dissenting.
I agree with my colleagues that the averments contained in the complaint filed by Pittsburgh Coal & Coke, Inc. (P.C.C.) against Coldren, DeHaas & Raclifee and its partners (the Coldren firm) fails to set forth a cause of action upon which relief can be granted. Pa.R.C.P. 1017(b)(4). Balsbaugh v. Rowland, 447 Pa. 423, 290 A.2d 85 (1972). I would also agree that P.C.C. has failed to aver fraud with particularity as required by Pa.R.C.P. 1019(b).
*311The complaint was dismissed without affording P.C.C. any opportunity to amend, however. I must respectfully dissent.
It has long been the law to liberally grant leave to parties to amend their pleadings. Pa.R.C.P. 1028(c), 1033. Otto v. American Mutual Insurance Co., 482 Pa. 202, 393 A.2d 450 (1978); MacGregor v. Mediq Inc., 395 Pa.Super. 221, 576 A.2d 1123 (1990). Although the decision of whether to grant leave to amend a pleading is a matter of judicial discretion, such amendments should be allowed at any stage of the proceedings to secure a decision on the merits, unless they violate the law or unfairly prejudice the rights of the other party. Id.
In Pennsylvania, a suit in trespass on a theory of negligence may be maintained against attorneys where either an attorney client relationship or a specific undertaking by the attorney furnishing professional services is shown. Guy v. Liederbach, 501 Pa. 47, 459 A.2d 744 (1983); Lawall v. Groman, 180 Pa. 532, 37 A. 98 (1897).
In this case, P.C.C. alleges that the Coldren firm, serving as legal counsel for an individual, a general partnership, and a corporation, each of whom are defendants in this action, drafted certain deeds for property pledged as security for the performance of certain obligations by the parties. The deeds were placed with an escrow agent on the representation that the grantor individual, Fred A. Cuteri (Cuteri), personally owned a one-half interest in the properties. The complaint further alleges that the Coldren firm had previously prepared a deed covering the same pledged property, which earlier deed transferred Cuteri’s interest into a partnership. The complaint also avers that the Coldren firm had, before the execution of the escrow agreement under which the agent held the later deeds, conducted a lien search. The Coldren firm had advised P.C.C.’s counsel that they had found no mortgages indexed against any of the parties and the only liens found had nothing to do with the property to be held in escrow for the benefit of P.C.C.
*312Although Pennsylvania might still be thought to adhere to the traditional rule requiring privity of contract, see Guy v. Liederbach, supra, the facts already set forth in the complaint now before us present a classic case of negligent misrepresentation at the very least. It can be inferred from the complaint that P.C.C. would not have entered into the escrow agreement without assurances that the deeds placed in escrow were capable of conveying good title in the event the defendants failed to perform under their agreement. Where, as here, the Coldren firm secures information and transmits it to a third party, knowing that the third party will rely on it to govern its future decisions and actions, its not entirely clear that an attorney-client relationship does not exist between the Coldren firm and P.C.C. Compare Greycas, Inc. v. Proud, 826 F.2d 1560 (7th Cir.1987) (Illinois rule—one who in the course of his business or profession supplies information for the guidance of others in their business transactions is liable for negligent misrepresentations that induce detrimental reliance.)
When a lawyer at the direction of her client prepares an opinion letter which is addressed to a third party or which expressly invites the third party’s reliance, she engages in a form of limited representation of that third party. Crossland Savings FSB v. Rockwood Insurance Co., 700 F.Supp. 1274, 1282 (S.D.N.Y.1988). There can be no question but that the letter from the Coldren firm attached to the complaint as Exhibit H is an opinion letter. The letter states that a lien check was performed and that no liens or mortgages were found having anything to do with the property to be held in escrow. Given the allegation in the complaint that the same firm which made the lien check had prepared the earlier deed divesting Cuteri of an exclusive one-half interest in the property, it does not seem unreasonable to expect that the firm would have alerted P.C.C. to the defective title.
At the very least, I firmly believe that the plaintiff should have been afforded the opportunity to amend its complaint *313in order to set forth sufficient facts to establish its claim upon which relief might be granted.
I must expressly disagree with my colleagues’ emphasis on the distinction between a “lien” search and a “title” search. We here review preliminary objections, not an order granting or denying summary judgment. Without affording the plaintiff at least one opportunity to amend its pleading, we should refrain from speculating as to whether the Coldren firm did, or did not, do “exactly what it appears it was required to do in notifying the Plaintiff of having performed a ‘lien’ check of the property.”
I would not be as quick as my colleagues to conclude, by way of footnote, that no amount of alteration would overcome the preliminary objections given the allegations made. Opinion, page 796 n. 5. It is not our role, on review, to fashion averments which, if included in a pleading, would render that pleading sufficient. Nevertheless, it would take little additional averments, in my judgment, to demonstrate either an attorney-client relationship or a specific undertaking. I believe the majority concedes as much. Moreover, it would not be irresponsible to revisit Guy v. Liederbach, supra, given the “rapidly eroding doctrine of privity.” Id., McDermott, J., dissenting.
The Coldren firm prepared the no-lien letter knowing its intended use. The firm had previously prepared a deed which, when recorded, operated to convert the deeds in escrow into worthless documents. The firm voluntarily assumed a relationship with P.C.C. when it issued its no-lien letter. P.C.C. should be afforded the opportunity to plead whatever additional facts are in its possession surrounding these transactions.
I would: (a) affirm so much of the order of July 9, 1990 (entered July 13, 1990) as sustained Preliminary Objections I and II of the Coldren firm, (b) reverse that portion of the order which dismissed all claims against the Coldren firm, and (c) remand for further consideration of Preliminary Objections III through VI, without prejudice to P.C.C.’s right to seek and secure amendment of the complaint fol*314lowing any subsequent order of the trial court. Hence this dissent.