted of credit card abuse under V.T.C.A. Penal Code, Sec. 32.-31(b)(1)(A) 1. The jury assessed punishment at two years incarceration in the Texas Department of Corrections. On appeal to the Thirteenth Court of Appeals in Corpus Christi, appellant’s conviction was affirmed. On original submission this Court upheld the judgment of the court below on appellant’s petition for discretionary review. Upon rehearing, we reverse the conviction.
*706Appellant contends this Court erroneously held that the evidence was sufficient to prove that he intended to fraudulently obtain services2 when he presented a credit card to a Sears & Roebuck clerk in exchange for selected items of clothing. On original submission we held that, because the salesperson filled out the required credit forms, accepted appellant’s proffered card, and ultimately extended him credit, that appellant had intended to fraudulently obtain services as well as property. Upon reconsideration, we do not believe that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant intended to obtain services. V.T.C.A. Penal Code, Sec. 31.01(7) defines “service” as:
“(1) ‘Service’ includes:
“(A) labor and professional services;
“(B) telecommunication, public utility, and transportation service;
“(C) lodging, restaurant service, and entertainment; and
“(D) the supply of a motor vehicle or other property for use.”
The Practice Commentary to V.T.C.A. Penal Code, Sec. 31.04 (1974) analyzes the definition of “service” as follows:
“ ‘Service’ is defined broadly in Section 31.01 to include almost anything that is ordinarily provided for compensation but that was traditionally excluded from theft because it is not classified as ‘property.’ ” Searcy and Patterson, Practice Commentary to V.T.C.A. Penal Code, Sec. 31.04 (1974).
While we agree that, under the facts of this case, the work done by the clerk to extend credit was “labor,” see Sec. 31.-01(7)(A), supra, we do not believe the evidence was sufficient to show such labor, or service, was the intended object of appellant’s desire. Rather, the evidence circumstantially shows the appellant was interested only in obtaining the selected items of clothing vis-a-vis the credit card, and inferentially, the appellant had not the slightest intention of fulfilling the terms of the transaction.3 The steps taken to extend him credit were merely incidental to the transaction.
We do not hold that “all” credit card transactions are excluded under Sec. 31.-01(7), supra. In the instant situation, if the appellant had purchased the clothing in question and had ordered tailoring alterations, with the resultant charges being made 'to the victim’s account, then the appellant would have obtained both property and services as contemplated by Secs. 31.-01(6) and (7), respectively. None of the factors present in the instant case is per se determinative of whether appellant intended to obtain services. We therefore hold that the extension of credit, in and of itself, without further proof, does not constitute a service under Sec. 31.01(7).
The indictment alleged that appellant: “intentionally and knowingly with intent to fraudulently obtain property and services from NINFA ESCOBEDO, did use and present a credit card, a SEARS, ROEBUCK & CO. CARD Number 57 85272 08504 5, with knowledge that the card had not been issued to the said MIKE ORTEGA AND JANIE SAENZ and that said card was not used with the effective consent of the cardholder, Ms. MA MARCELLA LANDEZ.” 4
The application portion of the charge instructed the jury, inter alia, that if they found from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant did, “with intent to fraudulently obtain property and services, ******** present a credit card *707that had not been issued to him, then they will find appellant guilty as charged.”
It was proper for the State to charge appellant by alleging conjunctively that he intended to fraudulently obtain property and services, and proof of either would have been sufficient to convict, Sidney v. State, 560 S.W.2d 679 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Garcia v. State, 537 S.W.2d 930 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Boyd v. State, 419 S.W.2d 843 (Tex.Cr.App.1967), and it was proper for the trial court to charge the jury that a finding of either would be sufficient to convict.
However, because the charge instructed the jury that it must find both property and services before returning a guilty verdict, then it was necessary that there be sufficient proof of both means alleged. Otherwise, a guilty verdict would be deemed contrary to the law and the evidence.5
Because the evidence is insufficient to support a finding of intent to fraudulently obtain both property and services, the cause is reversed and a judgment of acquittal is ordered. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978).
TEAGUE, J., concurs in result.. V.T.C.A., Sec. 32.31, in pertinent part, is as follows:
“A person commits an offense if:
"(1) with intent to obtain property or service fraudulently, he presents or uses a credit card with knowledge that:
"(A) the card, whether or not expired, has not been issued to him and is not used with the effective consent of the cardholder;
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. All emphasis is supplied throughout by the writer of this opinion unless otherwise indicated.
. The terms of the credit sale were, in pertinent parts, as follows:
“This purchase is made under my Sears Revolving Charge Account and Security Agreement of my Sears Charge Security Agreement or my Sears Charge Modernizing Credit Plan Security Agreement, which is incorporated herein by reference for the credit sales price consisting of the cash price plus the FINANCE CHARGE. This order is subject to the approval of the Credit Sales Department of Sears, Roebuck and Co."
.Charges against co-defendant Janie Saenz were ultimately severed from appellant’s cause.
. We pause to note that Judge Clinton’s analysis of the Court of Appeals opinion with regard to its reliance upon Love v. State, 627 S.W.2d 457 [Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, no petition filed] was entirely correct. As Judge Clinton noted:
"In sum, there is no such thing as ‘surplusage’ in the part of the court’s instructions to the jury which authorizes a conviction, and if the prosecutor believes that portion of the charge unnecessarily increases his burden of proof, it behooves him specially to request a charge which correctly allocates burden placed on him by law_”