(dissenting). In 1957 the Borough of Paramus (Paramus), pursuant to N. J. S. A. 40:36A-50, entered into a contract with the Bergen County Sewer Authority (Authority), an autonomous and independent entity, for *390disposal by the Authority of all sewage eminating from within the municipal limits. The Authority thereafter, at its expense, constructed in 1961 an interceptor main which passed over the rear and easterly side of plaintiffs’ lands, hereafter described. This interceptor main discharges into the Authority’s principal sewer main which in turn channels the sewage to the Authority’s disposal plant. At the insistence of the Borough and as part of that agreement, connections were provided in the interceptor main along the rear lines of various properties in order to permit those properties to discharge sewage directly into the interceptor. Such a connection was provided for plaintiffs’ lands.
In 1960, the Borough, as part of its municipal sewage system, authorized by ordinance the installation of the first stage (Stage 1) of its lateral collecting sewer lines.. The purpose of these lines was the collection of sewage from the lands in a portion of the municipality and the transmission thereof to the Authority interceptor main. The ordinance provided for these collecting lines as a local improvement — 18.47% of the cost to be borne by the municipality, the balance to be paid “* * * by special assessments which shall be levied in accordance with law on property specially benefited thereby, as nearly as may be in proportion to and not in excess of the peculiar benefit, advantage or increase in value which the respective lots and parcels of real estate shall be deemed to receive by reason of said local improvement/’ (Emphasis supplied)
Plaintiffs’ property lies within the confines of the territory encompassed by Stage 1. The westerly side thereof has a frontage on the easterly side of Forest Avenue of approximately 550 feet. The lands have no other street frontage. The plot is irregular in shape, having a further westerly length, without street frontage, of upwards of 165 feet and a depth of over 1,000 feet on the northerly side and 1,200 feet on the southerly side.
The Borough installed an 8-inch lateral collecting line on the westerly side of Forest Avenue, which is not available for *391use by plaintiffs. The collecting line on the easterly side of Forest Avenue stopped over 185 feet short of plaintiffs’ land on the north and an indeterminate distance short of plaintiffs’ land in the south. Thus, it is conceded that there is no lateral collecting line into which plaintiffs could tap for the discharge of sewage from their property. The reason for this situation lies in the fact that the elevation of Forest Avenue at plaintiffs’ property made it not feasible, without a disproportionately and unreasonably high cost, to construct a collecting sewer line at that location. The Borough engineer testified that the collecting lateral sewer lines in this vicinity were intentionally designed so as not to service plaintiffs’ property. In answer to the question, “Am I further correct in the assumption that it was your opinion that this property could be sewered by the Interceptor that had been installed or was about to be installed by the Bergen County Sewer Authority he replied: “Yes. This ground generally slopes toward the brook rather steeply and to provide a sewer in Forest Avenue to serve all of the property would have required an excessive depth. It was therefore considered that the Interceptor sewer which was at or near the brook and at a lower level would much better serve the property because it was contemplated and in fact required by the borough ordinance that a tract of this size when subdivided would be required to install its own sanitary sewers.”
Plaintiffs, having constructed an office building adjacent to Forest Avenue, applied for, in accordance with the AuthorityParamus contract, and were granted permission by the Authority (with the approval of the local board of health) to tie into and discharge their sewage directly into the interceptor. They ran an 8-inch private sewer line for some 1,200 feet across their lands for this purpose at their own expense.
The contract for the installation of the lateral collecting sewer lines having been completed, the Borough confirmed a special assessment in 1962 against plaintiffs of $18,568.70 for the benefit received from that improvement. The stipulation adverted to in the majority opinion was not that the assess*392ment was “not in excess of the alleged benefits” directly arising from the lateral collecting sewer installation, but rather that it was not in excess of the benefits arising from the interceptor installation. Although the stipulation could have been more clearly articulated, this conclusion becomes self-evident from plaintiffs’ firm position that they received no benefits from the collecting sewer.
As noted, plaintiffs argue, as they did before the Law Division, that their lands received no special benefit from the installation of the lateral collecting lines and therefore they are not liable for any assessment. The answer to the question thus posed must be found by relating the above facts to applicable legal principles.
The collecting sewers were installed as a local improvement under N. J. S. A. 40:56-1, which defines that term as:
“A local improvement is one, the cost of which, or a portion thereof, may be assessed upon the lands in the vicinity thereof benefited thereby.”
R. S. 40:56-27 provides:
“All assessments levied under this chapter for any local improvement shall in each ease be as nearly as may be in proportion to and not in excess of the peculiar benefit, advantage or increase in value which the respective lots and parcels of real estate shall be deemed to receive by reason of such improvement.” (Emphasis supplied)
The determinative test of the liability of lands for a special assessment is, in the statutory language, whether the property received a “peculiar benefit, advantage or increase in value * * * by reason of such improvement.” The definition of peculiar benefit was well expressed in In re Public Service Electric and Gas Co., 18 N. J. Super. 357 (App. Div. 1952), where the Court said, at p. 363:
“The foundation of the power to lay a special assessment or a special tax for a local improvement of any character, whether it be opening, improving or paving a street or sidewalk or constructing *393a sewer, or cleaning or sprinkling a street, is the benefit which the object of the assessment or tax confers on the owner of the abutting property, or the owners of property in the assessment or special taxation district, which is different from the general benefit which the owners enjoy in common with the other inhabitants or citizens of the municipal corporation." (Emphasis supplied)
See also Cirasella v. Village of So. Orange, 57 N. J. Super. 522, 527-528 (App. Div. 1959). Special assessments, therefore, can be sustained only upon the theory that the property assessed receives some special benefit from the improvement differing from the benefit that the general public enjoys. 14 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 38.32, p. 121 (3d ed. 1950).
It has long been recognized that the “peculiar benefit, advantage or increase in value” to the property assessed must arise from the particular improvement to pay for which the assessment is levied. Village of Norwood v. Baker, 172 U. S. 269, 19 S. Ct. 187, 43 L. Ed. 443 (1898); State, Kellogg, pros. v. City of Elizabeth, 40 N. J. L. 274, 276 (Sup. Ct. 1878); The Tide-water Company v. Coster, 18 N. J. Eq. 518, 527-528 (E. & A. 1866). That benefit must flow directly from the improvement for which the assessment was made and not from some other improvement. Maywood Land Co. v. Rochelle Park, 13 N. J. Misc. 841, 842, 181 A. 632 (Cir. Ct. 1935); 14 McQuillin, supra, § 38.31, p. 118. This is not to say that the improvement must be immediately adjacent to such property, but rather that the improvement must have an immediate, peculiar or especial beneficial impact upon the property to be assessed. Propinquity is only one element to be considered in deciding whether such a benefit has accrued to the land in question. See Cirasella v. Village of So. Orange, supra, 57 N. J. Super., at pp. 529-530; King v. Reed, 43 N. J. L. 186, 192 (Sup. Ct. 1881); State, Henderson, pros. v. Mayor, etc., of City of Jersey City, 41 N. J. L. 489, 492-493 (Sup. Ct. 1879).
The relationship of the improvement to the land must be such that use may be made of that particular improvement, *394and the benefit must be a present benefit immediately accruing from the work in question. See Cirasella v. Village of So. Orange, supra, 57 N. J. Super., at p. 529; Green v. Town of Montclair, 125 N. J. L. 19, 20 (Sup. Ct. 1940); Morris v. City of Bayonne, 53 N. J. L. 299, 305 (Sup. Ct. 1891); McKevitt v. Hoboken, 45 N. J. L. 482, 486 (Sup. Ct. 1883); King v. Reed, supra, 43 N. J. L., at p. 192; State, Kellogg, pros. v. Elizabeth, supra, 40 N. J. L., at p. 276; State, New Jersey R. R. & T. Co., pros. v. City of Elizabeth, 37 N. J. L. 330, 334-335 (Sup. Ct. 1875). A landowner, however, may not permanently escape an assessment for an improvement from which he receives no immediate benefit because of its then unavailability to his lands. Where such a situation exists he may, in certain circumstances, be ultimately assessed when further construction by the assessing authority makes the original improvement available to his lands and confers a, benefit thereon. See State, Kellogg, pros. v. Elizabeth, supra, 40 N. J. L., at p. 277. Cf. Morris v. Bayonne, supra, 53 N. J. L., at p. 301; R. S. 40:56-52.
A special assessment levied for a municipal improvement which is not grounded upon, or is in excess of, the special benefit conferred upon the assessed property by such improvement is unconstitutional. In Village of Norwood v. Baker, supra, the United States Supreme Court said:
“As already indicated, the principle underlying special assessments to meet the cost of public improvements is that the property upon which they are imposed is peculiarly benefited, and, therefore, the owners do not, in fact, pay anything in excess of what they receive by reason of such improvement. But the guaranties for the protection of private property would be seriously impaired, if it were established as a rule of constitutional law that the imposition by the legislature upon particular private property of the entire cost of a public improvement, irrespective of any peculiar benefits accruing to the owner from such improvement, could not be questioned by him in the courts of the country. It is one thing for the legislature to prescribe it as a general rule that property abutting on a street opened by the public shall be deemed to have been specially benefited by such improvement, and, therefore, should specially contribute to the cost incurred by the public. It is quite a different thing to lay it down as an absolute rule that such property, whether *395it is in fact benefited or not by the opening of the street, may be assessed by the front foot for a fixed sum, representing the whole cost of the improvement, and without any right in the property owner to show, when an assessment of that kind is made, or is about to be made, that the sum so fixed is in excess of the benefits received.
In our judgment, the exaction from the owner of private property of the cost of a public improvement in substantial excess of the special benefits accruing to him is, to the extent of such excess, a taking, under the guise of taxation, of private property for public use without compensation. We say ‘substantial excess,’ because exact equality of taxation is not always obtainable, and for that reason the excess of cost over special benefits, unless it be of a material character, ought not to be regarded by a court of equity, when its aid is invoked to restrain the enforcement of a special assessment.” 172 U. S., at pp. 278-279, 19 S. Ct., at pp. 190-191.
And in The Tide-water Company v. Coster, supra, 18 N. J. Eq., at p. 527, the Court said:
“Where lands are improved by legislative action, on the ground of public utility, the cost of such improvement, it has been frequently held, may, to a certain degree, be imposed on the parties who, in consequence of owning lands in the vicinity of such improvement, receive a peculiar advantage. By the operation of such a system, it is not considered that the property of the individual, or any part of it, is taken from him for the public use, because he is compensated in the enhanced value of such property. But it is clear this principle is only applicable when the benefit is commensurate to the burthen; when that which is received by the land owner is equal or superior in value to the sum exacted; for if the sum exacted be in excess, then to that extent, most incontestably, private property is assumed by the public. Nor, as to this excess, can it be successfully maintained that such imposition is legitimate as an exercise of the power of taxation. Such an imposition has none of the essential characteristics of a tax.”
If, therefore, no such “peculiar” benefit arises from the improvement, an assessment is not only violative of the mandate of N. J. S. A. 40:56-1 et seq., but is as well unconstitutional.
We come to a consideration of the facts sub judice in the light of the foregoing. In the instant case it is admitted by the Borough that the plaintiffs can make no use now or in the future of the lateral collecting sewer lines for the construction of which they were assessed. Indeed, the municipality intentionally designed the installation so that these lines *396would not abut plaintiffs’ property, and thereby denied plaintiffs any use thereof. That this was a calculated decision is evidenced by the testimony of the Borough engineer, who stated that the failure to make the collecting lines available to plaintiffs was intentional and that the Borough required owners of plots the size of plaintiffs to furnish their own lines for transmission of sewage to the interceptor. It should be noted parenthetically that the line which plaintiffs installed for that purpose was of the same dimension as the municipal line on Forest Avenue, i. e., an eight-inch pipe, quite clearly a substitute for the municipal collecting line.
The conclusion is inescapable that plaintiffs’ property received not only no “peculiar” benefit from the lateral collecting sewer lines but actually received no benefit of any kind therefrom. Hence plaintiffs should not be subject to the levy of any special assessment for that improvement. See In re Township of North Bergen, 10 N. J. Misc. 935, 937, 161 A. 807 (Cir. Ct. 1932); Beattie Mfg. Co. v. Little Falls Twp., 7 N. J. Misc. 161, 163, 144 A. 634 (Sup. Ct. 1929).
But the majority herein reasons that the interceptor would not have been installed by the Authority under its contract with the Borough except upon the actual or implied agreement of the latter to supply a lateral collecting sewer system through which all sewage of the municipality would flow into the Authority interceptor main. They rationalize that the Authority interceptor and the Borough collecting lines in reality constitute a single sewerage system. They conclude, in effect, that the special benefit received by plaintiffs from the construction of the lateral collecting lines was the earlier installation of the interceptor, which was constructed by the Authority in reliance upon fulfillment by the Borough of its obligation to install collecting lines which would discharge the municipal sewage into the interceptor. The answer is several-fold.
In the first place, the benefit to plaintiffs’ lands, which the majority herein finds, is not that which flows from the installation of the collecting lines by the Borough, as a part of the *397local improvement authorized by ordinance, but from the construction of the interceptor by the Authority. The Borough has no power to levy a special assessment for this construction by the Authority.
In the second place, the power to levy an assessment is statutory. N. J. S. A. 40:56-1 et seq. That statute requires, as above noted, a “peculiar” benefit which under our cases has been defined as an “especial” benefit that must arise directly from the particular improvement for which the assessment is levied and not some other improvement.
The Borough, admittedly, could have constructed the interceptor main with municipal funds. This it could have accomplished as a local improvement. The cost thereof could then have been distributed among the persons ultimately discharging sewage into such interceptor by assessing the properties served for the individual benefits received, whether the users tapped directly into the interceptor main or discharged their sewage indirectly through the collecting sewer lines. But then, the users of the lateral collecting sewer lines would have had to stand an additional assessment for the benefits received from the installation of those collecting lines which those making direct connection into the interceptor main would not have to bear. See R. S. 40:56-52.
However, the municipality in the instant case elected to pursue an alternative course by permitting the Authority to install the interceptor at Authority cost, thereby saving the Borough the original outlay of $300,000. That cost is being absorbed by annual sewer charges paid by all persons whose sewage finds its way into the interceptor, whether by direct discharge of sewage, as in the case of plaintiffs, or indirect discharge through the municipal collecting lines. See N. J. S. A. 40 :36A-43, 45. Thus plaintiffs and all other users are standing the cost of the construction of the interceptor through annual installment payments. The benefit so received from the interceptor main and paid for by all owners of properties whose sewage ultimately flows into the interceptor is analogous to a “general benefit which the owners enjoy in *398common with the other inhabitants or citizens of a municipal corporation.” In re Public Service Electric and Gas Co supra. As stated, plaintiffs herein do not enjoy any benefit from the interceptor main that is not enjoyed by any other user whose sewage is eventually discharged into the interceptor. Having undertaken the construction of the interceptor in a manner other than by a local special assessment the municipality cannot now, under the guise of assessing for the benefits received from the construction of the collecting lines, transmute the interceptor installation into a local assessment improvement. Cf. River Edge Homes, Inc. v. Borough of River Edge, 130 N. J. L. 376, 380-381 (Sup. Ct. 1943); R. S. 40:56-52.
The Borough saw fit not to pay for and make provision for the removal of sewage from plaintiffs’ lands through the collecting lateral system but placed the obligation to accomplish that result upon plaintiffs at their own expense. The special or peculiar benefit which can be attributed to the lateral collecting lines is enjoyed solely by the properties which have the privilege or at least the eventual possibility of tapping into the laterals for discharge of sewage originating on their lands. If this assessment is affirmed plaintiffs must pay not only for the line which they have presently installed at their own expense on their own lands, and any future lines required in a subdivision of their comparatively large tract, but must as well share the expense of installing a similar system for the exclusive use and benefit of other property owners — a system the use and enjoyment of which they are and will be denied. The result is tantamount to a double taxation and a taking of private property for public use without compensation. It is to that extent unconstitutional.
Also, assuming that the municipality has the duty to force all property owners to discharge their sewage into the Authority’s system, it has selected two methods of fulfilling that obligation. It had provided the collecting lines (at initial municipal expense with the property owner to ultimately bear the expense through assessments) and, where the collecting line *399is not available, as in the case of the plaintiffs’ land herein, it has arranged for such property owners to construct collecting sewers at their own expense in order to tap into the interceptor. The good faith of the municipality in refusing to make its collecting sewer available to plaintiffs is not questioned. This was no special privilege intentionally granted plaintiffs but was rather a decision based on topographical facts and grounded in lessening the financial burden of the users of the collecting sjrstem. In thus electing to force plaintiffs to install their own connecting lines, the municipality has fulfilled whatever duty it had under its contract with the Authority to oblige all property owners within the corporate limits to discharge sewage into the interceptor.
The fact that the cost of the line which plaintiffs installed at their own expense may have been less than the assessment levied against properties specially benefited by the collecting lines is of no consequence.
Research has disclosed no adjudication similar to the construction of special benefits arrived at by the majority. They have here extended the definition of “benefit” beyond the limits of the statutory language. As stated by this Court in Kingsley v. Hawthorne Fabrics, Inc., 41 N. J. 521 (1964), at pp. 528-530:
“As was said in Gould v. Gould, 245 U. S. 151, 153, 38 S. Ct. 53, 62 L. Ed. 211, 213 (1917) :
‘In the interpretation of statutes levying taxes it is the established rule not to extend their provisions, by implication, beyond the clear import of the language used, or to enlarge their operations so as to embrace matters not specifically pointed out. In case of doubt they are construed most strongly against the government, and in favor of the citizen.’
* * * We agree with Justice Heher in Pub. Ser. etc. Transport v. State Bd. Tax Appeals, supra, at p. 104 of 115 N. J. L., where he said, ‘The legislative body must express its intention to tax in distinct and unambiguous language.’ ”
The majority’s conclusion that an assessment may be levied under the facts herein is beyond the clear impact of the statute and embraces a matter not specially pointed out therein. *400In that situation, even though there should be some doubt, the statute must be construed most strongly against the Borough and in favor of plaintiffs.
I would reverse.
For affirmance — Chief Justice Weintraub and Justices Jacobs, Francis, Proctor, Hall and Schettino — 6. For reversal — Justice Haneman — 1.