Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by
Mb. Justice Allen M. Stearne :The court below in a supplemental order dismissed the preliminary objections of defendant and directed answers to be filed to the complaint.
Two main issues are involved. One is whether or not a court in equity possesses jurisdiction to establish the fact of a “taking” of property and to award com*124pensation therefor. The other is whether a state court has injunctive jurisdiction in equity to prohibit the operation of airplanes when they fly improperly and dangerously low.
When airplanes habitually fly so low as to dangerously interfere with the use and enjoyment of property adjacent to, or adjoining, air fields, whether authorized or not, it constitutes a “taking” of property for which compensation may be allowed: United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256. I agree that the jurisdiction, and determination, of this question rests in the state courts, but not in equity. The Commonwealth has enacted statutes and prescribed procedure relative to “taking” of property. This is by eminent domain. We have consistently decided that where a remedy or method of procedure is provided by an Act, its provisions shall be strictly pursued and exclusively applied: Wojnar v. Yale and Towne Manufacturing Company, 348 Pa. 595, 598, 36 A. 2d 321; Era Co., Ltd., v. Pittsburgh Consolidation Coal Co., 355 Pa. 219, 220, 49 A. 2d 342. For this reason I am of opinion that a court in equity has no jurisdiction to decree that a “taking” has occurred and to award compensation.
It is my opinion that the operation of airplanes, both interstate and intrastate, is exclusively within Federal jurisdiction. State courts possess no jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief concerning minimum safe altitudes and permissive minimum altitudes when landing or taking off, irrespective of whether the flights are interstate or intrastate. To my mind, it appears a remarkable hybrid jurisdictional doctrine which holds that while Congress has pre-empted Federal jurisdiction over navigable air space, as determined by the United States Civil Aeronautics Board and the Administrator of Civil Aeronautics, the states have retained jurisdiction over the navigable air space below *125that which has been pre-empted by Federal law. And what appears to be even more astounding is the argument that in landing and taking off, where it is claimed that the flights are dangerously low, the complainants must first establish such fact before the Federal Board or Administrator, and then after such determination, and only then, can the state act by way of an injunction in equity. Such a division of jurisdiction would indeed appear most cumbersome and extraordinary.
The ancient doctrine that ownership of land extends to the periphery of the universe has been modified by air travel. Such airspace is now regarded and declared by Congress to be a public highway: United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256; Braniff Airways Inc. v. Nevada State Board, 347 U.S. 590, 597. In Roosevelt Field v. Town of North Hempstead, 88 F. Supp. 177, 187, (E.D.N.Y. 1950) it is said: “The parallel . . . between the sovereignty of the Federal Government in the air space above the United States and that over navigable waters, is true and complete.”
As in the case of navigable waters, the airspace is subject to a servitude or easement of air navigation created by the self-executory operation of the Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 8, Clause 3. The airplane’s privileges, rights and protection, as far as transit is concerned, is derived from the Federal Government alone and not from any state government: see Justice Jackson in Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 303, where he stated: “Air as an element in which to navigate is even more inevitably federalized by the commerce clause than is navigable water”. (Emphasis supplied)
Consequently, as in the case of navigable waters, of necessity there is a nation-wide basis of air operations under Federal law. Air travel must be supported by *126uniform Federal law, unfettered by state laws: United States Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 2.
Congress enacted the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 984 sec. 205, 49 U.S.C. 425. The Board acting in pursuance of this enactment filed, its Regulations. Regulation 60.17 provides that over congested areas the minimum altitude is 1000 feet and in all other areas, 500 feet. However, the Regulation expressly states “Except when necessary for take-off or landing. . .” (Emphasis supplied) It is the manner of take-off and landing which is the crux of this case. Where, in so navigating, the airplanes fly so low as to dangerously interfere with the use and enjoyment of plaintiffs’ premises, it constitutes a “taking” as above stated.. I disagree, however, that a state court possesses equity jurisdiction to enjoin such landings and take-offs as a nuisance. The Regulations, as .interpreted by the Board, fix no standards. Indeed, to do so is obviously impossible. As stated in the oral argument by the learned counsel for the Amici Curiae, this is a variable- consideration. They may depend upon any one or a combination of circumstances. For example: the situation surrounding the air field, obstructions, type of plane, the weight of the cargo, the condition of the weather and the direction of the wind, etc. Such considerations are necessarily variable. To have state courts interpose judicial action would clearly interfere with necessarily exclusive Federal control of air navigation. I agree with counsel for Amici Curiae who, state in their brief: “Since flights on take-off and landing obviously, are indispensable if there is to be any flying at all, there is no reason to suppose that Congress intended to leave such flights outside of its concept of ‘navigable airspace;’ Indeed, the Civil Aeronautics Act expressly authorizes air traffic regulation down to the surface of the earth. *127The ‘safe altitudes of flight’ for air traffic regulation are the ‘minimum altitudes of flight’ which fix ‘navigable airspace’ under the Civil Aeronautics Act (Sec. 1(24), 49 U.S.C. 401(24)), and in which a ‘public right of freedom of transit’ exists (Sec. 3, 49 U.S.C. 403).”
I do not share in the reliance which the majority places upon Crew v. Gallagher, 358 Pa. 541, 546, 58 A. 2d 179, where this Court reversed a, decree in equity enjoining an anticipated nuisance. Following Essick v. Shillam, 347 Pa. 373, 380, 32 A. 2d 416, we again stated “. . . The court cannot anticipate an improper use of the premises and sanction' a restraining order founded upon surmise and speculation as to the future conduct of defendants.” It is true that there are many statements in the opinion referring to air navigation. However, such matters were not then before us and therefore constitute dicta. Even though that case related to a proposed intrastate air school, sale of light airplanes and renting of hanger space to private plane owners, such intrastate planes in flight and in landing and taking off obviously could interfere with interstate commerce. As air navigation is, in my opinion, within exclusive Federal control, a state possesses no jurisdiction to restrain such flights.
Again quoting from the brief of the Amici Guriae: “The field of air traffic regulation to which the determination of minimum altitudes of flight belongs, is recognized as one in which maximum safety can be achieved only by uniformity of regulation throughout the nation. Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 303 (Mr. Justice Jackson concurring); see also Chicago & Southern Airlines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 107 (1948); Rosenhan v. U. S., 131 F 2d 932, 934-5 (C.A. 10, 1942), cert. den. 318 U.S. 790; cf. Cooley v. Port Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299; International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261, 265 *128(1929). The Congress, therefore, has occupied and preempted the field of air traffic regulation of all flights (even intrastate flights because they may affect or endanger flights in interstate commerce or along the federal airways) in the entire airspace from the surface up through enacting comprehensive statutory provisions (Civil Aeronautics Act, Section 601, 49 U.S.C. 551) and delegating power to the Board to provide for the necessary detail of regulation. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Board, 330 U.S. 767, 773-4 (1947); Napier v. Atlantic Coast RR Co., 272 U.S. 605, 612-3 (1926).”
For these reasons I would reverse the order of the court below and direct the dismissal of the complaint upon the ground that the state court in equity possesses no jurisdiction, in the facts of this case, to decree a “taking” and award compensation, or to decree injunctive relief.