dissenting.
Today a majority of this Court acts contrary to explicit statutory language and legislative intent in order to achieve this outcome. Because I am not willing to read into statutes language that simply is not there, I dissent.
By its unambiguous language, the General Assembly has emphasized the overriding legislative goals of promoting the finality of adoptions and making primary the best interests of the child when construing Chapter 48. N.C.G.S. § 48-1-100 (2009). To that end, a final adoption decree that was not appealed may be set aside at a date as late as the one here only if the natural parent shows by clear and convincing evidence within six months of the reasonable date of discovery that his or her consent was obtained by fraud or duress. Id. § 48-2-607(c) (2009). Defendant Melissa Ann Jarrell has made no such allegations, and indeed, the record plainly shows her active, informed, and voluntary consent to plaintiff Julia Boseman’s adoption of .the minor child. As such, defendant can present no serious argument that any provision in Chapter 48 would authorize a court to set aside the adoption after the passage of so much time.
Instead, defendant contends that the adoption is void ab initio, despite conceding that the jurisdictional requirements set forth in N.C.G.S. § 48-2-100 were fully satisfied here. According to defendant, in reasoning largely adopted by the majority opinion, the trial court stripped itself of subject matter jurisdiction by exceeding its statutory authority under Chapter 48 when it allowed defendant to waive the provisions in N.C.G.S. § 48-l-106(c) (stating that a legal effect of an adoption decree is to sever the relationship between the adoptee and his natural parents) and § 48-3-606(9) (requiring the natural parent’s consent to include a recognition that the adoption decree will terminate all parental rights with respect to the minor child). Defendant offers no authority for this approach to subject matter jurisdiction, and I have found none. Instead, the majority opinion *555today creates an entirely new formulation of the law of subject matter jurisdiction.
The underlying premise of the majority’s holding, that the trial court was not authorized under Chapter 48 to waive the provisions of N.C.G.S. § 48-l-106(c) and § 48-3-606(9) concerning termination of defendant’s parental rights, at most could amount to an error of law. Our case law makes clear that any such error would neither divest the trial court of, nor even implicate, its subject matter jurisdiction or authority to grant the relief sought by the parties, namely, plaintiff’s adoption of the minor child. As such, I conclude that the adoption decree was not void, but merely voidable and subject to the statutory time limits for appeal. Because this challenge is time-barred, I would affirm the Court of Appeals.
When outlining the general adoption procedure in Chapter 48, the General Assembly specifically included a section titled “Jurisdiction,” which states in pertinent part:
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, jurisdiction over adoption proceedings commenced under this Chapter exists if, at the commencement of the proceeding:
(1) The adoptee has lived in this State for at least the six consecutive months immediately preceding the filing of the petition or from birth, and the prospective adoptive parent is domiciled in this State; or
(2) The prospective adoptive parent has lived in or been domiciled in this State for at least the six consecutive months immediately preceding the filing of the petition.
Id. § 48-2-100 (2005) (emphasis added).3 These are the only statutory requirements before a North Carolina court may exercise jurisdiction over adoption proceedings. Here the trial court found as fact, properly affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that plaintiff, defendant, and the minor child all fulfilled the North Carolina residency requirements necessary to establish the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction over the adoption under N.C.G.S. § 48-2-100. No party disputes *556that these statutory requirements were met, or challenges the trial court’s personal jurisdiction over the parties.
The majority acknowledges that the General Assembly specifically enacted a section in Chapter 48 entitled “Jurisdiction” and that those requirements were fully met here. The majority then reads into that section an additional requirement that does not actually appear in Chapter 48, to wit: that the trial court may not enter an order waiving certain statutory provisions. Based upon this new requirement, the majority then determines that the district court divested itself of jurisdiction by entering such an order, even though the statutory requirements for jurisdiction were satisfied. As such, reasons the majority, this adoption decree is void ah initio rather than potentially voidable for error. This new approach to subject matter jurisdiction — to ignore the statutory requisites and instead create our own — runs counter to the language of N.C.G.S. § 48-2-100, and decades of jurisprudence on subject matter jurisdiction. Indeed, had the General Assembly intended such a requirement, the “Jurisdiction” section makes obvious that legislators are more than capable of drafting it.
The Court’s holding today implies that a court may be stripped of • subject matter jurisdiction by its own action, a conclusion inconsistent with long-standing case law:
Once the jurisdiction of a court . . . attaches, the general rule is that it will not be ousted by subsequent events. . . . Jurisdiction is not a light bulb which can be turned off or on during the course of the trial. Once a court acquires jurisdiction over an action it retains jurisdiction over that action throughout the proceeding. ... If the converse of this were true, it would be within the power of the defendant to preserve or destroy jurisdiction of the court at his own whim.
See In re Peoples, 296 N.C. 109, 146, 250 S.E.2d 890, 911 (1978) (third alteration in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 929, 61 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1979). Moreover, if the trial court lacked jurisdiction ab initio, then the order defendant now uses to challenge the validity of the adoption must itself be void and of no effect. As such, that order could not serve as the basis for successfully challenging the jurisdiction of the court. In holding that the order does so serve, the majority adopts circular reasoning and has allowed this defendant to “destroy jurisdiction of the court at *557[her] own whim,” by asking the district court to enter the order she now claims deprived it of jurisdiction.4 Id.
In my view, defendant’s arguments that the adoption is void ab initio, making it “a nullity [which] may' be attacked either directly or collaterally,” State v. Sams, 317 N.C. 230, 235, 345 S.E.2d 179, 182 (1986) (citations omitted), must necessarily fail in light of the long-established rule that “[a]n order is void ab initio only when it is issued by a court that does not have jurisdiction,” id.-, see also Travis v. Johnston, 244 N.C. 713, 719-20, 95 S.E.2d 94, 99 (1956) (“To have validity a judgment must be rendered by a court which has authority to hear and determine the questions in dispute and control over the parties to the controversy or their interest in the property which is the subject matter of the controversy. When these tests are met, the judgment rendered by the court is not void.” (citations omitted)).
A judgment is not rendered void ab initio, nor is a trial court divested of subject matter jurisdiction or authority to enter a judgment, because of a failure to follow proper procedure or even because of an error of law. See Ellis v. Ellis, 190 N.C. 418, 422, 130 S.E. 7, 9 (1925) (noting “the established principle that where the court has jurisdiction of both the subject-matter and the parties and acts within its power, the binding force and effect of a judgment is not impaired because the same has been erroneously allowed, though the error may be undoubted and apparent on the face of the record” (citations omitted)); Peoples v. Norwood, 94 N.C. 162, 166, 94 N.C. 167, 172 (1886) (“[W]hen the parties are voluntarily before the [c]ourt, and ... a judgment is entered in favor of one party and against another, such judgment is valid, although not granted according to the orderly course of procedure.” (citations omitted)).
While a void judgment “is in legal effect no judgment,” as “[i]t neither binds nor bars any one, and all proceedings founded upon it are worthless,” Hart v. Thomasville Motors, Inc., 244 N.C. 84, 90, 92 S.E.2d 673, 678 (1956) (citation and quotation marks omitted), “[a]n erroneous judgment should be corrected by appeal or certiorari,” Ellis, 190 N.C. at 422, 130 S.E. at 9; see also Daniels v. Montgomery *558Mut. Ins. Co., 320 N.C. 669, 676, 360 S.E.2d 772, 777 (1987) (“ ‘An irregular order, one issued contrary to the method of practice and procedure established by law, is voidable.’ . . . An erroneous order may be remedied by appeal; it may not be attacked collaterally.” (citations omitted)); Worthington v. Wooten, 242 N.C. 88, 92, 86 S.E.2d 767, 770 (1955) (stating that a judgment, “even if irregular or even erroneous was binding on the parties, unless set aside or reversed on appeal. . . provided the court had jurisdiction of the person and the subject matter.” (citations omitted)); see also Sawyer v. Slack, 196 N.C. 697, 146 S.E. 864 (1929) (holding that, partly because of the strong public policy in favor of marriage and maintaining familial relationships and rights, the marriage of an underage female without the parental consent required by statute was not void but voidable).
The time limits for appeal or challenge to this adoption must be read in accordance with the General Assembly’s forceful statement of legislative intent in the opening section of Chapter 48, notably not mentioned in the majority opinion:
Legislative findings and intent; construction of Chapter
(a) The General Assembly finds that it is in the public interest to establish a clear judicial process for adoptions, to promote the integrity and, finality of adoptions, to encourage prompt, conclusive disposition of adoption proceedings, and to structure services to adopted children, biological parents, and adoptive parents that will provide for the needs and protect the interests of all parties to an adoption, particularly adopted minors.
(b) With special regard for the adoption of minors, the General Assembly declares as a matter of legislative policy that:
(1) The primary purpose of this Chapter is to advance the welfare of minors by (i) protecting minors from unnecessary separation from their original parents, (ii) facilitating the adoption of minors in need of adoptive placement by persons who can give them love, care, security, and support, (iii) protecting minors from placement with adoptive parents unfit to have responsibility for their care and rearing, and (iv) assuring the finality of the adoption; and
(2) Secondary purposes of this Chapter are (i) to protect biological parents from ill-advised decisions to relinquish a child or consent to the child’s adoption, (ii) to protect *559adoptive parents from assuming responsibility for a child about whose heredity or mental or physical condition they know nothing, (iii) to protect the privacy of the parties to the adoption, and (iv) to discourage unlawful trafficking in minors and other unlawful placement activities.
N.C.G.S. § 48-1-100 (emphases added); see also In re Adoption of Anderson, 360 N.C. 271, 275-76, 624 S.E.2d 626, 628 (2006) (noting that “the General Assembly recognized the public interest in establishing a clear judicial process for adoptions” and “promoting the integrity and finality of adoptions” (citation, internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted)).
Consistent with its legislative intent “to establish a clear judicial process for adoptions,” including the “prompt, conclusive disposition of adoption proceedings,” id. § 48-l-100(a), and its primary purpose of “assuring the finality of’ adoptions, id. § 48-l-100(b)(l), the General Assembly mandated carefully delineated time limits and circumstances for appeals or challenges to a final adoption. Direct appeal of an adoption decree entered by a district court judge is allowed if filed within thirty days after the adoption becomes final, id. § 48-2-607(b) (2009), or within six months of the time a natural parent’s consent or relinquishment “was obtained” or “ought reasonably to have been discovered” to have been obtained “by fraud or duress,” id. § 48-2-607(c). A natural parent may also revoke his or her consent within seven days of a consent to adoption, id. § 48-3-608(a) (2009), or within five days after receipt of a preplacement assessment in a direct placement adoption, id. § 48-3-608(b) (2009). A consent is void if clear and convincing evidence establishes that it was obtained by fraud or duress, or if the parties mutually agree to set it aside, if the petition to adopt is voluntarily dismissed with prejudice, or.if the court dismisses the petition to adopt and either no appeal is taken or the dismissal is affirmed on appeal and all appeals have been exhausted. Id. § 48-3-609(a) (2009).
Outside these specific situations, however, the General Assembly explicitly prohibits any challenge after a final order of adoption is entered. Through the unequivocal language of the section of Chapter 48 titled “Appeals,” the legislature has established its preference for the finality of adoptions over correcting procedural irregularities:
(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) of this section, after the final order of adoption is entered, no party to an adoption proceeding nor anyone claiming under such a party *560may question the validity of the adoption because of any defect or irregularity, jurisdictional or otherwise, in the proceeding, but shall be fully bound by the order. No adoption may be .attacked either directly or collaterally because of any procedural or other defect by anyone who was not a party to the adoption. The failure on the part of the court or an agency to perform duties or acts within the time required by the provisions of this Chapter shall not affect the validity of any adoption proceeding.
Id. § 48-2-607(a) (2009) (emphasis added).5 This strong preference is further evidenced in provisions that sanction final adoption decrees despite omissions of required information and vesting courts with a certain degree of leeway to determine compliance with statutory requirements. See, e.g., id. § 48-2-306(b) (2009) (“After entry of a decree of adoption, omission of any information required [to be in the adoption petition, including consent and/or relinquishments] by G.S. 48-2-304 and G.S. 48-2-305 does not invalidate the decree.” (emphasis added)); id. § 48-2-603(a)(4) (2009) (providing that, at the hearing on or “[e]ach necessary consent, relinquishment, waiver, or judicial order terminating parental rights, has been obtained and filed . .. and the time for revocation has expired”).
Here, despite the passage of so much time, defendant would have us invalidate the adoption decree, even though she expressly consented to any irregularity, and even though taking such action is contrary to statutory language prioritizing finality over strict procedural compliance. Defendant first sought to challenge plaintiffs adoption of the minor child in a custody proceeding in May 2007, nearly two years after the final adoption decree was entered in August 2005, and well after expiration of the time limits for an appeal specified in N.C.G.S. § 48-2-607. The waivers she now disclaims should fall squarely within the General Assembly’s prohibition against untimely *561appeals claiming “any defect or irregularity, jurisdictional or otherwise.” Id. § 48-2-607(a). Nothing in the statutory language itself supports defendant’s position, or the majority’s endorsement of it. Rather, such a holding is contrary'to the unequivocally stated primary legislative goal of assuring the finality of adoptions.6
The holding here likewise runs afoul of the General Assembly’s categorical directive that Chapter 48 be construed in a manner to ensure that “the needs, interests, and rights of minor adoptees are primary.” N.C.G.S. § 48-7-100(c) (emphasis added). Moreover, the legislature has instructed that “[a]ny conflict between the interests of a minor adoptee and those of an adult shall be resolved in favor of the minor,” id. (emphasis added), and Chapter 48 should be “liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies,” N.C.G.S. § 48-l-100(d), such as “the integrity and finality of adoptions” and the “prompt, conclusive disposition of adoption proceedings,” id. § 48-l-100(a).
These provisions are plain and unambiguous, and appear in statutory text. By contrast, there is neither an explicit prohibition against, nor an explicit authorization of, the waivers at issue here. In the absence of any statutory language indicating legislative intent regarding these waivers, we must be guided by the legislative priorities we do know and thus act to safeguard the best interests of this child by barring this late challenge and promoting the finality of this adoption. Reading into Chapter 48 a jurisdictional requirement that is not there, the majority overlooks the interests of this child and promotes defendant’s rights over those of the child, in direct contravention of the law as written.
CONCLUSION
The majority decision here is at odds with the timetables and express intent of Chapter 48, as well as prior case law on the finality of adoptions. I would hold that at all pertinent times the trial court had jurisdiction, that this appeal is time-barred, and that the adoption decree must stand. Accordingly, I would affirm the Court of Appeals.
. This statutory language was in effect when the petition for adoption was filed in this case, and subsequent amendments to remove barriers to adoption of North Carolina children by residents of other states, see Act. of Oct. 1, 2007, ch. 151, sec. 2, 2007 N.C. Sess. Laws 255, 255-56; N.C.G.S. § 48-2-100 (2009), do not affect my analysis here.
. Although not argued here, this Court in an unrelated case has applied the doctrine of judicial estoppel to bind a party to a settlement he acknowledged (unsworn) in open court and later refused to perform. Powell v. City of Newton, — N.C. —, S.E.2d — (2010) (No. 482A09). The Court of Appeals and ultimately this Court applied the doctrine even though it was not argued in the trial court or the Court of Appeals. Here, Jarrell sought, in a verified pleading, the order she now repudiates, arguably an even clearer scenario in which to apply estoppel.
. Citing to, but not quoting, this statute, the majority maintains that “the legislature’s words ‘no party,’ ‘defect’ and ‘irregularity’ indicate that this statute is designed to foreclose ‘waivable’ challenges in a court with subject matter jurisdiction.” I reiterate that statement here, while including the actual statutory language, to highlight that the majority must necessarily read words (at least the word “waivable”) into N.C.G.S. § 48-2-607, while ignoring the words “any” and “fully bound,” as well as the lack of a qualifier for “jurisdictional,” in order to reach its interpretation of this purported legislative intent.
This approach is at odds with the majority’s reliance on In re D.L.H., which states the maxim that when a statute is clear and unambiguous, “there is no room for judicial construction and the courts must give the statute its plain and definite meaning, and are without power to interpolate, or superimpose, provisions and limitations not contained therein.” 364 N.C. 214, 221, 694 S.E.2d 753, 757 (2010) (citation omitted).
. I note as well that this Court has previously considered, and rejected, untimely challenges to final adoption decrees that assert the decree is void for lack of jurisdiction. See Hicks v. Russell, 256 N.C. 34, 40-41, 123 S.E.2d 214, 219 (1961); see also Fakhoury v. Fakhoury, 171 N.C. App. 104, 613 S.E.2d 729 (rejecting as irrelevant due to the untimeliness of the appeal the argument that “public policy opposes a stepparent adoption when the stepparent, at the time of filing the petition for adoption, does not intend to stay in the marriage with the legal parent”), disc. rev. denied, 360 N.C. 62, 621 S.E.2d 622 (2005).