Yale University v. City of New Haven

Bogdanski, J.

(concurring). I concur with the result in this ease but not with the reasoning employed in the majority opinion. The majority holds that real property owned by Yale is entitled to a tax exemption whether or not it is used for educational purposes. That conclusion is unwarranted under the law and contrary to sound public policy.

Section 12-81 (8) of the General Statutes exempts from taxation the funds and estate of Yale and other institutions of higher learning which are “invested and held for the use of such institutions.” (Emphasis added.) The charter of Yale, as amended in 1834, also exempts from taxation the funds granted or given to Yale which are “invested and held for the use of that Institution.” (Emphasis added.) The “use” referred to must be construed to mean the proper educational uses for which Yale was formed. The original act of 1701 incorporating Yale College was for the expressed intent of “founding and suitably endowing and ordering a Collegiate School within his Majesties Colonie of Connecticutt, wherein youth may be instructed in the arts and sciences, who through the blessing of Almighty God, may be fitted for publick imployments both in church and civill state.” 4 Col. Rec. *470363; see 1 & 2 Private Laws 472. The subsequent history of the charter of Yale University is extensively treated in Yale University v. New Haven, 71 Conn. 316, 326-27, 42 A. 87, and need not be repeated here except to stress that the original intent to accomplish a public benefit and advance the public interest has not been changed by later revisions of Yale’s charter.

The tax exemption granted to Yale pursuant to its charter has been loosely described as exempting “all the property of the College from taxation.” Yale University v. New Haven, supra, 336. In that opinion, however, Justice Hamersley stated that “its main purpose was to exempt all estate and funds invested and held lawfully, i.e., ‘for the use of the College.’ ” Yale University v. New Haven, supra, 335. That latter statement is more precise and in accord with the law, for tax exemptions can lawfully be granted “only in recognition of a public service performed by the beneficiary of the exemption. They are not bestowed, as is too often unthinkingly supposed, as a matter of grace or favor. If lawfully granted, as most are, . . . exemptions are given for the assistance and help of the private endeavor in its effort to advance the public interest or to perform some share of the public governmental duty.” Corbin v. Baldwin, 92 Conn. 99, 107, 101 A. 834.

The furnishing of education for the general public is a state function and duty. Bridgeport v. Agostinelli, 163 Conn. 537, 550, 316 A.2d 371; State ex rel. Board of Education v. D’Aulisa, 133 Conn. 414, 418, 52 A.2d 636. Schools of learning, whether they be publicly or privately held, ordinarily provide an essential support of government, not only *471by performing a state function, but also by preparing and training youth, to render public service to the community and state. Originally, educational institutions were held tax exempt only if they performed both functions, i.e., were devoted to the public use and sequestered for educational uses. Pomfret School v. Pomfret, 105 Conn. 456, 460, 136 A. 88; Brunswick School v. Greenwich, 88 Conn. 241, 243, 90 A. 801. Later, on the premise that education in itself serves a public purpose, it was held sufficient for tax exemption purposes that the institution be devoted to educational uses, provided no person secure a profit from its operations. Forman Schools, Inc. v. Litchfield, 134 Conn. 1, 8-10, 54 A.2d 710, construing § 1163 (7) of the General Statutes (Rev. 1930), now § 12-81 (7) of the General Statutes. See also Edgewood School, Inc. v. Greenwich, 131 Conn. 179, 183, 38 A.2d 792. Where property held by an educational institution is not devoted to educational uses or other public purposes, however, it cannot be lawfully exempted from taxation. See New Canaan Country School, Inc. v. New Canaan, 138 Conn. 347, 352, 84 A.2d 691.

Thus, the statute involved in the present ease, § 12-81 (8) of the General Statutes, must not be construed as abrogating the fundamental requirement that property held by an educational institution be devoted to educational uses in order to be tax exempt. Such a construction would make the exemption a matter of “grace or favor” which was condemned in Corbin v. Baldwin, supra, and would, in my judgment, violate the provision of our constitution which declares that “no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community.” Conn. Const., art. first, §1.

*472In the very case relied upon by the majority, it is clearly stated that the charter of Yale does not exempt from taxation property held for private use, nor does it authorize any commercial dealings with its exemptions. Yale University v. New Haven, supra, 338. Those restrictions must also be engrafted on the language used in §12-81(8), which is identical to that of the charter referred to in the Yale University case, supra.

In its finding, the trial court did conclude that the real property occupied by Yale University Press was used for educational purposes. The underlying facts, recited in the majority opinion, support that conclusion. It is only for that reason, however, that I concur with the result reached in this case. Yale “had its origin in a profound conviction on the part of the leaders of the infant Colony, that the public welfare demanded the establishment within its borders of a school of higher education, where young men might be prepared and trained to render the best public service to the community and State.” Corbin v. Baldwin, 92 Conn. 99, 108, 101 A. 834. The publication of scholarly works by the Yale University Press serves not only to implement that goal, but also to further the public purpose of disseminating the knowledge of learned men.

For the foregoing reasons, I concur in the result.