dissenting.
This case presents the novel question of whether immunity overrides liability when there are multiple causes contributing to an accidental injury and only one of those causes would confer immunity on the municipality. The Court obviates the need to address this question, reasoning that; as a matter of law, the sole proximate cause of plaintiffs injury was the natural condition of the ocean. I do not subscribe to that conclusion, and therefore address the issue that I believe must be resolved to dispose of this case.
I
In construing and applying the Tort Claims Act (“TCA”), it is frequently observed that immunity for public entities is the rule and liability is the exception. See N.J.S.A. 59:2-1b. This notion supports the oft stated proposition that in the determination of whether an injured person can prevail against a public entity, “[w]hen both liability and immunity appear to exist, the latter trumps the former.” Tice v. Cramer, 133 N.J. 347, 356, 627 A.2d 1090 (1993). Although that proposition does not constitute a basis for the Court’s analysis and determination in this ease, I believe it bears on.the central issue that must be resolved, namely, the *546effect of multiple causes of accidental injury under the TCA. I do not find clear support for the expansive conclusion that the TCA always immunizes a public entity from liability for an accidental injury where there is a combination of causes of that injury, only one of which confers immunity. In order to ascertain the intended effect of the TCA in this context, an examination of the language of the statute and its legislative history is required.
A.
The TCA absolves a municipality from liability in respect of its natural property by providing:
Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable for an injury caused by a condition of any unimproved public property, including but not limited to any natural condition of any lake, stream, bay, river or beach.
[N.J.S.A. 59:4-8.]
The provision is silent on whether a condition of unimproved property that is combined with other causes of accidental injury necessarily confers immunity.
In determining the meaning of the unimproved property immunity under N.J.S.A. 59:4-8, we should first resort to the express language of the statute to ascertain whether that can yield a clear meaning. Bergen Comm’l Bank v. Sisler, 157 N.J. 188, 202, 723 A.2d 944 (1999) (“The first step in any statutory analysis is to examine the statute’s plain language as the clearest indication of its meaning.”). The TCA simply does not state that if a condition of unimproved property is one of a combination of causes of an accidental injury, immunity always follows. Rather, it is silent on whether such a condition necessarily confers immunity when it is a concurrent cause of the injury. The interpretative issue, therefore, is whether the statute should be construed to require that if only one of multiple causes of accidental injury gives rise to immunity — even though other causes would generate liability — no liability can be visited upon the municipality.
In determining the meaning of the unimproved property immunity under N.J.S.A 59:4-8, the language of this provision should *547be construed to assure its compatibility with other provisions of the TCA. Seatrain Lines, Inc. v. Medina, 39 N.J. 222, 226-27, 188 A.2d 169 (1963) (observing that provisions of statutes should be construed in harmony and as together effecting overall legislative intent). One area of the statute that expressly considers the relationship between immunity and liability involves governmental responsibility for public property in general. N.J.S.A. 59:3-11 provides:
A public employee is not liable for the failure to provide supervision of public recreational facilities. Nothing in this section exonerates a public employee for negligence in the supervision of a public recreational facility.
In effect, this provision contemplates both qualified immunity and limited liability in respect of the supervision over public property. The immunity provided by this section for a public employee is limited to a specific cause; “failure to provide supervision.” But, it does not “exonerate” employees for a cause based on negligent supervision. The limited, liability for public employees is similar to that contained in another section of the TCA, N.J.S.A. 59:2-7, which provides that a public entity is not exonerated for negligence once it undertakes to supervise a facility.
The approach espoused in these sections is based on the recognition that accidental injury resulting from the use of improved public property will often entail multiple causes. There is no obvious reason why that understanding does not inform -the intended application of provisions governing accidental injury in the context of unimproved public property. The TCA should be read as a whole, its individual provisions harmonized, and construed in a way most consistent with the overall legislative • intent. See Fiore v. Consol. Freightways, 140 N.J. 452, 466, 659 A.2d 436 (1995). A consideration of the legislative intent at the time the TCA was enacted compels the conclusion that the lability provisions of the TCA for negligent supervision of improved public property should be reconciled with its provisions regarding governmental responsibility for unimproved property.
In the absence of a clear meaning that can be derived from plain and unambiguous statutory language, determination of the under*548lying intent of the Legislature turns on consideration of extrinsic factors. Wingate v. Estate of Ryan, 149 N.J. 227, 236, 693 A.2d 457 (1997). In construing a statute that has its origins in the common law and incorporates common law principles, that analysis may sensibly “commence with an evaluation of ‘the common law of New Jersey ... [a]t the time of the adoption of the statute.’ ” Renz v. Penn Cent. Corp., 87 N.J. 437, 443, 435 A.2d 540 (1981) (citing Egan v. Erie R.R. Co., 29 N.J. 243, 250, 148 A.2d 830 (1959)).
The historical key to unlocking the legislative understanding of concurrent causation in the context of sovereign immunity, the common-law progenitor of the TCA, is the common law concept of contributory negligence. Contributory negligence emerged as a doctrine of the common law with judicial origins dating to 1809. Renz, supra, 87 N.J. at 450, 435 A.2d 540 (citations omitted). It found its way into New Jersey common law in the middle of the last century. See Central R.R. Co. v. Moore, 24 N.J.L. 824 (E. & A. 1854); Vandegrift v. Rediker, 22 N.J.L. 185 (Sup.Ct.1849). Early on, the doctrine of contributory negligence precluded recovery on the part of a negligent plaintiff, regardless of the degree of his or her culpability. Renz, supra, 87 N.J. at 451, 435 A.2d 540. Gradually, however, the doctrine experienced liberalizing influences. Most significantly, courts began to focus on the fairness and need to identify and clarify the real or substantial causes of injury in the tort law, and recognized that in the application of contributory negligence, it must be shown that a plaintiffs conduct is a direct or effective cause of the accident in order to bar recovery. In State v. Lauer, 55 N.J.L. 205, 215, 26 A. 180 (Sup.Ct.1893), the Court wrote:
In the trial of cases of this kind, where it appears that both parties were in fault, the primary consideration is whether the faulty act of the plaintiff was so remote from the injury as not to be regarded, in a legal sense, as a cause of the accident, or whether the injury was proximately due to the plaintiffs negligence, as well as to the negligence of the defendant. If the faulty act of the plaintiff simply presents the condition under which the injury was received, and was not, in a legal sense, a contributory cause thereof, then the sole question will be whether, under the circumstances, and in the situation in which the injury was received, it was due to *549the defendant’s negligence. But if the plaintiffs negligence proximately — that is, directly — contributed to the injury, it will disentitle him to a recovery, unless the defendant’s wrongfid act was willful, or amounted to an intentional wrong.
[Id. at 215, 26 A. 180 (emphasis added) ].
Principles of fairness in assigning responsibility and allocating damages also gained strength in the evolution of tort law. A major change in that growth was the emergence of the doctrine of comparative negligence.1 The Legislature overtook the common law by adopting an act providing for comparative negligence,, effective on May 24,1973. N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.1, -5.2. Influenced by considerations of public policy implicit in that legislative action, this Court subsequently rejected contributory negligence as part of New Jersey common law and adopted comparative negligence principles to govern the allocation of fault in tort actions. Renz, supra, 87 N.J. at 456, 435 A.2d 540.
At the time of the TCA’s adoption in 1972, then, principles of contributory negligence were in the course of being modified and superseded by those of comparative negligence. The Legislature’s clear understanding of principles of comparative negligence and concurrent causation is demonstrated by explicit and implicit references to proximate causation in the TCA For example, the TCA adopts an express comparative negligence principle in N.J.S.A. 59:9-4:
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any party ... to recover damages to the extent permitted under this act, if such negligence was not greater than the negligence of the party against whom recovery is sought or was not greater than the combined negligence of the persons against whom recovery is sought. Any damages sustained shall be diminished by the percentage of negligence attributable to the person recovering.
The comment to N.J.S.A 59:9-4 reflects the Legislature’s appreciation of the state of the common law:
The purpose of this provision is to humanize the law by eliminating the harsh doctrine of contributory negligence and adopting in its place comparative negligence. Under the doctrine of contributory negligence a plaintiff is barred from *550recovery if his own negligence contributed to his injury — no matter how great or how slight that contributory negligence may have been. Under the comparative negligence doctrine contained in this provision the damages to which an injured party would be entitled under the act will be’ diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to him.
At least twelve states have adopted a form of the comparative negligence rule____ In fact, in a recent decision in which the New Jersey Supreme Court attempted to deal with the potential unfairness of the contributory negligence rule, Justice Francis, in a concurring opinion joined in by Justice Proctor, called upon the Legislature to adopt some form of comparative negligence. O’Brien v. Bethlehem Steel Corporation, 59 N.J. 114, 125-128, 279 A.2d 827 (1971).
Although there are a number of different comparative negligence plans, it is proposed that the so-called “pure form” of comparative negligence be adopted____ It is [] consistent with the general approach of this act which is intended to increase settlement and to reasonably and fairly increase the compensation of injured persons. It is anticipated that this form of comparative negligence will apply in all actions in which a public entity or public employee is a party.
[Comment on N.J.S.A. 59:9-4 (1972) (emphasis added).]
More significantly, the general liability provision that applies to dangerous conditions of improved public property is expressed in language that is virtually identical to that used in the immunity provision for unimproved public property. The unimproved property immunity provision applies where “an injury [was] caused by a condition of any unimproved property.” N.J.S.A 59:4-8. The improved property liability provision is implicated when “the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition.” N.J.S.A. 59:4-2.
It is indisputable that in providing for liability caused by the dangerous condition of property under N.J.SA 59:4-2, the Legislature contemplated that principles of comparative negligence would apply despite the absence of any express reference to concurrent causation or comparative negligence in that statutory section. Cf. Nora v. Township of Livingston, 171 N.J.Super. 579, 410 A.2d 278 (App.Div.1980) (per curiam) (noting in situation involving joint tortfeasors relevance of comparative negligence principles in allocating liability among plaintiff, defendant gas company, and defendant municipality for injury caused by negligently maintained road). There is not the slightest suggestion or intimation that in providing a specific immunity attributable to *551unimproved property under N.J.S.A 59:4-8, the Legislature intended to foreclose the application of comparative fault principles expressly recognized in N.J.S.A 59:9-4, when there is a combination of multiple causes, some of which ordinarily give rise to liability. See, e.g., Nora, supra, 171 N.J.Super. 579, 410 A.2d 278. See also Garrison v. Township of Middletown, 154 N.J. 282, 309, 712 A.2d 1101 (1998) (Stein, J. concurring) (recognizing that Legislature clearly considered common law concepts of concurrent causation in drafting TCA and that such principles are relevant to immunity, inquiry, although disagreeing with Court’s position concerning definition of “dangerous condition” of improved public property).
Further support for this position can be found in other authority. The Court has recognized the relevance of California’s TCA in lending meaning to our TCA. E.g., Garrison, supra, 154 N.J. at 289, 712 A.2d 1101; Levin v. County of Salem, 133 N.J. 35, 46, 626 A.2d 1091 (1993).
Principles of comparative fault or causation were recognized and applied by California in the context of a combination of causes (including one conferring immunity) resulting in accidental injury. In a case in which statutory design immunity was applicable, the California Supreme Court imposed liability on negligent failure-to-warn grounds, and refused to confer immunity. Cameron v. State, 7 Cal.3d 318, 102 Cal.Rptr. 305, 497 P.2d 777 (1972) (in bank). The court explained that because “negligent failure to warn is a concurrent cause of [plaintiffs’] injuries ... this concurrent negligence is an independent basis for recovery.” Id. at 783. The court accepted the plaintiffs’ contention “that, even if design immunity is eventually found to be applicable, it would not immunize the state for its concurrent negligence in failing to warn of the dangerous condition.” Ibid.
The California court also relied on another decision, Flournoy v. State, 275 Cal.App.2d 806, 80 Cal.Rptr. 485 (1969). There the court stated that although the plaintiff-heirs could be denied recovery for the state’s active negligence in creating a danger by *552building a faulty bridge, they might still recover for the state’s passive negligence in failing to warn of that danger. The Cameron court explained:
There may be two concurring, proximate causes of an accident____ Regardless of the availability of the active negligence theory, plaintiffs were entitled to go before a jury on the passive negligence theory, i.e., an accident caused by the state’s failure to warn the public against icy danger known to it but not apparent to a reasonably careful highway user.
[497 P.2d at 784 (quoting Flournoy, 275 Cal.App.2d at 811, 80 Cal.Rptr. 485).]
Further, the court in Cameron specifically rejected the defense argument that the design immunity provided in Section 830.6 of California’s TCA must “prevail” over any liability for a dangerous condition of public property under section 835 of that act. Ibid. The court adopted the reasoning in Flournoy:
By force of its very terms the design immunity of section 830.6 is limited to a design-caused accident. (Citation omitted). It does not immunize from liability caused by negligence independent of design, even though the independent negligence is only a concurring, proximate cause of the accident.
[Ibid, (quoting Flournoy, 275 Cal.App.2d at 811, 80 Cal.Rptr. 485.) ]
These decisions clearly recognize that in a context in which accidental injury may be attributable to a combination of causes only one of which confers immunity, it was not the intent of the TCA that immunity would necessarily override liability; significantly these decisions had been rendered when this State adopted its TCA, and presumably expressed an understanding of the law that our Legislature shared. Garrison, supra, 154 N.J. at 289, 712 A.2d 1101; Levin, supra, 133 N.J. at 46, 626 A.2d 1091.
Another instructive California case, Gonzales v. City of San Diego, 130 Cal.App.3d 882, 182 Cal.Rptr. 73 (1982), involved the drowning death of a woman who was swimming at a beach that had lifeguards voluntarily provided by the city of San Diego. Her children sued the city, alleging a negligent failure to warn of a dangerous riptide. The trial court granted the city’s demurrer asserting absolute immunity under a provision of California’s TCA providing immunity for injuries resulting from a natural condition at any unimproved public property. The appeals court reversed. The court assumed that the beach was unimproved property, but *553held that the requirement that the injury be caused by a “natural condition” was not met. Rather, the court found that plaintiff had pled a “hybrid dangerous condition,” described as “partially natural and partially artificial in character, the result of a combination of a natural defect within the property and the third party conduct of the [c]ity,” which allowed the claim against the city to go forward. Id. at 885, 182 Cal.Rptr. 73. The court explained that “the dangerous condition [ ] arose from the existence of a natural dangerous riptide condition, plus [the][c]ity’s voluntarily providing lifeguard service at [the][b]each (a duty with which it impliedly was not burdened under [the TCA]), and its performing that voluntarily assumed service negligently by failing to warn of the known, hazardous, natural condition.” Ibid. Gonzales thus reflects an intent to account for multiple causes of accidental injury, even where one of those causes is accorded statutory immunity.2
B.
In my view, in dealing with distinct, multiple or concurrent causes that contribute to an accidental injury, one of which gives rise to governmental immunity, the Legislature intended to invoke principles of comparative negligence or fault. Therefore, I believe the proper principle of law to be applied is one that compares and balances the immunity-conferring and liability-imposing causes, as well as any contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, and accords each cause its proportionate weight in the allocation of statutory responsibility.
*554In balancing the relative weight of these causes, where a dangerous condition of unimproved property combines with the negligent supervision of a municipal employee resulting in a plaintiff’s injury, it is appropriate to allocate damages to the government entity to the extent that a liability-imposing cause substantially increased the risk of injury. See Gonzales, supra, 130 Cal.App.3d 882, 182 Cal.Rptr. 73 (allowing claim against municipality to go forward on “hybrid dangerous condition” theory, because public entity’s negligent conduct increased risk of danger posed by natural condition); see also Scafidi v. Seiler, 119 N.J. 93, 108-109, 574 A.2d 398 (1990) (holding where there is evidence that defendant’s negligent act or omission increased risk of harm, and trier of fact determines that this increased risk was “substantial factor” in producing harm actually suffered by plaintiff, liability may be imposed); Evers v. Dollinger, 95 N.J. 399, 417, 471 A.2d 405 (1984) (same). Utilizing “increased risk” as a measure of liability is “consistent with the principles underlying the comparative-negligence statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.1 (damages sustained shall be diminished by percentage of negligence attributable to person recovering); Scafidi, supra, 119 N.J. at 113, 574 A.2d 398; see also Ostrowski v. Azzara, 111 N.J. 429, 449-51, 545 A.2d 148 (1988) (finding that damages should be allocated to reflect doctor’s malpractice that increased risk of harm attributable to plaintiff’s condition and acts of personal negligence). This analysis also comports with the principle of tort law that recognizes that a duty of care that encompasses a victim’s own potential wrongdoing or contributory negligence can be a proper basis for liability. See Steele v. Kerrigan, 148 N.J. 1, 689 A.2d 685 (1997); Cowan v. Doering, 111 N.J. 451, 545 A.2d 159 (1988).
A critical factor in these situations is that a protective duty is voluntarily assumed by the governmental entity. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323(a) (stating that rendering necessary protective services to another may subject provider to liability for injury for negligence “if [the] failure to exercise [reasonable] care increased the risk of such harm.”). Equally important in assessing increased risk is the “induce[ment of] public reliance” on the *555part of the public entity by assuming a protective duty. Gonzales, supra, 130 Cal.App.3d at 886, 182 Cal-Rptr. 73. Thus, “when a public entity voluntarily provides a protective service for particular members of the public, which induces their reliance on the proper performance of that service, [the TCA] does not necessarily provide immunity.” Arroyo v. State, 34 Cal.App.4th. 755, 764, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 627 (1995). “Put another way, the immunity is inapplicable where a public entity’s conduct actively and negligently increases the degree of danger posed by a natural condition.” Mercer v. California, 197 Cal.App.3d 158, 167, 242 Cal.Rptr. 701 (Ct.App.1988). See also Lee v. Doe, 232 N.J.Super. 569, 579, 557 A.2d 1045 (App.Div.1989) (holding that immunity for inadequate police protection would not apply “if the police officer caused the victim to rely on him for protection or the police officer otherwise increased the risk of injury to the victim.”).
These principles of comparative negligence and concurrent causation are appropriately invoked in construing and applying the TCA. To reiterate, comparative causation has long been recognized in the common law of New Jersey. It is entirely reasonable to view the choice of language in N.J.S.A. 59:4-8 as implicitly incorporating the common law principles of concurrent comparative causation. Thus, where a concurrent cause — such as the negligent supervision of a public employee — independently or concurrently causes, or substantially increases the risk of injury posed by other causes, any specific liability provision covering this cause should provide a recovery to plaintiff in proportion to the fault attributable to that cause. In this case, imputing principles of comparative causation to N.J.S.A. 59:4-8 reconciles a legislative intent to protect bathers from negligent supervision by lifeguards with the text of the statute.
To the extent that the negligent supervision of municipal employees substantially increased the risk of injury posed by the condition of unimproved property, namely, the. ocean, that percentage of increased risk may be used to impose and allocate liability. Thus, allowing recovery only for the increased risk attributable to *556negligent supervision simultaneously acknowledges the immunity ascribed to the condition of the unimproved property by exonerating the municipality to the extent the immunity-conferring condition proximately contributed to the accidental injury.
Ill
The majority determines as a matter of law that plaintiffs accident was caused only by the waves, a natural condition of the ocean, ante at 544-45, 732 A.2d at 1041, and thus grounds its holding on plaintiffs failure to establish that the lifeguards’ negligent supervision proximately caused his injury. Ante at 543, 732 A.2d at 1041. I disagree. I believe that the Court more properly should determine liability based on comparative negligence principles, taking into account that this case presents concurrent or multiple causes.
This record cannot be viewed as excluding negligent supervision by the lifeguard as an independent concurrent cause. Further, the record also reveals a basis for determining that plaintiff was contributorily negligent.3 Consequently, there is evidence that the condition of the ocean coupled with the employees’ negligent supervision and plaintiffs own negligence combined to contribute to the accidental injury.
Comparative negligence doctrine does not foreclose the entry of summary judgment when there are no genuine disputes over facts that are material to the issue of proximate cause. Vega by Muniz v. Piedilato, 154 N.J. 496, 529, 713 A.2d 442 (1998) (Handler, J., concurring) (stating that our comparative negligence jurisprudence “permits courts to enter summary judgment in the defendant’s favor in the extraordinary case where no rational juror *557could conclude that the plaintiffs negligence did not exceed the defendant’s negligence.”). Here, the record does not allow the Court to conclude, as a matter of law, that the condition of the ocean was the sole proximate cause of the accident. Nor does the record require the determination, as a matter of law, that plaintiffs own negligence, even when combined with the condition of the ocean, which would confer immunity, exceeds any fault that would be attributable to the negligent supervision of the lifeguards. That is particularly so in a case, such as this, where the defendant’s duty to afford protection includes the prevention of plaintiffs possible wrongdoing. See Kerrigan, supra, 148 N.J. 1, 689 A.2d 685; Cowan, supra, 111 N.J. 451, 545 A.2d 159. Thus, there remains the ultimate issue whether the negligent supervision of the lifeguards substantially increased the risk of accidental injury to plaintiff posed by the condition of the ocean and whether that increased risk outweighs other causes of the accidental injury that may be attributed to either or both the condition of the ocean and plaintiffs contributory negligence.
I conclude that plaintiff has presented genuinely disputed issues of material fact that must be resolved by a trial. I would, therefore, affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division.
IV
For the reasons stated, I dissent. Justices O’HERN and STEIN join in this opinion.
While as late as 1968 all but seven states still recognized the defense of contributory negligence in its traditional form, by 1974 comparative negligence had become the majority rule. Renz, supra, 87 N.J. at 453, 435 A.2d 540.
The majority criticizes Gonzales and notes it was superseded by Cal. Gov. Code § 831.21. Ante at 542, 732 A.2d at 1040. That, however, indicates only that California's legislature has chosen to provide a specific immunity for lifeguards, not that the original basic intent of the TCA — that immunity will not necessarily or always supplant concurrent independent negligence — was inaccurately expressed in Gonzales, as well as in Cameron and Flournoy. In fact, Gonzales was never overruled by the California Supreme Court. The Legislature of course, may always determine as a matter of policy whether an immunity in a specific situation must prevail notwithstanding the presence of independent concurrent fault.
The Court points out that plaintiff was an experienced surfer, familiar with the dangers of a high surf, and had been at the beach five hours on the day in question. Ante at 535, 543, 732 A.2d at 1036, 1041. Because of plaintiff's experience and the length of time he had been at the beach, he knew the ocean conditions and appreciated the risks associated with surfing in the turbulent ocean.