dissenting. Because I think that the verification testimony had a non-hearsay purpose, I respectfully dissent. To me, the non-hearsay purpose for the admission of the fact of verification by an independent examiner is simply to show the effect on the hearer, independent of its truth or falsity.
*550Many relevant oral expressions made out of court may be offered for a variety of purposes other than to prove the facts asserted. When this is done, the hearsay rule is not a bar. A common example is where an utterance is offered to show the effect on the hearer for the purpose of proving circumstantially the state of mind of the person to whom the statement is made or to show the information he had as bearing on the reasonableness of his subsequent conduct.
Ellsworth v. Watkins, 101 N.H. 51, 53 (1957) (citations omitted).
The State’s fingerprint expert, Timothy Jackson, testified that “according to standard operating procedures I’m not even allowed to brief the submitting agency on my findings until they are verified if an identification has been made.” Thus, testimony regarding Jackson’s receipt of verification under the ACE-V protocol is admissible for the non-hearsay purpose of showing “the reasonableness of his subsequent conduct” in rendering his opinion on the fingerprint evidence. Id.
The ACE-V protocol is accepted in a number of jurisdictions. See, e.g., United States v. Mahone, 453 F.3d 68, 71 (1st Cir. 2006) (noting that “other federal courts have favorably analyzed the ACE-V method under Daubert [v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993),] for footwear and fingerprint impressions”). As Jackson’s testimony indicates, an opinion of an examiner is of little use in court or out unless it is verified. Accordingly, verification evidence should be admissible in some limited form with a limiting instruction.
In this case, the proper procedure would have been for the defendant to request, and the trial court to give, an instruction that the verification testimony was not to be considered for its truth but for the limited purpose of explaining how Jackson was able to render his opinion under the ACE-V protocol. As the defendant failed to request such an instruction, I would affirm. Cf. State v. W.J.T. Enterprises, 136 N.H. 490, 494 (1992) (noting that although defendants challenging evidence admitted for a non-hearsay purpose “may have been entitled to a limiting instruction regarding the purpose for which the testimony was admitted, none was requested”).