Respectfully, I concur in part and dissent in part. I fully concur in the majority opinion to the extent that it affirms the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Respondents on the grounds they committed malpractice by failing to advise Harris Teeter of the risk of lease termination and by failing to settle the case before arbitration. However, I part company with the majority and would reverse the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment as to Harris Teeter’s allegations that Respondents committed malpractice by failing to introduce any evidence in regards to the two Kiriakides factors.
I.
The single issue presented is whether Harris Teeter has presented sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment; I express no opinion as to what the outcome of this case would be after a trial on the merits. Faithful to my understanding of the principles governing review of an order granting summary judgment, as recently enunciated by this Court, my focus is only on whether Harris Teeter has presented a mere scintilla of evidence in support of its allegations of malpractice. See Hancock v. Mid-S. Mgmt. Co., 381 S.C. 326, 330, 673 S.E.2d 801, 803 (2009) (“[I]n cases applying the preponderance of the evidence burden of proof, the non-moving party is only required to submit a mere scintilla of evidence in order to withstand a motion for summary judgment.”). This standard requires merely “the slightest amount of relevant evidence” on an issue to warrant denial of summary judgment. Black’s Law Dictionary 635 (3d pocket ed.2006). If this indeed is the *295standard, it must be applied in every case, including attorney malpractice cases.
As the majority correctly recognizes, Kiriakides v. United Artists Communications, Inc., 312 S.C. 271, 440 S.E.2d 364 (1994), is the controlling case in South Carolina to determine whether a tenant materially breached the terms of his lease agreement with a landlord so as to justify termination of the lease. In Kiriakides, we held, “a lease may not be forfeited for a trivial or technical breach even when the parties have specifically agreed that ‘any breach’ gives rise to the right of termination.” 312 S.C. at 275, 440 S.E.2d at 366. Instead, we stated, “to justify forfeiture, the breach must be material, serious, or substantial.” Id. In order to determine whether the breach was material, we announced the following five factor test:
(a) the extent to which the injured party will be deprived of the benefit which he reasonably expected;
(b) the extent to which the injured party can be adequately compensated [by damages] for the part of that benefit of which he will be deprived;
(c) the extent to which the party failing to perform or to offer to perform will suffer forfeiture;
(d) the likelihood that the party failing to perform or to offer to perform will cure his failure, taking account of all the circumstances including any reasonable assurances;
(e) the extent to which the behavior of the party failing to perform or to offer to perform comports with standards of good faith and fair dealing.
Id. at 275-76, 440 S.E.2d at 366-67 (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 241 (1981)).
A. Standard of Care
During Levick’s deposition, he testified that Respondents breached their standard of care by failing to introduce any evidence during the arbitration in regards to the two Kiriakides factors.9 In his deposition, Levick was asked, “[w]as it *296incompetent to fail to put in the monetary value of the lease to Harris Teeter?” Levick responded “yes.” Additionally, Levick testified that Respondents’ failure to introduce any evidence during the arbitration concerning the value of Harris Teeter’s current lease — as Levick stated, “not just to Harris Teeter, but the value to the landlord when he bought it” — was a “key issue.” At another point in his deposition, Levick was asked, “[gjiven the first Kiriakides factor is the extent to which a party will be deprived o[f] [the] benefitf ] reasonably expected, was it incompetent to fail to specifically argue that factor was met because Harris Teeter always paid their rent?” Again, Levick responded “yes.” Moreover, the following colloquy occurred during Levick’s deposition:
Q: Let’s go down to [subpart] D [of Harris Teeter’s complaint against Respondents], failing to adequately prepare for the arbitration. Tell me specifically what was not done that you think in your judgment should have done to prepare?
A: I would have had a tremendous amount of evidence on the value of the lease to Harris Teeter. I would have had a whole economic evaluation of why the purchase price that was paid at the time that Durlach bought it, why that price was fair and reasonable given the lease and what a windfall the termination would produce. I would have an appraiser’s analysis show the value of the property if the Harris [Teeter] lease wasn’t in place.... And I don’t recall that any of that — well, I didn’t see that any of that was presented. In fact, I did see that there was a conscious decision to not show the value of the lease to Harris Teeter---- There was no evidence submitted on any of this I can find.
*297The majority disregards Levick’s testimony and concludes “Respondents presented Kiriakides front and center to the arbitrator.” This finding is in direct conflict with the testimony of Howell Morrison, the attorney representing Harris Teeter at arbitration. During his deposition, Morrison acknowledged he did not introduce any evidence in regards to the Kiriakides factors at issue. In fact, Morrison testified that he made a conscious decision not to introduce such evidence. The relevant portions of Morrison’s testimony are quoted below.
Q: Did you ever look at the effect of that long term lease that was under market [value] on the price that Mr. [D]urlach paid for the building?
A: I knew that it had a depressive market impact on the market value for most buyers. I assumed so. It was common sense and obvious to me.
Q: Did you get any evidence on that? I don’t see any evidence in the record about that.
A: No. I didn’t see that as any primary issue in the Arbitration.
Q: The first criteria [sic] of the Kiriakides [case] is the extent to which the injured party will be deprived of the benefit which he reasonably expected. If you buy a building under value, depressed because of the lease, you’re expecting to get the lease that’s on the building — the lease payments aren’t you?
A: If you buy below market value or above market value or at market value, you expect to get your lease. Right.
Q: I don’t see anything in the record to show how much money Mr. Durlach was going to [make in] windfall, not only in lease payments, but in the value to his property by getting this lease out. And that was crucial to this case. Why wouldn’t you have [done] that?
A: It was not crucial. In my judgment it would not have helped the presentation of the case to emphasize the under market lease that Harris Teeter held.
*298Q: Is there any evidence in the record that would show what the value would — how the fair market value of the building would appreciate or what rent he might get?
A: I did not specifically introduce evidence of that type.... And in my view then, and still in my view, if we had spent time showing the Arbitrator emphasizing that we had a submarket lease, it was very much a two-edged sword that could have easily worked to our detriment.
Q: Did you put in one dollar figure at what it would cost Harris Teeter?
A: I don’t think [so]. I made a decision not to do that.
Q: ... And did you have in the record, one dollar figure at how this would impact Mr. Durlach in getting more money than he would have expected when he bought the property?
A: Well, what if he expected to find a way to renegotiate the lease, number one?
Q: Did you show him [the arbitrator] how much money he would make by doing that?
A: No. I did not express total dollar figure either way.
The majority relies exclusively on Respondents’ pre-hearing memorandum and comments made by Respondents during opening and closing arguments to support its conclusion that Respondents fully presented Kiriakides to the arbitrator.10 As demonstrated by the testimony set forth above, Morrison unequivocally conceded that he did not introduce any evidence pertaining to the two Kiriakides factors in question to the arbitrator. Moreover, the statements relied on by the majority — the pre-hearing memorandum and opening and closing remarks — are merely arguments of counsel and have long been recognized by this Court not to constitute evidence. See, e.g., Ex parte Morris, 367 S.C. 56, 64, 624 S.E.2d 649, 653 (2006).
*299B. Proximate Cause
In order to demonstrate proximate cause, a plaintiff must show he most probably would have been successful in the underlying suit if the attorney had not committed the alleged malpractice. Summer v. Carpenter, 328 S.C. 36, 42, 492 S.E.2d 55, 58 (1997). This Court in Baughman v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. succinctly stated the “most probably” rule as follows:
It is not sufficient for the expert ... to testify merely that the ailment might or could have resulted from the alleged cause. He must go further and testify that taking into consideration all the data it is his professional opinion that the result in question most probably came from the cause alleged.
306 S.C. 101, 111, 410 S.E.2d 537, 543 (1991). But, “[i]n determining whether particular evidence meets this test it is not necessary that the expert actually use the words ‘most probably.’ ” Id.
To survive summary judgment, the evidence presented must amount to more than mere speculation and conjecture. McKnight v. S.C. Dep’t ofCorrs., 385 S.C. 380, 390, 684 S.E.2d 566, 571 (Ct.App.2009). The expert must therefore state this opinion with reasonable certainty. See Ellis v. Oliver, 323 S.C. 121, 125, 473 S.E.2d 793, 795 (1996). However, in evaluating a motion for summary judgment, we must not weigh the credibility of the witnesses and the testimony. Anderson v. The Augusta Chronicle, 355 S.C. 461, 475, 585 S.E.2d 506, 513 (Ct.App.2003). Thus, if the expert’s testimony facially meets these criteria, it will be sufficient to defeat summary judgment.
During his deposition, Levick testified as follows:
My opinion is had they gone step by step through the Kiriakides case, had they shown the extreme windfall for the landlord and the extreme detriment to the tenant, had they shown the communications between the parties in great depth orally, had they shown the intent of the original parties in its entirety, had they shown what the law is in other jurisdictions, had they shown custom and usage ... there is not a way in the world that they could have come up *300with this decision. That is my opinion. It could not have happened.
Then, in another point in his deposition, the following colloquy occurred:
Q: Is it your overall opinion that if this case before the arbitrator had been handled in some different fashion, more specifically in the way that you suggest, the case would have been won by Harris Teeter before this arbitrator?
A: Obviously it’s speculation, but in reading the opinion, the only thing that I can gather is that the arbitrator believed that Harris Teeter’s conduct was so egregious that terminating a very valuable lease was a remedy. I don’t think that the arbitrator had an inkling in assuming he was the fair person that they thought they were hiring, had an inkling that this was a landlord who Harris Teeter’s lawyer believed was trying to set them up for a lease termination, that basically was trying to get out of this lease and was using the arbitrator as a way to do it. I don’t think he had a clue, and I don’t think he would have permitted himself to be used as a vehicle for terminating a perfectly valid lease that had been in force for 21 years when the guy bought it; that he bent backwards and forwards over it; that he requested no changes when he bought it; that this all of a sudden would translate into egregious bad faith that would deprive HT [sic] of the benefit of a lease that they had honored for 21 years. I just don’t see him coming to that decision if the case was presented properly.
(emphasis added).
Levick’s first statement clearly satisfies the most probably requirement. As a result, I would hold that Harris Teeter has presented sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment with respect to its allegation that Respondents committed malpractice by failing to introduce any evidence in regards to the two Kiriakides factors.
Admittedly, Levick’s second statement is more problematic because he began by stating, “[o]bviously it’s speculation.” In the circuit court’s view, Levick’s introductory statement rendered his entire opinion on the issue of proximate cause as nothing more than mere conjecture or speculation. I disagree with this interpretation of the statement. In reading Levick’s *301second statement in context, I would find he did not state his conclusion — whether the result of the proceeding most probably would have been different-was speculation.11 See Brockbank v. Best Capital Corp., 341 S.C. 372, 378-79, 534 S.E.2d 688, 692 (2000) (“In determining whether any triable issues of fact exist, the court must view the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.”). Rather, in answering the question, Levick began by speculating as to why the arbitrator reached the conclusion he reached. In doing so, he initially stated that such telepathy is “[ojbviously ... speculation.” In explaining why be believed the arbitrator terminated the lease, Levick surmised that the arbitrator inexplicably and erroneously viewed Harris Teeter as the bad actor in this case when in reality the landlord was the bad actor. This hypothesizing ended, however, when at the end of his answer Levick unequivocally stated, “I just don’t see him coming to that decision if the case was presented properly.”
In Baughman, this Court stated expert testimony is sufficient to establish proximate cause so long as the testimony is such “as to judicially impress” that the opinion represents the expert’s professional judgment as to the most likely among possible outcomes. 306 S.C. at 111, 410 S.E.2d at 543 (internal quotation omitted). Mindful of Baughman and our standard of review, I would find Levick testified that the result of the proceeding most probably would have been different if Respondents had not breached their duty of care to Harris Teeter.12
*302Based on our analysis, I would conclude that Levick’s deposition established the standard of care for attorneys; Respondents breached that standard of care by failing to introduce any evidence in regards to the two Kiriakides factors; and finally, that the result of the proceeding most probably would have been different had Respondents not breached their duty of care to Harris Teeter.
C. Judgmental Immunity Rule
I concur in the majority’s decision to not adopt the judgmental immunity rule at this time. Under the judgmental immunity rule, strategic decisions made by an attorney in good faith and in conformity with the standard of care cannot be the basis of a legal malpractice claim. Biomet Inc. v. Finnegan Henderson LLP, 967 A.2d 662, 666 (D.C.2009). If Respondents did not breach their standard of care as a matter of law, then an additional rule insulating them from liability is unnecessary. While I agree that we should not adopt this rule under the facts before us, it would be my view that we should never adopt it.
The core of this rule is nothing more than a tautology; it has always been clear that so long as an attorney exercises a reasonable degree of skill and care he will not suffer liability. Adopting a separate rule that restates that cardinal principle of our malpractice jurisprudence and denominates it an “immunity” certainly is de trop. See Sun Valley Potatoes, Inc. v. Rosholt, Robertson & Tucker, 133 Idaho 1, 5, 981 P.2d 236 (1999) (“Rather than being a rule which grants some type of ‘immunity’ to attorneys, it appears to be nothing more than a recognition that if an attorney’s actions could under no circumstances be held to be negligent, then a court may rule as a matter of law that there is no liability.”). Indeed, if this rule is in fact different from our general rules concerning attorney malpractice, then it would inherently sanction some conduct that would otherwise be negligent. To the extent the judgmental immunity rule restates the general rule that attorneys must comply with the standard of care, I would not adopt it as it is superfluous; to the extent that it offers any more protection to attorneys, I cannot join in the sanctioning of unprofessional and negligent conduct under the guise of “good faith” and “professional judgment.”
*303II.
Every malpractice case is, by its very nature, “Monday morning quarter-backing,” and I wholeheartedly agree with the majority’s statement that “[t]he practice of law is not an exact science.” I also agree we grant attorneys a wide degree of discretion in how they prepare and try their cases. Indeed, clients are compensating attorneys for that very exercise of discretion. However, the issue of whether Respondents committed legal malpractice is not before the Court; that question must wait for another day. Rather, today we are called upon to determine solely whether Harris Teeter has met its burden in opposing summary judgment. I would hold that Harris Teeter adduced at least a mere scintilla of evidence sufficient to survive summary judgment. I want to reiterate that in so doing, I pass no judgment on the merits of either side of this case or Levick’s credibility. Rather, I would faithfully adhere to the principles established by this Court as to the role we play on review of summary judgment orders. Accordingly, I would reverse and remand for a trial on the merits of Harris Teeter’s claim regarding the two Kiriakides factors.
. I agree with the majority’s determination that Scarminach failed to establish the appropriate standard of care and satisfy the "most proba*296bly” requirement to prove proximate cause. Accordingly, his testimony and post-deposition affidavit are irrelevant to the determination of whether Harris Teeter has set forth sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment. I disagree, however, with the conclusion that Levick's post-deposition affidavit is a sham because this later affidavit did not contradict the position he took at his deposition. See Cothran v. Brown, 357 S.C. 210, 218, 592 S.E.2d 629, 633 (2004) (stating under the sham affidavit rule, a court may disregard a subsequent affidavit as a sham — as not creating an issue of fact for purposes of summary judgment — if the subsequent affidavit contradicts a party’s own prior sworn statement).
. I note even in the pre-hearing memorandum and in opening and closing statements. Respondents merely mentioned Kiriakides by name, listed the five factor test, and generally stated the factors weighed in Harris Teeter's favor. Respondents never produced any evidence demonstrating how these two Kiriakides factors applied to the facts of this case.
. Even if I were to agree with the circuit court and the majority that Levick failed to satisfy the most probably requirement in his second statement, Harris Teeter has still presented sufficient evidence to overcome Respondents’ motion for summary judgment by virtue of Levick’s first statement.
. The majority holds that Harris Teeter’s claim fails for lack of proximate cause because the arbitrator, in his ruling, did cite and discuss all the Kiriakides factors. In response, Harris Teeter offered the testimony of Levick, as discussed above. These two competing viewpoints — that the arbitrator fully considered Kiriakides and that he most probably would have reached a different conclusion had the Respondents fully presented Kiriakides to him — are the sine qua non of denying summary judgment: a genuine issue of material fact.