dissenting. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla and means such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Fouch v. State, Alcoholic Beverage Control Div., 10 Ark. App. 139, 662 S.W.2d 181 (1983). I dissent because the Board’s decision to deny Muncriefs transfer application lacks supporting evidence. The evidence introduced in opposition to Muncriefs application included the testimony of Shirley Janisse, a competing convenience store operator with a beer permit, who testified that Muncriefs proposed move would put her out of business because Muncriefs proposed location would be closer to the “dry” county line than her convenience store, and the testimony of Mary Laribee, a witness residing directly east of Muncriefs proposed location, who testified that Muncriefs proposed new location would increase traffic congestion. The Board also received a petition with over 400 signatures opposing Muncriefs proposed transfer.
The testimony of Ms. Janisse is legally irrelevant since the Board does not issue or deny permits for the purpose of protecting the interests of presently licensed owners. Fouch, supra. The irrelevance of Janisse’s testimony, combined with, the total discreditation of the testimony regarding potential traffic problems, leaves no evidence to support the Board’s denial of Muncriefs application. The majority correctly notes that the number of persons who object to the issuance of retail liquor permits is of no significance, yet the majority upholds the denial based on the discretionary leeway the Board has in determining whether public convenience and advantage will be promoted by the issuance of a permit. In the “findings of fact” promulgated by the Board in this case, the Board concluded that public convenience and advantage would not be served by Ms. Muncriefs proposed transfer because “public” does not refer to that portion of the public situated in dry counties. This interpretation is contrary to both the plain meaning of “public” and the interpretation this court set out in Fayetteville School Dist. No. 1 v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 279 Ark. 89, 648 S.W.2d 804 (1983). The reference to the public convenience and advantage means that the interest of the general public is to be considered. As there is most certainly no law against persons in dry counties commuting to buy liquor and beer, no reasonable basis exists for the agency’s bizarre limitation on the word “public.” As I can find no evidence to support the Board’s denial of Muncriefs transfer application, I would affirm the trial court.