Transportation Insurance v. South Carolina Second Injury Fund

Justice PLEICONES,

concurring in part and dissenting in part in a separate opinion.

I dissent in part and concur in part, and would affirm the decisions of the Workers’ Compensation Commission (Commission) holding that S.C.Code Ann. § 15-3-600 (2005) is inapplicable to these reimbursement requests.

Chapter 3 of Title 15, entitled “Limitation of Civil Actions,” is concerned with the time periods, i.e. statutes of limitation, within which a ‘civil action’ can be commenced. A “civil action” within the meaning of Title 15 is brought in a court, and is “commenced when the summons and complaint are filed with the clerk of court ...” S.C.Code Ann. § 15-3-20(B) *433(2005). See also Rule 2, SCRCP: “There shall be one form of action to be known as civil action”; compare McDowell v. S.C. Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 304 S.C. 539, 405 S.E.2d 830 (1991) (administrative proceeding is a civil action for purposes of the attorney’s fees statute once it reaches circuit court, but not while before agency). On the other hand, a claim for reimbursement from the Fund is made by written notice to the Commission and to the Director of the Fund. S.C.Code Ann. § 42-9-400(f) (Supp.2009). I agree with the Commission that S.C.Code Ann. § 15-3-600, the default statute of limitations provision for civil actions, is irrelevant to the question whether carriers timely pursued their reimbursement claims from the Fund.

The majority also holds that it is following Greenwood Mills, Inc. v. Second Injury Fund, 315 S.C. 256, 433 S.E.2d 846 (1993) by applying “the default statute of limitations [i.e. § 15-3-600] according to its express terms.” As I read Greenwood Mills, it holds that the statute of limitations found in S.C.Code Ann. § 42-15-40 did not apply to Fund reimbursement claims, but that those claims were timely so long as they are made within the period provided by S.C.Code Ann. § 42-9-400(f) (Supp.2009). Here, all the carriers gave proper and timely notice as required by § 42-9-400. In my opinion, Greenwood Mills does not support the majority’s conclusion that a Fund reimbursement request is a “civil action” within the meaning of Title 15.

In light of my view that the Commission correctly found § 15-3-600 inapplicable, I would not reach the accrual issue. Moreover, I agree with the majority that neither the laches question nor the Yuasa Exide issue is preserved for our appellate review.

I concur in part and dissent in part.

Acting Justice JAMES E. MOORE, concurs.