OPINION ON REHEARING
On motion for rehearing, Shelby contends that it did meet all the requirements for a permit under the original ordinance because the lease constituted consent as required by Original Ordinance 96. In our original opinion, this Court stated that Shelby was not entitled to a permit because it had not secured Aztec’s consent as was required by Original Ordinance 96. Shelby then argues that, “If this court does not change its opinion, it will have held, without discussion, that a surface owner in 1996 can unilaterally change an oil and gas lease executed in 1945.” Shelby then charges this Court that, “The ‘consent’ issue is a question that is clearly pertinent to this court’s decision and should not be avoided.”
We write separately on the motion for rehearing to reduce any confusion regarding the ability of the surface owner to alter the provisions of a mineral lease and why the Court did not address the consent issue in our original opinion.
As to the ability of the surface owner to change the terms of a mineral lease, Texas law is well settled. The mineral owner possesses the dominant estate and the surface owner possesses the subservient estate. Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618, 621 (Tex.1971). The surface owner may not unreasonably interfere with the mineral estate. Ball v. Dillard, 602 S.W.2d 521, 523 (Tex.1980). In the present case, Aztec, as merely a surface owner, had no power of its own to change the original terms of the 1945 lease which required that the mineral owner be allowed to drill anywhere except within 200 feet of a building then in existence. However, Aztec was not relying on its own power under the lease when it refused to allow Shelby to drill within 500 feet of its building, but Aztec was relying on the police power of the City of Waskom which, embodied in the form of Ordinance 96, allowed Aztec to withhold its consent.
The right of an oil and gas operator to conduct drilling activities is not an absolute right, but is subject to reasonable restriction by the state. Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 146 Tex. 575, 210 S.W.2d 558, 561 (1948). A city may enact reasonable regulations to promote the health, safety, and general welfare of its people. City of College Station v. Turtle Rock Corp., 680 S.W.2d 802, 805 (Tex.1984). The development of oil and gas within the city limits is clearly an area subject to regulation under the police powers of a municipality. See Unger v. State, 629 S.W.2d 811, 813 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1982, writ ref'd); Helton v. City of Burkburnett, 619 S.W.2d 23, 24 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see also Mills v. Brown, 309 S.W.2d 919, 925-26 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1958), rev’d on other grounds, 159 Tex. 110, 316 S.W.2d 720 (1958) (holding that municipal ordinance was legitimate exercise of police power and therefore constitutional).
Since we must presume that Ordinance 96 was valid, absent a showing from the challenger of the ordinance otherwise, we hold that Aztec, in withholding its consent, was simply acting within the scope of the ordinance and not as a surface owner independent of the ordinance.
As to whether or not the lease constituted consent under the ordinance, this Court finds that we are not squarely faced with that issue in the present case. Shelby’s brief to this Court does not raise the consent issue. Shelby addressed the subject of consent only in the context that the trial court, when it originally ruled on Shelby’s summary judgment motion, found that the lease did constitute consent. Shelby then proceeded to rely on this ruling of the trial court, which, as explained in our original opinion, was of no *84legal effect. This Court may only review final judgments rendered at the trial court level. Hinde v. Hinde, 701 S.W.2d 637, 639 (Tex.1985). Whether or not the lease constituted consent was not an issue that the trial court disposed of in its final judgment. Therefore, this Court was not called upon to decide the issue in this appeal, and it would be improper for us to do so.
Shelby’s motion for rehearing is overruled.