Dissenting Opinion by
Judge Mencer :I respectfully dissent.
First: Mandamus is not Jared A. Cooper’s (Cooper) proper remedy, and he should have appealed the zoning officer’s refusal of his application to the zoning hearing board and thereafter taken a further appeal to the Court of Common Pleas if not satisfied by the board’s action. Unger v. Hampton Township, 437 Pa. 399, 263 A.2d 385 (1970). Section 909 of the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code, Act of July 31, 1968, P.L. 805, as amended, 53 P.S. §10909, specifically so provides. It must be kept in mind that we are reviewing an application for a permit made in 1973 under a 1971 ordinance whose validity is not challenged in this litigation. The admitted validity of an existing and applicable zoning ordinance here is what makes Borough of Monroeville v. Effie’s Ups and Downs, 12 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 279, 315 A.2d 342 (1974), inapposite and not controlling in this case on the initial question as to whether or not mandamus is the appropriate remedy to compel the issuance of the permit sought.
*253Second: The majority concludes that Cooper has “a vested right to building permits for a gasoline service station on his tract.” The basis for that conclusion is unclear to me. It surely could not be by virtue of our holding in Cameron v. Greensburg, 3 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 209, 281 A.2d 271 (1971), by which we upheld a ruling which ordered the zoning officer to issue certificates of compliance and occupancy to Cooper. Those certificates were issued, and, if they have any remaining validity, what need did Cooper then have in 1973 for additional permits? However, because Cooper has changed somewhat the size, of the lot in question and substituted another oil company as a prospective purchaser and the permits issued became null and void by a failure of Cooper to commence the authorized improvement within six months from the, issuance date of the permits as provided by Section 1204-4 of the City of Greensburg’s 1955 zoning ordinance, Cooper did need in 1973 to reapply and was subject to the 1971 zoning ordinance.
As we carefully pointed out in City of Greensburg v. Cooper, 14 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 419, 322 A.2d 152 (1974), we did not decide in Cameron v. Greensburg, supra, that Cooper had the right to use the premises in question for a service station but only that Cooper was entitled to the permits he applied for on June 29, 1967. Those permits were issued and are not the subject matter of this mandamus action seeking issuance of permits applied for on June 14, 1973. The application in question here seeks a new compliance permit in accordance with the provisions of the 1971 zoning ordinance and is not controlled by our holding in Cameron v. Greensburg, supra.
A vested right to build in futuro a structure which violates a zoning ordinance can only be acquired by first securing a permit and thereafter expending sub*254stantial sums in reliance thereon. Dunlap Appeal, 370 Pa. 31, 87 A.2d 299 (1952). The record discloses that, since the issuance, of the permits which were the subject of. the Cameron v. Greensburg, supra, litigation, no action has been taken by Cooper to commence the erection of a gasoline service station on the subject property. The majority’s, reference to' Cooper’s having spent “large sums, of money for excavation of the land” is in reference-to grading and removal of an earthen bank on an adjácent lot sold by Cooper to the Church of the Open Door. These expenditures were for work completed in February of 1972, less than two months after the completion of the litigation involving the 1967 permit applications and more than 16 months before the permit application which is the subject of this suit.
The only vested-right theory that has any comprehension to me on this record is the vested right, recognized in Cameron v. Greensburg, supra, that Cooper had. to the issuance of the permits he sought by his application of June 29, 1967. We surely did not hold that he would have a vested- right to any permit sought at any time thereafter.
Cooper is not here seeking utilization or renewal of the permits which were issued- in accord with our decision in Cameron v. Greensburg, supra, but rather the issuance of a new permit in 1973 under the zoning ordinance of 1971 which zoned the property in question R-l. If the majority’s affirmance is' based on the, concept that the permits sought here are somehow merely renewals of those previously approved by this Court in Cameron v. Greensburg, supra, then it is granting relief in a mandamus action that is not responsive to the relief prayed for by Cooper.' If the majority’s affirmance is to authorize a permit to issue under the provisions of the 1971 zoning .ordinance, as *255is sought by Cooper’s 1973 application, then a commercial permit will issue contrary to the residential zoning provisions of the ordinance applicable to Cooper’s property.
If this is, as the majority understandably hopes, the last chapter in the already overprotracted litigation which has befallen the property in question, it will not have an ending that coincides with my understanding of the applicable law.