Concurring.
I join the majority opinion, and in particular Part II, regarding the procedural objections that Ralph Nader (“Nader”) and Peter Miguel Camejo (“Camejo”) (collectively, the “Candidates”) raised. I also agree with Part I of the majority opinion that Section 951(e) and Section 951.1 of Pennsylvania’s Election Code, 25 P.S. §§ 2911(e), 2911.1, do not disqualify Nader or Camejo from appearing on the Pennsylvania General Election ballot. I write separately to set forth an alternative *55rationale for this conclusion, which is based on statutory-construction. More specifically, I conclude that the General Assembly did not intend for Sections 951(e) and 951.1 presently to apply.1
I am guided by the following principles. Under the Statutory Construction Act, the object of all statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the General Assembly’s intention. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). Every statute is to be construed, if possible, to give effect to all of its provisions. Id. When the words of a statute are clear and free from ambiguity, the letter of the statute is not to be disregarded, under the pretext of pursuing its spirit. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b). When, however, the words of a statute are not explicit, the General Assembly’s intent may be ascertained by considering a variety of factors, which include the occasion and necessity for the statute; the circumstances of its enactment; the mischief it remedies; the object it attains; and the consequences of a particular interpretation. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c). Moreover, it may be presumed that the General Assembly does not intend to violate the United States or Pennsylvania Constitutions; does not intend an absurd or unreasonable result or one impossible of execution; and that it intends the entire statute to be effective and certain. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(1)—(3). Finally, the Election Code is to be liberally construed so as not to deprive the voters of their right to elect a candidate of their choice or an individual of his right to run for office. In re Silcox, 543 Pa. 647, 674 A.2d 224, 225 (1996).
I turn first to Section 951(e).2 In my view, this provision is not explicit as to whether it applies to a person, like Nader or Camejo, who seeks to appear on the ballot in this Commonwealth as an independent candidate for a national office, but who has been nominated by a party for that office in another state. While some of the words in the provision at issue are *56broad and all-inclusive, certain others suggest that the legislature was not concerned with this sort of political activity beyond Pennsylvania’s borders. Therefore, Section 951(e) is ambiguous. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b).
Thus, resort to the factors listed in 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c) to ascertain the General Assembly’s statutory intent is in order. The purposes that Section 951(e) serves and the difficulties it aims to avert are instructive. It has been recognized that Section 951(e) prevents cross-nominations by prohibiting a candidate from appearing on the ballot as the candidate of more than one political group, see Patriot Party of Allegheny County v. Allegheny County Dept. of Elections, 95 F.3d 253, 256 (3d Cir.1996), and prevents the election ballot from being cluttered by candidates who hope to multiply the number of times their name appears on the ballot under various labels. Packrall v. Quail, 411 Pa. 555, 192 A.2d 704, 706 (1963).3
In this case, however, these purposes and aims of Section 951(e) are not implicated. That is, despite Nader’s and Camejo’s nomination in Michigan by the Reform Party and their concomitant appearance on the Michigan ballot as candidates for President and Vice President, under the nomination papers they have filed in the Commonwealth, their respective names will appear only once on the Pennsylvania ballot in connection with the November 2004 General Election as independent political body candidates for these offices. Thus, I do not believe that the General Assembly intended that Section 951(e) apply to the Candidates before us.
Moreover, inasmuch as this analysis of the legislatures intent in Section 951(e) avoids any infringement upon the Candidates constitutional rights, it is consistent with the pre*57sumption that the General Assembly intends constitutional enactments, see 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(3), and insofar as it,upholds access to the ballot, it is mindful of the liberal construction that election laws are to be given. See In re Silcox, 674 A.2d at 225.
I likewise conclude that Section 951.1, 25 Pa.C.S. § 2911.1, under which the Commonwealth Court ruled that Camejo cannot appear on the ballot as the candidate of a political body because of his membership in the (minor) Green Party, is inapplicable. I believe that the language of this provision, which includes “thirty (30) days before the primary----” as its reference point of disaffiliation, when read in context, clearly reveals that the General Assembly intended it to apply to major, not minor, political parties. This is so because in the Election Code, the legislature has determined that only major parties may gain ballot access through the primary process. See Heicklen v. Pennsylvania Board of Elections, 751 A.2d 260, 262 (Pa.Cmwlth.), aff'd per curiam, 561 Pa. 33, 747 A.2d 894 (2000)(holding that 25 Pa.C.S. § 2872.2 is capable of only one meaning; that minor political parties must nominate candidates by nomination papers and are not entitled to participate at party primaries.)
Further, even if Camejo’s affidavit were deemed to be false in this regard, I do not believe that his name should have been removed from the ballot on this basis. In State Ethics Comm’n v. Baldwin, 498 Pa. 255, 445 A.2d 1208 (1982), we tempered our holding in In re Nomination Petition of Cianfrani, 467 Pa. 491, 359 A.2d 383 (1976), and explained that before an affidavit may be declared void and invalid because it contains false information, there must be evidence that the candidate knowingly falsified the affidavit with the intent to deceive the electorate. Baldwin, 445 A.2d at 1211-12. As the record revealed no intent to deceive on Camejo’s part, there was no reason to disqualify him from ballot status based on statements he made in his affidavit.
Accordingly, I join the majority in reversing the Order of the Commonwealth Court dated August 30, 2004, and remanding this case to the Commonwealth Court for expedited hear*58ings on the Petition to Set Aside the Nomination Papers of Ralph Nader and Peter Miguel Camejo.
Justice CASTILLE and NIGRO join this concurring opinion.. Because I would resolve the issues relating to Sections 951(e) and 951.1 on a statutory construction basis, I would not reach the constitutional arguments raised in connection therewith.
. As noted on page 18 of the majority opinion, Section 976 of the Election Code, 25 P.S. § 2936, reflects Section 951(e)’s requirements.
. Section 951(e) also prevents a loser in a primary from running in the general election as an independent or another party's candidate. See In re Zulick, 832 A.2d 572 (Pa.Cmwlth.2003), aff'd, 575 Pa. 140, 834 A.2d 1126 (2003). This statutory purpose is not relevant. It is because the Candidates filed nomination papers in Pennsylvania as candidates of a independent political body for the offices of President and Vice President in the November 2004 General Election and are simultaneously running as candidates for these same offices in Michigan by nomination of the Reform Party that Section 951(e) was raised by the Objectors.