I respectfully dissent and would affirm the decision of the circuit court. In my opinion, the Workers Compensation *394Commission (Commission), when changing the reimbursement rate for ambulatory surgery centers in a manner that substantially alters the prior rate, must afford notice and an opportunity to be heard to those affected by the change. The proper means to achieve notice and an opportunity to be heard is by requiring these revisions to be promulgated through regulations submitted to the General Assembly for its approval, and I would require the Commission to do so in this case.
Although both sides agree this issue should be decided as a matter of law, both disagree with the decision of the circuit court. Surgery Centers argue the circuit court erred in finding they did not have the right to a contested case under Section l-23-310(3).8 Conversely, the Commission contends the circuit court erred in holding Surgery Centers had a right to have any revision of the schedules promulgated in a regulation, while at the same time holding Surgery Centers had no property interest in the payment schedule established by the Commission. Unlike the majority, I would find no error, because I believe the right to notice and a hearing claimed by Surgery Centers does not hinge on the existence of a liberty or property interest.
Section 42-3-30 of the South Carolina Code (1985) requires the Commission to promulgate regulations relating to the administration of the workers’ compensation laws of this State. Section 1-23-110 of the South Carolina Code (2005 & Supp. 2009) provides that, before the Commission promulgates a regulation, it must publicize notice of the change, detailing an address where interested persons may submit written comments before the regulations are tendered to the General Assembly. Thus, generally speaking, section 42-3-30 requires *395the Commission to promulgate regulations for matters affecting workers’ compensation programs in this state, and section 1-23-110 requires the Commission to give notice before promulgating a regulation and provide interested individuals with the opportunity to be heard. Therefore, pursuant to the statutes detailed above, I believe the Commission is required to give notice and provide for an opportunity to be heard before adopting the new schedules contained in the recommendations of the Hospital Advisory Committee.
The Commission maintains, and the majority holds, the necessary regulation authorizing its conduct has already been promulgated in regulation 67-1304. Following this reasoning, the Commission’s conduct in commissioning the Advisory Committee to study the situation, then subsequently adopting its recommendations, is simply fulfilling the directive of regulation 67-1304, albeit nine years later. Additionally, the Commission cites the affidavit of its Executive Director, Gary Thibault, wherein he stated that since 1984, “in each case where the Commission has established a new or revised schedule of maximum allowable payments for services, the Commission did so by a vote of the Full Commission at a monthly Business Meeting.” The mere fact that this practice has existed, without apparent challenge until today, is, in my opinion, not dispositive of its legitimacy.
Furthermore, “there is a basic presumption that the legislature has knowledge of previous legislation as well as of judicial decisions construing that legislation when later statutes are enacted concerning related subjects.” Whitner v. State, 328 S.C. 1, 6, 492 S.E.2d 777, 779 (1997) (citing Berkebile v. Outen, 311 S.C. 50, 426 S.E.2d 760 (1993); 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 316, at 541-42 (1953)). Therefore, absent specific language in regulation 67-1304, or other qualifying statute, that authorizes the Commission to act in the revision of these maximum allowable payment schedules for ambulatory surgery centers without promulgating a new regulation as provided in sections 42-3-30 and 1-23-110, this Court must presume the General Assembly intended the Commission to promulgate a regulation in this matter. Instead, the majority reads a mandate in favor of the Commission that does not expressly exist within the plain and unambiguous terms of regulation 67-1304: instead of adhering to the general rule that all changes in the administration of *396Workers’ Compensation must be accomplished through the promulgation of regulations, the majority holds that a legislative directive contained in a prior regulation absolves the Commission in perpetuity from thereafter complying with an express statute. Importantly, although regulations authorized and adopted by the General Assembly generally have the force of law, a regulation may not alter or add to an existing statute. See Goodman v. City of Columbia, 318 S.C. 488, 490, 458 S.E.2d 531, 532 (1995) (stating that insofar as a regulation added a requirement to a statute, the specifications set forth in the statute must prevail). Therefore, even assuming such a “mandate” can be read into regulation 67-1304, it is invalid insofar as it could be interpreted to permit the Commission to act absent promulgation of a regulation under section 42-3-30.
Moreover, article 1, section 22 of the South Carolina Constitution, which was adopted by the General Assembly in 1970, provides: “No person shall be finally bound by a judicial or quasi judicial decision of an administrative agency9 affecting-private rights except on due notice and an opportunity to be heard ... and he shall have in all such instances the right to judicial review.” Commenting on the basis for the recommended addition of section 22, the Committee authorized to make proposals to change the existing Constitution stated:
More and more governmental decisions are being made under powers delegated to administrative divisions of State Government. In many cases, the decisions of administrative divisions are more significant than laws enacted by the General Assembly or decisions made by the courts. The Committee agrees with many other constitutional study groups throughout the country that judicial and quasi-judicial decisions of administrative agencies should be consistent with due process of law and complete fairness to the citizen. This provision is recommended as a safeguard for the protection of liberty and property of citizens.
Final Report of the Committee to Make a Study of the South Carolina Constitution of 1895, p. 21 (1969).
*397I agree with the majority that the circuit court correctly found Surgery Centers had no “property” interest that was implicated by the Commission’s revision of the maximum allowable payment schedules, in the sense that Surgery Centers had no right to a guaranteed payment schedule at the discount rate of 12.1 percent. In order to determine the effect of Surgery Centers’ lack of a cognizable property interest on their entitlement to notice and an opportunity to be heard under article 1, section 22, it is imperative that this Court examine the source of these private rights. While the circuit court, the parties, and the majority by acquiescence, have denominated the rights sought by Surgery Centers as “due process rights,” I believe a closer examination reveals the label to be incorrect. In previous cases, this Court has been inconsistent in the manner in which it has labeled rights flowing from article 1, section 22 of our State Constitution. In some cases, we have referred to the guarantees of notice and the right to be heard emanating from article 1, section 22 as “due process rights.” See League of Women Voters of Georgetown County v. Litchfield-by-the-Sea, 305 S.C. 424, 426-27, 409 S.E.2d 378, 380 (1991) (overruled on specific grounds by Brown v. S.C. Dep’t of Health and Envtl. Control, 348 S.C. 507, 560 S.E.2d 410 (2002); Garris v. Governing Bd. of S.C. Reinsurance Facility, 333 S.C. 432, 444, 511 S.E.2d 48, 54 (1998)). In other cases, the Court has, without calling them “due process rights,” simply stated article 1, section 22 guarantees “persons the right to notice and an opportunity to be heard by an administrative agency....” Ross v. Medical Univ. of S.C, 328 S.C. 51, 68, 492 S.E.2d 62, 71 (1997).
I do not think the rights guaranteed under article 1, section 22 are the same as those classically protected under the Due Process Clause of our State and National Constitutions. See U.S. Const, amend. XIV § 1; S.C. Const, art. V, § 5 (stating no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law). Even if the Court has referred to the rights under article 1, section 22 as “due process rights,” for claims under section 22, we have neither focused on, nor required the existence of a liberty or property interest, in the sense of a prerequisite to the Court’s analysis of claims under the Due Process Clause. Stono River Envtl. Prot. Ass’n v. S.C. Dep’t of Health and Envtl. Control, 305 S.C. 90, 94, 406 *398S.E.2d 340, 342 (1991); League of Women Voters of Georgetown County, 305 S.C. at 426-27, 409 S.E.2d at 380; Ross, 328 S.C. at 68, 492 S.E.2d at 71; Garris, 333 S.C. at 444, 511 S.E.2d at 54.
As stated above, I recognize the right to notice and an opportunity to be heard are typically identifiable with rights incident to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Clear Channel Outdoor v. City of Myrtle Beach, 372 S.C. 230, 235, 642 S.E.2d 565, 567 (2007) (“Due process requires (1) adequate notice; (2) adequate opportunity for a hearing; (3) the right to introduce evidence; and (4) the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses.”). However, in this case, the right of Surgery Centers to notice and an opportunity to be heard emanates, not from the Due Process Clause, but from article 1, section 22 of our State Constitution and from section 1-23-110. Therefore, because the rights in this case do not flow from the Due Process Clause, I believe it unnecessary, as the majority has done, to employ a traditional due process analysis to determine whether Surgery Centers’ constitutionally protected interests have been deprived. See Sloan v. S.C. Bd. of Physical Therapy Exam’rs, 370 S.C. 452, 483, 636 S.E.2d 598, 614 (2006) (stating in order for due process rights to attach, a party must show that he was arbitrarily and capriciously deprived of a cognizable property interest rooted in state law).
Instead, I would look solely to the process through which the Commission enacted its new prospective payment system for Surgery Centers. In my view, the Commission’s actions in forming the Advisory Committee to study, develop, and propose a new prospective payment system for outpatient hospital services and the services rendered by ambulatory surgical centers, and the Commission’s subsequent adoption of the Advisory Committee’s proposal, all without the proper notice and opportunity to be heard by Surgery Centers, constitute exactly the sort of quasi judicial decision section 22 was intended to address.
Finally, I am not persuaded that the General Assembly intended to provide the Commission with unfettered authority to adjust this reimbursement rate in perpetuity without affording the safeguards which attach to provisions promulgated *399within the framework of the regulatory process. Consequently, I would vote to affirm the circuit court’s determination that Surgery Centers are entitled to the proper notice and opportunity to be heard under section 1-23-110. Under out State’s jurisprudence, should the Commission want to establish a new prospective payment system it should do so by promulgating a new regulation subject to the participation of interested parties under sections 42-3-30 and 1-23-110, and the subsequent adoption by the General Assembly.
KITTREDGE, J., concurs.. I agree with the majority that the circuit court correctly held Surgery Centers did not establish the necessary independent right to a contested case under section 1-23-310(3). See Triska v. Dep't of Health and Envtl. Control, 292 S.C. 190, 196-97, 355 S.E.2d 531, 534 (1987) (stating a contested case does not exist where there is no requirement deriving from South Carolina or Federal law that there be an opportunity for a hearing). However, that ruling does not foreclose Surgery Centers’ right to notice and an opportunity to be heard on other grounds, as set forth herein. See Stono River Envtl. Prot. Ass'n v. S.C. Dep’t of Health and Envtl. Control, 305 S.C. 90, 94, 406 S.E.2d 340, 342 (1991) (finding parties are entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard, apart from the APA, under article 1, section 22 of our Constitution).
. The Commission qualifies as an agency under section 1-23-10(1) of the South Carolina Code (2005). (providing an " ‘[a]gency’ or ‘State agency' means each state board, commission, department, executive department or officer ... authorized by law to make regulations or to determine contested cases”).