Opinion by
Mr. Justice Chidsey,The plaintiff, Harold J. Wiegand, individually as a citizen of the County of Montgomery, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and as editorial writer for The Philadelphia Inquirer Division of Triangle Publications, Inc., with the consent of the Attorney General, filed a bill in equity against The Barnes Foundation and the individual defendants who comprise its officers and trustees, averring that the latter were not carrying out the purposes for which the Foundation was incorporated as a corporation of the first class. The defendants filed an answer raising a number of preliminary objections to the bill, two of which the lower court, composed of four judges sitting en banc, sustained, and entered a final decree dismissing the bill. From this decree the plaintiff has appealed.
Dr. Albert C. Barnes, now deceased, was the progenitor of The Barnes Foundation, and following the grant of its charter on December 4, 1922, by indenture and agreement dated December 6, 1922, conveyed to the Foundation certain real estate on which was erected a large art gallery and other buildings, and transferred and delivered to the Foundation his valuable and outstanding collection of works of art consisting, inter alia, of hundreds of paintings, drawings, etchings and lithographs. In addition, he gave to the Foundation large sums of money and securities. The indenture and agreement contained conditions and stipulations under which the donation was made and received by the corporation, and as provided therein, was made a part of the by-laws of the corporation. The primary purpose of the incorporation, as set forth in the Foundation’s charter, was “to promote the advancement of education and the appreciation of the fine arts.”.
The gravamen of plaintiff’s complaint is that the Barnes Foundation is a charitable institution exempt *152from taxation and that the manner in which it is administered by the officers and board of trustees (all of the officers are members of the board) so drastically limits access to the art gallery by the public as to defeat the purposes for which the corporation was founded.1
The preliminary objections sustained by the court below challenged the bill on the ground that the deed of gift and the by-laws of the corporation confer discretionary powers upon the trustees in the management of the corporation and its assets, and in the exercise of these discretionary powers the court may not interfere unless the trustees are guilty of bad faith.
While we are in accord with the conclusion reached by the court below on the merits of the bill, we are of opinion that the bill should have been dismissed for want of a proper party plaintiff by sustaining defendants’ preliminary objection that “. . . The person named *153as plaintiff in said Amended Bill, to wit, Harold J. Wiegand, either individually or as editorial writer for The Philadelphia Inquirer Division of Triangle Publications, Inc., is not alleged to be a member of the defendant corporation, to wit, The Barnes Foundation, nor to have any right or interest therein other than such right or interest, if any, which he may hold in common with other members of the general public. ...”.
In the absence of statutory authority, no person whose interest is only that held in common with other members of the public, can compel the performance of a duty owed by the corporation to the public. Only a member of the corporation itself or someone having a special interest therein or the Commonwealth, acting through the Attorney General, is qualified to bring an action of such nature. In the early case of The Buck Mountain Coal Company v. The Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company, 50 Pa. 91, this Court, at p. 99, speaking through Mr. Justice Thompson, said: “There are many authorities in England and in this country which deny the right of private parties in their own names — in the absence of special laws — when their interests are only in common with the public, to compel the performance of a duty to the public. The reason is, that if one individual may interpose, any other may, and as the decision in one individual case would be no bar to any other, there would be no end to litigation and strife. The general laws of order so necessary to good government forbid anything like this.”. As a matter of public policy we see no reason for departing from this sound concept. No cases have been cited by appellant in this or any other jurisdiction of contrary import.
In Healy v. Loomis Institute, 128 A. 774 (1925), the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut at p. 778 said: “So that if the trustees do not pursue the objects *154of the charity, or abuse the charity by violating its franchises, its charter or act of incorporation, or the conditions attached to it or by the perversion of its funds, the court of chancery will intervene and compel the trustees to establish or execute the trust in accordance with their power under the charter or act of incorporation and in accordance with the law of the land. The Attorney General is the proper person to have brought this action, and the bill in equity a proper remedy. . . .”.
In State ex rel. Heddens v. Rusk, 139 S.W. 199 (1911), the Supreme Court of Missouri at p. 203 said: “. . . At such time as his [the chancellor’s] power is invoked to construe the trust instrument or to restrain an abuse, of power on the part of such trustees, or correct a negligent performance of duty whereby the estate is put in peril or diverted, or to remove or suspend an unfaithful trustee, or to protect and conserve the corpus of the trust estate from being dissipated or lost, he may move only at the instance of the Attorney General who moves on behalf of the people, or at the instance of some other proper party, whereby he grants relief on due process of law on giving parties their day in court. The proceedings complained of in the instant case are not of that sort.”.
In MacKenzie et al. v. Trustees of Presbytery of Jersey City, 61 A. 1027 (N. J. 1905) at p. 1041 the following language appears: “In the case in hand the persons interested in the estate or fund, being an indefinite or fluctuating body, are properly represented only by the Attorney General; and only he or the Presbytery of Jersey City, by and through the body charged with the duties of trusteeship, or some member of that body, can acquire or have a standing to invoke the action of the courts touching the due administration of the trusts. . .
*155Section 391 of Restatement, Trusts, states: “A suit can be maintained for the enforcement of a charitable trust by the Attorney General or other public officer, or by a co-trustee, or by a person who has a special interest in the enforcement of the charitable trust, but not by persons who have no special interest or by the settlor or his heirs, personal representatives or next of kin.”. Comment d reads: “A suit for the enforcement of a charitable trust cannot be maintained by persons who have no special interest in the enforcement of the trust. The mere fact that as members of the public they benefit from the enforcement of the trust is not a sufficient ground to entitle them to sue, since a suit on their behalf can be maintained by the Attorney General.”.
The appellant relies upon the consent of the Attorney General to the filing of the bill. The protection of the public generally against the failure of a corporation to perform the duties required by its charter is the concern of the sovereign, and any action undertaken for such purpose must be by the Attorney General on its behalf. In the absence of statutory authority, the Attorney General may not delegate the conduct or control of the suit.
Appellant claims that there is statutory authority for his instituting the bill with the consent of the Attorney General and points to the Estates Act of 1947, P. L. 100, §10, 20 PS §301.10, which, according to the Joint State Government Commission’s comment, is intended to supplant the provisions of §10 of the Act of April 26, 1855, P. L. 328, as amended by the Act of May 23, 1895, P. L. 114, §1, 10 PS §13. The provisions referred to in all of the Acts mentioned have tó do with the application of the cy pres doctrine. Under the Act of 1855, as amended by the Act of 1895, it was required that proceedings be instituted “by leave of the Attor*156ney General”. Section 10 of the Act of 1947 provides: “Except as otherwise provided by the conveyor, if the charitable purpose for which an interest shall be conveyed shall be or become indefinite or impossible or impractical of fulfilment, or if it shall not have been carried out for want of a trustee or because of the failure of a trustee to designate such purpose, the court may, on application of the trustee or of any interested person or of the Attorney General of the Commonwealth, after proof of notice to the Attorney General of the Commonwealth when he is not the petitioner, order an administration or distribution of the estate for a charitable purpose in a manner as nearly as possible to fulfill the intention of the conveyor, whether his charitable intent be general or specific.”.
It is extremely doubtful that plaintiff is an “interested person” within the intendment of the Act, but assuming that he is, it is clear that the charitable purpose of The Barnes Foundation is not and has not become “indefinite or impossible or impractical of fulfilment” and the other contingencies provided for in the Act are not here present. The trust has not failed. Its objects and the administrative provisions for their accomplishment were before this Court when it was approved as a charitable institution in Barnes Foundation v. Keely et al., 314 Pa. 112, Footnote 1, supra. Appellant’s bill does not seek application of the cy pres doctrine because of alleged failure of the trust, but complains of the manner in 'which the Foundation is being administered as being violative of its corporate purposes. The prayer of the bill is that the court require the trustees to adopt different administrative rules and regulations. .Even if there were substance to appellant’s complaint, suit by the Attorney General would be required and his mere consent to action by the appellant clearly insufficient. ' . .
*157Cases cited by appellant do not support Ms contention that he had a standing to institute the proceeding because of the consent of the Attorney General nor are they in conflict with our conclusion. The litigation in Williams Estate, 353 Pa. 638, 46 A. 2d 237, arose following the audit of the account of an executrix and involved the invocation of the cy pres doctrine. In Spring Garden Institute v. Wanamaker Institute, etc., et al., 56 D. & C. 406, the plaintiff invoked the cy pres doctrine alleging forfeiture of the trust through abandonment by defendant of its charitable purposes. In Abel et al., Trustees v. Girard Trust Company, Trustee, 365 Pa. 34, 73 A. 2d 682, the proceeding was a bill in equity to quiet title and the plaintiffs who were trustees had a direct special interest in the matter.
The dismissal of the bill is affirmed at appellant’s cost.
Mr. Justice Bell dissents.The Foundation’s charter and the provisions for its administration under the by-laws (which incorporated the indenture and agreement) were before this Court in Barnes Foundation v. Keely et at., 314 Pa. 112, 171 A. 267, wherein a bill in equity was filed by the Foundation to restrain the collection of real estate taxes on a property owned by it in Philadelphia. The taxing authorities resisted the exemption, contending that the Foundation was not a purely public charity because, inter alia, “The property of the Barnes Foundation is not open to the public.”. In commenting on this contention, Mr. Justice Kephart quoted the opinion of the president judge of the trial court as follows: “ ‘It must be borne in mind that the gallery is used not as an art gallery as that term is ordinarily understood, but that it is an integral part of a new educational experiment, and the unrestricted admission of the public would be as detrimental to the work of The Barnes Foundation as it would be to the work carried on in the laboratories and clinics of the University of Pennsylvania. A clear conception of this fundamental destination [distinction] will aid in understanding the educational work of The Barnes Foundation.’ ”, It was held that the Foundation was entitled to tax exemption as a purely public charity.