concur and dissent as follows.
Although there is much in Judge Cathell’s, Judge Wilner’s, and Judge Battaglia’s opinions that is commendable, we find ourselves unable to join fully any of them. This is because we conclude that, while the Legislature possesses the power to modify the terms of service of the incumbent members of the Public Service Commission (PSC) so as to terminate their service as of 30 June 2006, it went too far when, in fashioning an ad hoc and utterly novel appointment procedure to govern solely the selection of the immediate successors to the incumbents (which process would be abandoned for future appointments, as the terms of the immediate successors’ terms expire or they otherwise depart office, at which time the traditional gubernatorial appointment/Senate consent process, as was previously the case, would resume for future appointments to the PSC), the Legislature essentially fashioned a “contingent strawman” role for the Governor in what essentially is a mock *607gubernatorial appointment process. This process violates, in our view, Article 8 (Separation of Powers) of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.1
As to the portions of SB-1-2006 challenged in the present litigation, we would affirm the Circuit Court’s order as to the unlikelihood of success regarding Appellant(s)’ claims as to Section 12(1), but reverse as to the balance of Section 12 and Section 22 in its entirety. This would leave the provisions of Md.Code, Public Utility Companies (PUC) Article, § 2-102, as amended by SB-1-2006, Section 1, which is unchallenged here, to govern the Governor’s appointment and the Senate’s confirmation of “open field” successor-nominees to the ousted incumbent members of the Public Service Commission.
We are unpersuaded by the analysis in Judge Cathell’s majority opinion for the Court which concludes that the Legis*608lature’s modification of the terms of office of the incumbent PSC members violates Article II, §§ 1, 9, and 15 of the Maryland Constitution. SB-1, and specifically § 12(1), does not assign to that modification any underlying legislative motive regarding the incumbents’ performance in office insofar as incompetency or misconduct are concerned. The Court should not be concerned properly with legislative motive in any event, only the effect of the legislation. The Majority, however, looks to the motive or purpose of the General Assembly, and concludes that the purpose of Section 12(1) of S.B.l was to remove the current members of the PSC. From this assumption, the Majority concludes that the Legislature “fired them.” Maj. op. 394 Md. at 546-47, 907 A.2d at 191. The Majority then reasons that, because under the Act the Legislature fired the Commissioners, S.B.1, Section 1 violated “express provisions of the Maryland Constitution, including, but not limited to, Section 8 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights and Article II, §§ 1, 9, and 15 of the Maryland Constitution, and in the process denying to the Appellant(s) due process of law.” Id. at 566-67, 907 A.2d at 203.
The Majority’s entire reasoning rests upon this proposition. The Legislature, however, did notare or remove the Commissioners. The Majority’s conclusion collapses, therefore, because it concedes that the Legislature has the power to abolish, create, and restructure. The Majority holds that:
“[t]he power to remove officers appointed by a Governor, during the term of the officers’ appointment, for misconduct or incompetency, is solely the Governor’s and the attempt by the Legislature to terminate those officers, previously appointed by the Governor and approved by the Senate, prior to the expiration of their terms of office, was an usurpation of executive power in violation of Article II, §§ 1, 9, and 15 of the Maryland Constitution and in violation of Article 8 of the Declaration of Rights of Maryland.”
Id. at 596, 907 A.2d at 220.
Clearly, the Legislature may shorten or lengthen the term of office of a non-constitutional employee. The only way the Majority may reach the conclusion that the Legislature fired *609these Commissioners is to examine the motive2 of the General Assembly in enacting the legislation, something that this Court plainly is not permitted to do in these circumstances. The motive of the Legislature in enacting legislation is not a proper subject for judicial examination.3 See e.g., Workers’ Compensation Commission v. Driver, 336 Md. 105, 118-19, 647 A.2d 96 (1994); Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. State, 15 Md. 376, 461 (1860); Cf. County Council for Montgomery County v. District Land Corp., 274 Md. 691, 337 A.2d 712 (1975).
Seeded within Judge Cathell’s majority opinion are the reasons for our belief that the Legislature properly may modify the terms of office of the Commissioners in this instance. The Commission, for its very existence, sprang in 1910 (Chp. 180, Laws 1910) wholly and fully formed from the brow of the Legislature. No constitutional mandate for its creation existed. Although operating, and later formally denominated, as an “independent” Executive Branch agency (Chp. 8, Sec. 2, Laws of 1998), the Commission and its responsibilities were subject, over the years, to periodic re*610invention by the Legislature, including not infrequent tinkering with the terms of office of the Commission members (see Chp. 474, Laws 1949; Chp. 756, § 2, Laws 1976; Chp. 729, Laws 1980). From time to time, the Legislature also modified the general qualifications prescribed for eligibility of individuals for appointment to the Commission. See Chp. 441, Laws 1955; Chp. 756, § 3, Laws 1976. From the creation of the Commission in 1910 until 1975, the Legislature was content to permit the Governor to appoint individuals to the Commission, without an overt and specific legislative approval requirement, subject only to each individual meeting the prescribed general eligibility prerequisites mentioned in the statute. In 1975, however, the Legislature injected into the statutory scheme, for the first time, a requirement that each individual appointed by the Governor to the Commission must receive the post-nomination approval of the Senate before assuming his or her office. At no time, however, during the long history of the Commission has the Legislature, until now, purported to require the Governor to make appointments to the Commission, by a truncated date certain, exclusively from a short list of specifically named individuals, selected by the leadership of the Legislature4 (referring to the Legislature’s determination that no person in the list of 10 requires subsequent Senate consent, i.e., they were pre-approved), or risk losing altogether the opportunity to make the appointments and defaulting that duty to one or another array of the Speaker of the House of Delegates and the President of the Senate, or the Attorney General. This Frankenstein-like5 appointment process is all the more remarkable because the Legislature, while proclaiming that the Commission at all times remained an “indepen*611dent” Executive Branch unit of government, in the same breath effectively held out the singularity of the temporary appointment process contemplated by §§ 12 and 22 of S.B. 1 as a one-time only action and, after a new Commission is selected according to the temporary requirements, business would resume as usual for future Commission appointments.
Section 12 (1) of SB-1-2006 facially is precisely what the Legislature did in 1949, by Chp. 474, when it terminated the terms of the then-Commissioners as of 1 June 1949 and re-set the new staggered terms to apply prospectively. The only relevant difference between the 1949 action and S.B. 1-2006, Sec. 12(1) is that in 1949 the Governor was not precluded in tandem from reappointing incumbents (which it appears is exactly what he did-see maj. op. 394 Md. at 537, 907 A.2d at 185-86). This situation repeated itself in 1976 (see maj. op. 394 Md. at 538-39, 907 A.2d at 186).
We associate ourselves with much of the reasoning in that part of Judge Battaglia’s dissent discussing Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. State, 15 Md. 376 (1860) (dissent op. 394 Md. at 625-27, 907 A.2d at 238-39). The appointment process to an Executive Branch agency governing body is neither inherently nor exclusively associated with the Governor as an executive prerogative where the agency is entirely a creation of the Legislature, unrestrained by relevant constitutional limitation. Thus, as was iterated in Commission on Medical Discipline v. Stillman, 291 Md. 390, 409-411, 435 A.2d 747, 757-758 (1981), discussing Baltimore and its progeny, “[wjhere the office is of legislative creation, the Legislature can modify, control or abolish it.... ” (Citing Davis v. State, 7 Md. 151 (1854)). What the Legislature chose to do here regarding the terms of office fits properly and historically as an allowable modification of the office of commissioner of the PSC.
The Legislature, by creating an “independent” Executive Branch unit of government, but where it facially purports to maintain an ostensible appointment power in the Governor, nonetheless may revisit periodically the methodology of the appointment process, alter the organic hierarchical structure of the unit (which it did not purport to do in S.B.1), prescribe *612general and specific eligibility requirements for appointees, retain consent approval as to the appointees, and determine (from time to time) what the terms of office for appointees ought to be; HOWEVER, it should not be understood to possess the power to limit the Governor’s consideration to a short list of specific persons handpicked by the leadership of the Legislature itself from which the Governor must make the appointments, within an arbitrary and unreasonably short time, or risk losing the power of appointment, without further legislative enactment. The Legislature here effectively precluded the incumbent Governor from reappointing the incumbent commission and required that his appointees be from a list submitted by the Legislature. That presents issues not presented in an abolition or restructuring of the agency, issues that implicate at least Article 8 of the Declaration of Rights, as Judge Cathell points out (maj. op. 394 Md. at 598-99, 907 A.2d at 222). Judge Cathell’s analysis, however, following that observation, goes too far.
If it is within the province of the General Assembly, without any organic restructuring of the agencies or offices, to proceed to appoint the replacements for all Executive officials for which it properly may have terminated service, to serve at its pleasure or the pleasure of its agent, then the Legislature effectively would emasculate the Governor’s Constitutional authority and responsibility. If permitted, the Legislature indeed will have created a parliamentary form of Government, as Judge Cathell and Judge Wilner decry and which Article 8 of the Declaration of Rights prohibits.
The Legislature, as Judge Cathell notes (maj. op. 394 Md. at 599-600, 907 A.2d at 222-23), has not gone that far in this case. It took control, however, over the method of appointment of the immediate replacements of the incumbent commissioners of one Executive Branch agency, only to return the traditional appointment power to the next Governor. The authority asserted for it to do that, however, if recognized by this Court as Judge Battaglia urges, would permit much more pervasive intrusions. To forestall that, we would draw the line that the General Assembly may not replace the incumbent commissioners with its own choices, while maintaining a sham *613appointment power in the incumbent Governor. If it has the power to do that, it has the power to make the Governor a mere hand puppet, which Art. 8 does not contemplate or permit.
We do not subscribe to the reasoning in Judge Battaglia’s dissent (dissent op. 394 Md. at 614-15, 907 A.2d at 231-32) that the refusal to issue the TRO is not immediately appeal-able. Maryland Rule 15-501(c) defines a “temporary restraining order” as “an injunction granted without opportunity for a full adversary hearing on the propriety of its issuance.” Thus, denial of a TRO is a denial of injunctive relief within the meaning of § 12-203 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Art. of the Maryland Code.
Moreover, we do not associate ourselves with Judge Battaglia’s dissent regarding whether members of the PSC are “civil officers” within the meaning of Art. II, § 15 of the Maryland Constitution (dissent op. 394 Md. at 614-18, 907 A.2d at 231-34). As Judge Cathell’s opinion explains (maj. op. 394 Md. at 548-50, 907 A.2d at 192-93), School Com’rs v. Goldsborough, 90 Md. 193, 44 A. 1055 (1899) was decided before the addition to the Constitution in 1922 of Article XVTI. Section 5 of that Article limits Article II, § 13 by providing that all officers appointed by the Governor hold office for the terms fixed by law, which may be greater or lesser than two years. Section 9 of Article XVII provides that, in the event of a conflict between Article XVII, Article XVII prevails. The problem solved by the Goldsborough decision has not existed since 1922. There is no longer any reason or need to give the term “civil officer” such an artificially narrow definition. The term “civil officer” should be given its normal meaning as any officer other than a military officer. Members of the Public Service constitute civil officers within the meaning of Article II, § 15.
In summary, we would affirm that portion of Judge Matricciani’s 28 June 2006 order which denied a TRO as to enforcement of Section 12(1) (terminating the incumbent Commissioners as of 30 June 2006) of S.B.-1-2006 on the ground that it was unlikely that Appellant(s) could succeed on the merits of their claims. As to the remainder of Judge Matricciani’s order, however, we would reverse and hold that Appellant(s) *614claims likely would be successful that the balance of Section 12 and the entirety of Section 22 (the appointment process for the immediate successors to the incumbents) of S.B.-1-2006 are unconstitutional as violative of State constitutional separation of powers principles.
BATTAGLIA, J., dissents.
. It is not entirely clear, however, that a declaration as to Article 8 was sought by Appellant(s) in the complaint. The complaint does not mention Article 8 in its averments (see especially prayer for relief "D,” seeking a declaration that Sections 12 and 22 of SB-1-2006 violate Art. 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, Art. II, § 15 of the Maryland Constitution, and Art. I, § 10 of the U.S. Constitution. In prayer for relief "E” of the complaint, Appellant(s) generically sought a declaration that Sections 12 and 22 of SB-1-2006 "are illegal, ultra vires, and of no legal face and effect.” Judge Matricciani’s 28 June 2006 order denying Appellants)’ motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO) likewise does not mention Art. 8 of the Declaration of Rights in its analysis, although it concludes that Appellant(s) were not likely to succeed on the merits of the complaint because §§ 12 and 22 of SB-1-2006 "do[] not run afoul of the federal constitution’s dictates on separation of powers....” Given the complaint’s relevant invocation of only Art. I, § 10 of the U.S. Constitution, we understand Judge Matricciani's analysis to reflect a conclusion as to that contention only. Finally, neither Appellant(s) nor Appellee, in their briefs to this Court, list Art. 8 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights in their Table of Authorities in support of their respective arguments. Despite our concern whether Art.. 8 has been put in play in this litigation by the parties or the Circuit Court’s opinion and order under review, Judge Cathell’s majority opinion for the Court, Judge Wilner’s concurrence, and Judge Battaglia’s dissent engage in analyses of its application to Sections 12 and 22 of SB-1-2006. Perhaps this is because analysis of Art. II, § 15 of our State Constitution necessarily compels consideration of Art. 8 as well. In any event, we also shall express a view as to the Art. 8 implications.
. Motive and intent are different. The distinction aptly was set out in Glen Cove Theatres, Inc. v. City of Glen Cove, 36 Misc.2d 772, 773, 233 N.Y.S.2d 972, 974(1962)):
“In the field of legislation, motive and intent have different connotations .... The former may be defined as the impelling force of reason which induces action and precedes it. The latter signifies the intendment and meaning of the enactment, the purpose it seeks to accomplish, its construction, all as gathered from the text of law itself, legislative studies, etc.”
. Excluded generally from this rule are equal protection cases involving racial discrimination. After Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 2047, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976), and Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-68, 97 S.Ct. 555, 563-66, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977), courts recognize that a legislative enactment may be challenged on the basis of invidious intent if plaintiff alleges racial discrimination. “It is equally clear, however, that the [U.S.] Supreme Court and lower federal and state courts will not always show the same receptivity to claims of impermissible motive when constitutional principles other than racial equality are at issue.” Alan E. Brownstein, ILLICIT LEGISLATIVE MOTIVE IN THE MUNICIPAL LAND USE REGULATION PROCESS, 57 U.Cin.L.Rev. 1(1988).
. As opposed to a delegation to a non-governmental professional associ- ' ation, relevant to the field of endeavor regulated by the affected agency, to fashion a list of possible appointees from which the Executive Branch was obliged to select members. See Commission on Medical Discipline v. Stillman, 291 Md. 390, 435 A.2d 747 (1981).
. "Frankenstein-like" only in the sense that the process was constructed from odd parts and animated for a brief time only to die a certain death.