dissenting.
Differing from my brethren’s view of the nature, and their disposition, of this cause, I respectfully dissent. Unlike them, I do not view the cause as an attempt by Lawrence Systems, Inc., by and through its successor-in-interest, Douglas-Guardian Warehouse Corp., to “enforce” against Superior Feeders, Inc., O.C. Elliott, and Herbert Vogel an Oklahoma judgment, the filing and enforcement of which are barred by the limitation provisions of Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Annotated § 16.066 (Vernon 1986).1 Rather, in my view, the cause presents the narrower question whether section 16.066 bars the filing of the 1992 Oklahoma judgment under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code Annotated §§ 35.001-35.-008 (Vernon 1986) (the Act).2 I conclude that it does not; thus, I would reverse and render.
The events leading to the signing of the Oklahoma judgment on 23 September 1992 are adequately recorded in the majority opinion. It suffices to state that before the judgment was signed, there was only the Oklahoma jury verdict filed with the court clerk on 22 March 1977. Although the verdict was treated as, and given the authority of, a final, enforceable judgment in Oklahoma, see Lawrence Systems v. Superior Feeders, 837 P.2d 488 (Okl.App.1992), neither section 16.066 nor any other statute authorized the filing of the verdict in Texas as a foreign judgment. Then, not until the Oklahoma judgment was signed on 23 September 1992 was there a foreign judgment which could be filed pursuant to section 16.066.
Thereafter, on 29 October 1992, Lawrence Systems,3 following the procedure specified by the Act, filed its notice of filing of the September 23 foreign judgment with the 222nd Judicial District Court of Deaf Smith County, Texas. The filing activated these pertinent provisions of the Act:
(b) The clerk shall treat the foreign judgment in the same manner as a judgment of the court in which the foreign judgment is filed.
(c) A filed foreign judgment has the same effect and is subject to the same procedures, defenses, and proceedings for reopening, vacating, staying, enforcing, or satisfying a judgment as a judgment of the court in which it is filed.
Tex.Civ.Prae. & Rem.Code Ann. § 35.003(b)-(c) (Vernon 1986).
*213Subsequently, Superior Feeders, Vogel and Elliott, collectively referred to as Superi- or Feeders, moved the trial court to vacate the judgment and have it declared null, void and unenforceable. As the basis for the motion, Superior Feeders alleged that the 23 September 1992 judgment was nothing more than a memorialization of the 22 March 1977 judgment and not entitled to full faith and credit in Texas, because its 29 October 1992 filing, and an action to seek its enforcement, are barred by the 10 year limitations period of section 16.066 which, in its entirety, reads:
(a) An action on a foreign judgment is barred in this state if the action is barred under the laws of the jurisdiction where rendered.
(b) An action against a person who has resided in this state for 10 years prior to the action may not be brought on a foreign judgment rendered more than 10 years before the commencement of the action in this state.
(c) In this section “foreign judgment” means a judgment or decree rendered in another state or a foreign country.
Supporting the motion, Elliott and Vogel filed affidavits stating that they had lived in Texas for at least the last 10 years.
Inescapable is the threshold observation that the motion filed by Superior Feeders is an independent proceeding to have the Oklahoma judgment declared null, void and unenforceable pursuant to section 16.066, which also is alleged to prevent its filing. Whether the 1992 judgment is subject to the limitation period of section 16.066 as a 1977 judgment should be determined when an “action” is brought on the foreign judgment, not as an independent proceeding which attacks the filing of the judgment.
Lawrence Systems failed to persuade the trial court that section 16.066 was inapplicable, and cannot act as a bar, to proceedings under the Act. Finding that the 22 March 1977 judgment memorialized by the 23 September 1992 judgment, the foreign judgment, was not entitled to enforcement or recognition under the Act, the trial court ordered that the judgment was null and unenforceable, that it was vacated, and that all liens based upon, and all abstracts of, the judgment shall be released.
The seven-points-of-error challenges to the court’s judgment are not enumerated as such in the majority opinion. Although all points will be later identified, only those necessary to a proper disposition of the appeal are addressed. Tex.R.App.P. 90(a).
Lawrence Systems’ first- and third-point contentions that the trial court erred in granting the motion to vacate and in vacating the foreign judgment are correct. A Texas court cannot vacate the judgment of a court of another state. Moncrief v. Harvey, 805 S.W.2d 20, 22 n. 2 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1991, writ denied); and see Roland v. Roland, 244 S.W.2d 318, 320 (Tex.Civ.App.—Texarkana 1951, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
Moreover, in the trial court, Superior Feeders candidly conceded it was not, and is not, “attacking [the Oklahoma judgment] directly or collaterally,” and, on appeal, admits that it “is not seeking to invalidate the Oklahoma judgment.” It follows that the foreign judgment, fully litigated in Oklahoma and properly filed in this state, is entitled to full faith and credit, Roark v. Sweigart, 848 S.W.2d 387, 389 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1993, no writ), and should not have been vacated by the trial court. Lawrence Systems’ first and third points of error should be sustained, not overruled under the guise that the trial court did not vacate the judgment.
Although the Oklahoma judgment is valid, the trial court, by its findings, conclusions, and order that the judgment is null and unenforceable, implicitly determined that the proceedings under the Act were barred by section 16.066 as alleged by Superior Feeders. With its second and fifth points of error, Lawrence Systems contends that such a determination was erroneous because the plain language of the statutes makes a stated distinction between actions on foreign judgments and proceedings under the Act. Pointing out that its proceeding under the Act was basically a filing procedure, not an action, Lawrence Systems represents that a distinction between an action under section 16.066 and a proceeding under the Act is recognized by section 35.008 of the Act, which provides that “[a] judgment creditor *214retains the right to bring an action to enforce a judgment instead of proceeding under this chapter.”
Without question, Texas has the power to prescribe the period of limitation for actions in its own forum upon judgments rendered in other jurisdictions, Collin County Nat. Bank v. Hughes, 110 Tex. 362, 220 S.W. 767, 768 (1920), such a limitation being procedural rather than substantive in nature. Newhouse v. Newhouse, 271 Or. 109, 530 P.2d 848, 849 (1975). Thus, the question becomes whether the statute of limitations provided by section 16.066 was properly applied to bar proceedings under the Act on the Oklahoma judgment, thereby rendering the judgment unenforceable, albeit not null as found by the trial court.
In enacting the previously quoted section 16.066, the Legislature provided that an action on a foreign judgment is barred in this state if the action is barred under the laws of the jurisdiction where the judgment was rendered, and that an action against a person who has resided in this state for 10 years prior to the action may not be brought on a foreign judgment rendered more than 10 years before the commencement of the action in this state. The term “action” is not defined in the statute; therefore, it is to be given the particular meaning it has acquired by common usage. Tex.Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.011 (Vernon 1988).
Historically, limitation statutes employ the term “action,” which is synonymous with the term “suit,” Whitfield v. Burrell, 54 Tex.Civ.App. 567, 118 S.W. 153, 156 (1909, writ ref'd), to denote a judicial proceeding which, if prosecuted effectively, results in a judgment. Garcia v. Jones, 147 S.W.2d 925, 926 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1940, writ dism’d judgm’t cor.). In this sense, Lawrence Systems, by filing its Oklahoma judgment, which Superior Feeders moved the trial court to vacate and hold null, void, and unenforceable, has not brought an action to secure a judgment, or to enforce the judgment within the meaning of § 35.008 of the Act; instead, Lawrence Systems merely followed the procedure provided by the Act for the registration of its foreign judgment.
It is to be noticed that the procedure for filing a foreign judgment authorized by the Act neither involves the adjudication of any rights of the parties nor introduces an issue between them, except in respect to compliance with the filing requirements. The status of the parties and their relative rights, as fixed in the foreign judgment, remains unaltered by the filing as authorized by the Act. Therefore, the procedure cannot be regarded as an “action” within the meaning of section 16.066, or be subject to the limitation therein provided so as to render the foreign judgment unenforceable.
This determination remains unchanged after examining the cited holdings of courts in other states which have adopted the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, offered by the parties for their respective positions since this is a case of first impression in Texas courts. Of the citations, the circumstances in Producers Grain Corporation v. Carroll, 546 P.2d 285 (Okl.App.1976), most closely parallel the situation presented to us, because the language of the Oklahoma statute of limitations tracks more closely the language of section 16.066.
In Carroll, the Oklahoma Court of Appeals was called upon to decide whether the Oklahoma statute of limitations, providing that “civil actions ... can only be brought within the following periods ...,” governed proceedings under the Act. The key factor in the court’s determination that the proceedings were not barred was that the Act does not involve the institution of an action to enforce the judgment; it requires only that it be filed in accordance with the provisions of the Act to be enforceable, and the statute of limitations barred only “civil actions” not brought within the specified period. Id. at 287-88.
Thus, the Carroll court and I arrived at like decisions by much the same reasoning based upon the particular, but similar, language of the applicable statutes of limitations. By contrast, those cases, cited by Superior Feeders, one of which distinguished and did not follow Carroll, applied their limitations statutes to foreign judgments on the basis of the precise wording of their respective state statutes.
*215The case in which Carroll was distinguished and not followed, Eschenhagen v. Zika, 144 Ariz. 213, 696 P.2d 1362 (App.985), nevertheless recognized a distinction between an action brought on a foreign judgment and a proceeding under the Act. Presented with the question whether the filing of a foreign judgment nine and one-half years after it had been entered should be quashed, the court noted that if Eschenhagen had brought an action to enforce the foreign judgment, the action would have been barred by Arizona’s four-year statute of limitation, but she proceeded under Arizona’s version of the Act and an Arizona statute providing that “no execution or other process shall issue upon a judgment after expiration of five years from the date of its entry” unless properly renewed. Id., 696 P.2d at 1364. The court distinguished the Carroll holding primarily on the basis that the Arizona statute placing limitations on “execution or other process” on judgments did not contain the Oklahoma statute’s language limiting it to “civil actions” on a foreign judgment. Id, at 1367. Then, the court held that enforcement of the foreign judgment was precluded under either of its limitations statutes and, without determining which one applied, ordered the quashal of the filing.
Neither of the other two decisions cited by Superior Feeders addresses a situation comparable to the one in this appeal. In Newhouse v. Newhouse, 271 Or. 109, 530 P.2d 848 (1975), the registration of, coupled with the commencement of an action to enforce, a foreign judgment obtained more than twenty-two years earlier was set aside because the Oregon statute of limitations provided that an action on such judgment shall be commenced within ten years. But, in our appeal, an action to enforce the foreign judgment is not involved.
In Alexander Construction Co. v. Weaver, 3 Kan.App.2d 298, 594 P.2d 248 (1979), the entry of a foreign judgment was stricken because it was filed some four years after the time allowed by the applicable statute of limitation for “execution, including any garnishment proceeding and any proceeding in aid of execution.” Id. 594 P.2d at 250-51. Unlike the Kansas statute, section 16.066 applies only to an action on a foreign judgment.
The determination that proceedings under the Act are not affected by the limitations provided by section 16.066 does not, as Superior Feeders suggests, render section 16.066 meaningless. The limitations on actions brought on foreign judgments is not within the scope of the issue presented, which is only the narrow question whether the limitations provided by section 16.066 bar proceedings under the Act. Our holding should be that the procedure provided by the Act is not an “action” to which the plain language of section 16.066 applies. Lawrence Systems’ second and fifth points of error should be sustained.
The sustainment of Lawrence Systems’ first, second, third, and fifth points of error would dictate the sustaining of its fourth point, by which it challenges the trial court’s order that all liens or abstract of judgment liens be released. By these sustainments, a resolution of Lawrence Systems’ last two points — its complaint of the admission of evidence aliunde and its claim of res judicata— would be pretermitted. Tex.R.App.P. 90(a).
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court should be reversed, and judgment should be here rendered that Superior Feeders take nothing by its motion to vacate the foreign judgment and have it declared null, void and unenforceable. Because the majority has not done so, I respectfully dissent.
. Subsequent references to section 16.066 are to that section of Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Annotated (Vernon 1986).
. Subsequent references to the Act are to the Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code Annotated §§ 35.001-35.008 (Vernon 1986).
.Although Lawrence Systems, Inc. is acting through its successor-in-interest, Douglas-Guardian Warehouse Corp., the name Lawrence Systems is used for simplicity.