The opinion of the Court was delivered by
CLIFFORD, J.This appeal implicates principles of rendition law. We granted certification, 122 N.J. 379, 585 A.2d 383 (1990), to determine whether defendant, who is serving a life sentence in a New Jersey prison, may be extradited to California to face the death penalty. We affirm the Appellate Division's order denying dismissal of the warrant of extradition and permitting defendant to be extradited to California. We conclude that under the circumstances of this case, the decision to extradite a prisoner is a matter of executive discretion, and that defendant fails to overcome the strong presumption of validity in favor of the warrant of extradition granted by the Governor.
I
In November 1980, New Jersey authorities arrested defendant, Malcolm Robbins, for the sexually-motivated murder of nine-year-old E.B., a crime to which defendant later confessed. On August 7, 1981, Robbins pled guilty to charges of murder, kidnapping, aggravated sexual assault, and other offenses arising from that murder, for which the court sentenced him to an aggregate term of life imprisonment with a forty-year parole disqualifier. Robbins is currently incarcerated in New Jersey State Prison at Trenton.
*285At the time defendant confessed to the murder of E.B., he also admitted to several other offenses, including the sodomizing and choking to death of a young boy in California. The details of that crime met the description of the June 1980 murder of C.F., a six-year-old boy whose skeletal remains had been found on the campus of the University of California at Santa Barbara. Two officers from the Santa Barbara Sheriffs Department came to New Jersey, where Robbins was incarcerated awaiting trial, to question him about that California murder. When shown a picture of C.F., Robbins admitted, “He’s the little boy that I killed.”
In November 1981, after defendant had already begun serving his New Jersey life sentence, he was transferred from the New Jersey State Prison at Trenton to California to stand trial for the kidnapping and murder of C.F. A California jury found Robbins guilty of both charges, and the court sentenced him to death. California officials then returned Robbins to New Jersey to continue serving his life sentence here while his appeal from the California conviction and sentence was pending.
The California Supreme Court affirmed defendant’s conviction and sentence, People v. Robbins, 45 Cal.3d 867, 755 P.2d 355, 248 Cal.Rptr. 172 (1988), and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in January 1989. Robbins v. California, 488 U.S. 1034, 109 S.Ct. 849, 102 L.Ed.2d 981. Shortly thereafter, California Governor George Deukmejian requested that New Jersey extradite Robbins to allow California to carry out the death sentence. On April 11, 1989, then-Govemor Thomas Kean signed the warrant of extradition.
Robbins moved to dismiss the warrant on the grounds that neither the Interstate Agreement on Detainers nor the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act provides for his extradition to California before he completes his New Jersey sentence. The trial court denied defendant’s motion, and the Appellate Division affirmed in an unreported opinion. In letting stand the order of extradition the Appellate Division held that whether New Jer*286sey’s or California’s sentence is the first to be served “is not a matter of interpretation of [the Interstate Agreement on Detainers or the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act]” but rather “a matter of comity between jurisdictions.”
II
A
Initially we consider Robbins’ claim that general principles of extradition law do not contemplate his transfer to California under the circumstances. We acknowledge at the outset that some commentators, beginning with J. Scott, The Law of Interstate Rendition, Erroneously Referred to as Interstate Extradition § 1 at 1-5 (1917), have recommended the use of “rendition” for reference to interstate practice and “extradition” for international practice; but at the risk of perpetuating an error that has taken on a life of its own, we use the terms interchangeably in this opinion.
Our analysis begins with the extradition clause of the United States Constitution. “To prevent the states from serving, unwittingly or otherwise, as havens for fugitives from sister states,” In re Basto, 108 N.J. 480, 485, 531 A.2d 355 (1987), that clause provides:
A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime. [U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2.]
The extradition clause “served important national objectives of a newly developing country striving to foster national unity.” Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 288, 99 S.Ct. 530, 535, 58 L.Ed.2d 521, 527 (1978). Because the clause was thought not to be self-executing, Congress enacted the Extradition Act of 1793, 1 Stat. 302, to carry its substance into effect. Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U.S. 80, 94, 6 S.Ct. 291, 299, 29 L.Ed. 544, 548 (1885). The Federal Rendition Act (the Rendition Act), 18 *287U.S. C. §§ 3181 to 3195, the modern counterpart of the Extradition Act, states in relevant part:
Whenever the executive authority of any State or Territory demands any person as a fugitive from justice, of the executive authority of any State, District or Territory to which such person has fled, and produces a copy of an indictment found or an affidavit made before a magistrate of any State or Territory, charging the person demanded with having committed treason, felony, or other crime, certified as authentic by the governor or chief magistrate of the State or Territory from whence the person so charged has fled, the executive authority of the State, District or Territory to which such person has fled shall cause him to be arrested and secured, and notify the executive authority making such demand, or the agent of such authority appointed to receive the fugitive, and shall cause the fugitive to be delivered to such agent when he shall appear. [18 U.S.C. § 3182.]
Section 3182’s repeated reference to the “executive authority” illustrates the central role that Congress intended governors to play in matters of interstate rendition. At issue here is the extent of the deference to be given a governor’s actions in carrying out that central role.
B
In Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 16 L.Ed. 717 (1861), the Supreme Court held that the extradition clause and the Rendition Act impose on governors of asylum states a mandatory duty to deliver up fugitives on proper demand. For many years, that duty was essentially nothing more than a moral obligation, because Dennison also held that the federal courts had no authority to compel extradition. See Comment, Interstate Rendition: Executive Practices and the Effects of Discretion, 66 Yale L.J. 97, 98-99 (1956). In 1987, however, the Supreme Court overruled Dennison and held that federal courts have the power to compel rendition. See Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219, 107 S.Ct. 2802, 97 L.Ed.2d 187.
Despite Branstad’s restriction on gubernatorial power, rendition remains discretionary if the fugitive demanded is incarcerated in the asylum state for a violation of that state’s laws. See Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 366, 371, 21 L.Ed. 287, 290 (1873); Note, The Detainer: A Problem in *288Interstate Criminal Administration, 48 Colum.L.Rev. 1190, 1200-06 (1948). In that situation, the governor’s duty to extradite does not mature until punishment in the asylum state has been completed. See Nelson v. George, 399 U.S. 224, 229 n. 6, 90 S.Ct. 1963, 1966-67 n. 6, 26 L.Ed.2d 578, 583 n. 6 (1970). Before the duty matures, “the court which first takes the subject-matter of the litigation into its control, whether this be person or property, must be permitted to exhaust its remedy * * * before the other court shall attempt to take it for its purpose.” Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254, 260, 42 S.Ct. 309, 310, 66 L.Ed. 607, 611 (1921). As a matter of comity, the governor of the asylum state may choose to extradite such prisoners, and a prisoner “may not complain if one sovereignty waives its strict right to exclusive custody of him for vindication of its laws in order that the other may also subject him to conviction of crime against it.” Ibid.
C
Robbins had been sentenced and was incarcerated in a New Jersey prison at the time the Governor of California demanded his extradition, making this case one in which the mandatory duty to extradite has not yet matured. In that situation, the majority rule, which we adopt, is that
[t]he executive authority of the asylum state may withhold a rendition request until the fugitive has completed a prison sentence imposed by a court of the asylum state, but this is a matter of executive discretion and not a personal right of the fugitive. * * * [I]t is usually held that the executive of the asylum state may waive the right of that state to retain the prisoner and may surrender him to the demanding state * * * while he is still undergoing, or subject to, punishment in the asylum state. [35 C.J.S. Extradition § 11 at 398-99 (1960) (collecting cases).]
Former-Governor Kean thus had the option of immediately extraditing Robbins to California or delaying the extradition until Robbins had completed his New Jersey sentence. He decided to allow California to exact its punishment before New Jersey had fully exacted its own. That exercise of executive discretion was clearly within his authority.
*289Defendant’s assertion that general principles of extradition law limit extradition to situations in which one is transferred to stand trial is without merit. In Guerrieri v. Maxwell, 174 Ohio St. 40, 186 N.E.2d 614 (1962), the Supreme Court of Ohio stated:
[W]here one has placed himself in the position of being wanted at the-same time by two different sovereigns for the violation of penal statutes of both, it is a matter for the sovereigns to determine which shall first exact punishment from the offender, and not the offender. Under such circumstances it is the interested sovereigns that make the determination and the offender cannot complain of the order of his trials or punishment for such offenses. [Id. at 44, 186 N.E.2d at 616.]
Similarly, in State v. Williams, 92 N.J.Super. 560, 224 A.2d 331 (1966), the Appellate Division held:
Inasmuch as it is impossible for a person to be in two places at the same time, where one owes penalties to two separate sovereigns, one sovereign must relinquish its claim and allow the other to exact its penalty first. * * * The order of punishment is a matter to be decided between the sovereigns — it is a matter of comity between them, and the decision arrived at is one over which the convict has no control. [Id. at 563, 224 A.2d 331.]
Defendant is attempting to delay the imposition of his death sentence in California by using as a shield the fact that he is serving his sentence in New Jersey. He seeks to force New Jersey to carry out its full punishment. This he cannot do. “He owe[s] a debt to two different sovereigns. Under our law these debts must be paid, and it is not up to the accused to determine in what order they should be paid.” Guerrieri, supra, 174 Ohio St. at 46, 186 N.E.2d at 618.
D
When a governor has exercised discretion to grant extradition, “judicial inquiry on a habeas corpus proceeding is limitecl to whether the extradition documents are on their face in order, whether the prisoner has been charged with a crime in the demanding state, whether the prisoner is the person requested for rendition, and whether the prisoner is a fugitive from the demanding state.” Basto, supra, 108 N.J. at 488, 531 A.2d 355 (citing Doran, supra, 439 U.S. at 289, 99 S.Ct. at 535, 58 L.Ed.2d at 527). “A governor’s grant of extradition is prima *290facie evidence that the constitutional and statutory requirements have been met.” Doran, supra, 439 U.S. at 289, 99 S.Ct. at 535, 58 L.Ed.2d at 527. Because defendant does not raise any objections based on the Doran factors, he fails to overcome the strong presumption that the warrant of extradition is valid.
Ill
Next we address defendant’s contention that his extradition is precluded by the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act (the Uniform Act), codified in New Jersey at N.J.S.A. 2A:160-6 to -35. Defendant calls our attention to N.J.S.A. 2A:160-10, which is based on section 2 of the Uniform Act. See 11 U.L.A. 61 (1936). Specifically he relies on the following ambiguously-worded proviso that was added to N.J.S.A. 2A:160-10 by L. 1940, c. 259:
[I]f the executive authority of any other state or district requests the extradition of any person charged in that state with murder, and that person is imprisoned in a penal institution or jail of this state for a term less than imprisonment for life, the governor of this state may deliver him or her up to the executive authority of the demanding state or district for the purpose of trial in said state or district; provided, however, that prior to the removal of the person from this state, the executive authority of the demanding state or district shall have agreed that the person so delivered up is to be returned immediately to this state, at the cost of the demanding state or district, to serve the balance of his or her term of imprisonment in the event of his or her acquittal in the demanding state, or in the event of his or her conviction in such state of manslaughter or any degree of murder the punishment for which is less than death or imprisonment for life. [Emphasis added.]
Application of N.J.S.A. 2A:160-10 clearly is limited to extradition “for the purpose of trial,” yet defendant reads the proviso to prohibit transfer of all prisoners who are serving life sentences in New Jersey, whether for trial or for punishment.
The text of the proviso mirrors the language of N.J.S.A. 2A:160-5. Its proper interpretation may be reached only by reading it in conjunction with that section, which provides in relevant part:
*291If any person charged with the crime of murder in this state is undergoing imprisonment in any other state, territory or district of the United States for a term less than imprisonment for life, and the governor of this state shall make demand for the return to this state of the person so charged, the governor may agree with the executive authority of such state, territory or district that, if the person so charged shall, on his trial in this state, be acquitted, or shall be convicted of the crime of manslaughter, or any degree of murder the punishment for which is less than death or imprisonment for life, such person shall be returned immediately to such other state, territory or district, at the expense of this state. The costs incident to the return of such person shall be borne by the county in which such person was tried for the crime of murder.
The manifest purpose of N.J.S.A. 2A:160-5, which was adopted in 1933, seven years before the proviso was added to N.J.S.A. 2A:160-10, is to permit the Governor of New Jersey to agree that this State will cover the cost of returning certain demanded prisoners to their asylum state if after trial they receive a New Jersey sentence less than death or life imprisonment. The proviso to section 10, in mirroring the language of section 5, merely intended to create a reciprocal burden on other states. Hence, nothing in N.J.S.A. 2A:160-10 prohibits the Governor from exercising his discretion to extradite a prisoner serving a life sentence in New Jersey to another state for that state to exact its punishment.
Although N.J.S.A. 2A:160-10 concerns only extradition for trial, the language of the proviso is indicative of how the Legislature would view this case concerning extradition for the purpose of punishment. The proviso states that the demanding state must return the prisoner to New Jersey “in the event of his or her acquittal in the demanding state, or in the event of his or her conviction in such state of manslaughter or any degree of murder the punishment for which is less than death or imprisonment for life.” If the prisoner is convicted and sentenced to death or life imprisonment in the demanding state, however, that state is free to retain the prisoner and exact its own punishment. Thus, the Legislature has expressed no interest in exacting full punishment from a prisoner serving a life sentence in New Jersey when the prisoner will receive the same or an even harsher punishment in another state.
*292If any section of the Uniform Act is implicated in this case, it is section 19, codified at N.J.S.A. 2A:160-27. That section provides:
If a criminal prosecution has been instituted against such person under the laws of this state and is still pending, the governor, in his discretion, either may surrender him on demand of the executive authority of another state or hold him until he has been tried and discharged or convicted and punished in this state.
As the dissent notes, “[t]hat provision permits the governor to extradite anyone prosecuted criminally by New Jersey when such prosecution ‘is still pending.’ ” Post at 289, 590 A.2d at 1136. But courts construing section 19 have found it “broad enough to cover rendition of a prisoner then serving his sentence.” E.g., In re Ierardi, 366 Mass. 640, 648, 321 N.E.2d 921, 926 (1975). Thus, although in the typical case section 19 allows the governor of the asylum state to extradite a prisoner to stand trial, see, e.g., Commonwealth ex. rel. Houser v. Seip, 385 Pa. 545, 124 A.2d 110, 115 (1956), that section also has been interpreted to permit extradition of a prisoner to allow the demanding state to exact its punishment. See, e.g., Koch v. O’Brien, 101 N.H. 11, 13, 131 A.2d 63, 64 (1957). The section reflects one of the guiding principles of the Uniform Act: the decision to extradite is a matter of comity between sister states. See State v. White, 131 Ariz. 228, 230, 639 P.2d 1053, 1055 (Ct.App.1981). Here, N.J.S.A. 2A:160-27 merely provides the Governor with the same option he had under general principles of extradition law: he could immediately extradite Robbins to California or he could delay extradition until Robbins has completed his sentence in New Jersey.
IV
Finally we consider defendant’s assertion that the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (the Agreement), codified at N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-1 to -15, precludes extradition under the circumstances of this case. Robbins argues that the Agreement provides the exclusive means for transferring a prisoner between jurisdictions, and that his transfer is precluded be*293cause it is not authorized by the Agreement. Because we conclude that the Agreement does not apply to this case, we reject defendant’s contention.
The purpose of the Agreement “is to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of indictments, informations or complaints pending against defendants already incarcerated in other jurisdictions.” State v. Brockington, 89 N.J.Super. 423, 428-29, 215 A.2d 362 (App.Div.1965). California does not seek rendition in this case to place Robbins on trial for outstanding criminal charges; rather, it wishes to carry out its already-pending sentence. As the court observed in Johnson v. Williams, 508 F.Supp. 52, 55 (D.N.J.1980), aff'd, 666 F.2d 842 (3d Cir.1981), “Detainers lodged to obtain custody for the purpose of serving a sentence are not within the scope of the Agreement at all.” See also State v. Evans, 235 N.J.Super. 189, 193, 561 A.2d 1174 (App.Div.1989) (detainer that sought custody of defendant for completion of sentence rather than to face pending criminal charges “clearly does not come within the scope of the Agreement”). Defendant’s argument that the Agreement provides the exclusive means of transferring prisoners is without merit.
V
We hold that as a matter of comity, the decision to extradite a prisoner serving a New Jersey sentence to a demanding state to allow that state to exact its punishment before the prisoner completes his sentence here is within the discretion of the Governor of New Jersey. Nothing in the Uniform Act or the Agreement prohibits extradition under those circumstances.
The record is uninformative, however, on whether when the former Governor decided in favor of Robbins’ extradition, the Governor and his counsel applied the same legal principles bearing on his decision as we do now, those principles not having been hitherto explicated in any opinion of this Court. More specifically, the record does not contain findings demon*294strating that the Governor was aware that the circumstances did not mandate extradition and left him free to exercise his discretion either to sign or refuse to sign the warrant. As noted above, supra at 290, 590 A.2d at 1137, the exercise of such executive power is presumptively correct and thereby in accord with correct legal principles. Of course, it remains open to the parties to request that the matter be reconsidered anew in light of the principles set forth in this opinion.
Judgment affirmed.