dissenting. In 1979, Charles Laverne Singleton stabbed Mary Lou York to death, and upon overwhelming evidence presented at trial, Singleton was found guilty and sentenced to death. Now after nearly twenty years of state and federal court trials and appeals, Singleton is still in the courts defending himself against the death penalty. As this court said in Rector v. Clinton, 308 Ark. 104, 823 S.W.2d 829 (1992), “[E]ven death cases must come to an end.”
Although this court’s Rector case clearly requires a denial of Singleton’s motion to stay his execution, the majority opinion, using some rather bewildering logic, attempts to distinguish Rector. I first set out what this court said and held in Rector, which is almost totally ignored by the majority.
The Rector case involved almost the identical situation as Singleton’s, except there, we denied Rector’s motion to stay his execution eleven years after his conviction for murdering Conway Police Officer Bob Martin. Like Singleton, Rector filed a petition for declaratory judgment in circuit court, stating he was ineligible for execution because (1) a state cannot execute persons whose mental illness prevents comprehension of the reasons for the penalty, and (2) the Arkansas standard limiting executions of persons with mental deficiencies is more stringent than that required under the Supreme Court’s decision in Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), and Arkansas’s law should prevent Rector’s execution if his current mental impairment prevented him from assisting his counsel in coming up with reasons to stay the execution. Id. at 105. In denying Rector’s request to stay his execution, this court held that, under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-506 (1987), the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to stay execution based upon Rector’s claim of current insanity, and that the matter rested with the executive branch of government. This court summarized its holding in Rector as follows:
(1) The circuit court lacked jurisdiction to stay the execution on the basis of the allegation that Mr. Rector is ineligible for execution due to his mental condition; (2) even if that court had such authority, we could not disagree with its finding that there had been no change in Mr. Rector’s condition since his evaluation by federal authorities in 1989; and (3) Arkansas law does not pose for execution of a person who may be mentally deficient a standard different from that declared by the United States Supreme Court in Ford v. Wainwright. The matter of clemency rests with the executive branch.
(Emphasis added.)
The only essential difference between Rector’s situation and Singleton’s is that Singleton’s counsel advances the legal argument that the State cannot “forcibly” medicate a death-sentenced inmate in order to make him competent to be executed. However, if his argument had any merit, Singleton had every opportunity to have raised it both in federal court and in the state courts on several occasions. See Singleton v. Norris, No. PB-C-93-425 (E.D. Ark. June 2, 1995) (where Singleton raised and later abandoned the argument); Singleton v. Endell, 316 Ark. 133, 870 S.W.2d 742 (1994) (where Singleton chose not to mention the issue, and the court surmised that Mr. Singleton apparently preferred to present the issue in federal court).
Confoundedly, the majority court blindly adopts Singleton’s argument that our court in Singleton in some unspoken way looked to the federal courts to decide Singleton’s issue, and the federal district court was looking for Singleton to raise the issue in state courts. With all due respect, these assumptions are balderdash! The simple fact is that Singleton chose not to raise his issue in either the federal or state court. To reiterate, all this court said in Singleton was “it is apparent that Mr. Singleton would prefer to present the medication issue exclusively in the federal court.”
Singleton also had a third opportunity to raise his issue. The State Medication Review Panel, authorized under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-506 to review Singleton’s examination, reviewed and concluded that Mr. Singleton should be given a trial on mandatory medication to see if he returned to a higher level of function. Singleton never questioned the Panel’s decision, nor did he request its administrative review. Mr. Singleton’s counsel claims he could not have obtained a legal resolution to his forcible-medication argument because Singleton previously had chosen to take medication, but now he is being “involuntarily” medicated.
Obviously, if Singleton could simply choose at will when he wants or does not want medication, the constitutional issue he raises now (and earlier raised in the U. S. District Court), might never be decided. This court, in Endell, recited one report where Singleton asked to be taken off the medication because he was to see some “federal doctors.” And another physician reported that Mr. Singleton wanted to appear “crazy.” The judicial system should not be manipulated in such fashion. This court in Endell would have undoubtedly reached the issue if Singleton had seriously wanted it decided. The majority court’s suggestion to the contrary is wrong.
Fortunately, whether Singleton is being manipulative need not control whether he is entitled to another last-ditch opportunity to have an answer to the question whether the State is medicating him in order to make him competent to be executed. Instead, although the State has been medicating Singleton, the federal district court has found Singleton was not placed on medication to make him competent, so the State could execute him; rather, the court found he was being medicated to meet his medical needs. See Singleton, No. PB-C-93-425 at p. 14; see also, Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (where Court held the safeguards provided by Washington law were sufficient and did not preclude the State from medicating the prisoner prior to the prescribed hearing on the issue if he posed a danger to himself or others). The federal court’s finding has never been challenged or appealed. In short, Singleton’s assertion that he is being forced to take medicine so he can be executed is a last minute red herring. It is untrue and not an issue. Instead, Singleton has been appropriately and lawfully receiving medication for his own medical needs, so he will not be a danger to himself or others.
In the Singleton v. Endell decision, we held that Singleton’s remedy is under § 16-90-506(d)(l) which the court declared to be constitutional. As I pointed out above, § 16-90-506(a)(l) places Singleton’s remedies for evaluation and review with the executive branch.
Lastly, the majority court offers the hollow suggestion that this court somehow has authority to stay an inmate’s execution even though § 16-90-506 only gives this court such authority when appeals or writs of error are involved. No such writ or appeal is before us. Nonetheless, the majority points to language in provision (a)(1) of § 16-90-506 which reads, “or should the execution of the sentence be stayed by any competent judicial proceeding,” and avails Singleton another judicial hearing. It takes little or no thought to understand that, under § 16-90-506, “a competent judicial proceeding” as far as the Arkansas Supreme Court is concerned is where an appeal or a writ of error is involved. Again, our Rector decision upheld the constitutionality of § 16-90-506 placing matters involving insanity with the executive branch, but the majority opinion dismantles the executive branch’s role in the reviewing and deciding of such matters.
To summarize, I submit that Arkansas’s trial and appellate procedures should be evenly interpreted, applied, and enforced. Over a twenty-year period, Singleton has had every opportunity to raise his full panoply of defenses, constitutional and otherwise, as to guilt and penalty. We decided as much in Rector when this court denied Rector any further stays. Maybe, in the future, Arkansas will decide the death penalty is one the state should abandon. But, until then, the State’s procedures under § 16-90-506(d)(1) should be fairly and indiscriminately followed. Mr. Singleton has been afforded due process and his other constitutional guarantees. To follow, now, the procedures established in § 16-90-506 (d)(1) will serve only to minimize the enormous delays between when capital-murder convictions are rendered and when a death-penalty sentence is administered.
As was done in Rector, I would deny Singleton’s stay motion.
Arnold, C.J., and Corbin, J., join this dissent.