with whom CLIFFORD, J. joins, concurring.
[¶ 34] I join in the Court’s opinion, but write separately to address in greater depth the application of the separation of powers doctrine established in Article III of the Maine Constitution to 4 M.R.S.A. § 312 (Supp.2002).
[¶ 35] The extra-judicial activity of judges of probate is an area of shared concern of the legislative and judicial branches of Maine government. The Judiciary’s interest arises from the constitutional grant of “judicial power” contained in Article VI, section 1, which, at its very essence, assumes a duty to regulate the extra-judicial conduct of judges that bears on the integrity and impartiality of the judicial process. The Legislature’s interest arises from its constitutional authority to enact “all reasonable laws and regulations for the defense and benefit of the people of this State,” ME. CONST, art. 4, pt. 3, § 1, which has long been recognized to include legislation governing the qualifications and activities of candidates for elective office. See Opinion of the Justices, 623 A.2d 1258, 1262-63 (Me.1993) (“[W]e find no implicit basis for restricting the power residing in the Legislature to enact reasonable qualifications for [the offices of secretary of state, treasurer, or attorney general].”).
[¶ 36] Because neither branch can claim an exclusive “ ‘textually demonstrable constitutional commitment”’ on the subject, State v. Hunter, 447 A.2d 797, 800 n. 4 (Me.1982) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962)), the conflict between 4 M.R.S.A, § 312 and Canon 5(A)(3) is not resolved simply by determining within which of the two branches the regulatory power over probate judges properly belongs. ME. CONST, art. Ill, § 2 (“No person or persons, belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any of the powers properly belonging to either of the others, except in the cases herein expressly directed or permitted.” (emphasis added)); see also Hunter, 447 A.2d at 800.25 When each branch’s authority is necessarily “limited *353by the existence of a similar power in [the other],” Bd. of Overseers of the Bar v. Lee, 422 A.2d 998, 1002 (Me.1980), principles of comity must guide our application of Article III. Accordingly, we have enforced statutes designed to regulate the licensure of attorneys — a subject squarely within the realm of judicial interest and authority— “as a matter of comity, but not in surrender of [the judiciary’s] inherent power.” Id. at 1008 (citing In re Feingold, 296 A.2d 492, 496 (Me.1972) (“Courts ... may and frequently do honor implementing legislation, but clearly are not bound to do so.”)).
[¶ 37] Legislative enactments that address an issue of shared concern to the legislative and judicial branches should be upheld unless an enactment substantially interferes with the administration of justice or constitutes an unreasonable burden on judicial authority. See id. at 1003 (citing State ex rel. Bushman v. Vandenberg, 203 Or. 326, 280 P.2d 344, 348 (1955)) (invoking the doctrine of inherent judicial power to strike down a statute authorizing the removal of judges from cases because the statute was in the area of court procedure and an undue burden on the judiciary). This compels us to consider the degree to which 4 M.R.S.A. § 312 interferes with and burdens the judicial branch. Section 312 runs afoul of the constitutional separation of powers only if, by its operation, the Legislature is “unreasonably burdening or substantially interfering with the judicial branch.” State ex rel. Fiedler v. Senate, 100, 155 Wis.2d 94, 454 N.W.2d 770, 772 (1990); see also Lee, 422 A.2d at 1003 (citing Bushman, 280 P.2d. at 348).
[¶ 38] I conclude that section 312 unreasonably burdens and substantially interferes with the Judicial Branch because active political participation by the judges of probate has a direct and detrimental impact in an area of primary concern to the judiciary: the maintenance of the integrity of the judicial process both in appearance and in fact. As established in the Preamble to the Code of Judicial Conduct, the regulation of the conduct of judges is essential to advancing the public’s trust and confidence in the legal system:
[T]he Maine Code of Judicial Conduct is founded on the precepts that judges, individually and collectively, must respect and honor the judicial office as a public trust and must strive to maintain and enhance public confidence in our legal system.
Maine Code of Jud. Conduct Preamble. Canon 5(A)(3) exemplifies these precepts by ensuring that all judges, whether appointed or elected, will neither abuse their positions nor neglect their duties because of aspirations for higher office. Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 968, 102 S.Ct. 2836, 73 L.Ed.2d 508 (1982); see also Robert M. O’Neil, National Symposium on Judicial Campaign Conduct and the First Amendment: The Canons in the Counts: Recent First Amendment Rulings, 35 IND. L. REV. 701, 720 (2001). Numerous jurisdictions have recognized that reasonable restrictions on political activity by sitting judges are necessary to maintain the integrity of the judicial process. See, e.g., Signorelli v. Evans, 637 F.2d 853 (2d Cir.1980); Mortal v. Judiciary Comm’n of La., 565 F.2d 295 (5th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1013, 98 S.Ct. 1887, 56 L.Ed.2d 395 (1978); Suster v. Marshall, 121 F.Supp.2d 1141 (N.D.Ohio 2000); Wagner v. Milwaukee County Election Comm’n, 263 Wis.2d 709, 666 N.W.2d 816 (2003); Mitchell v. Judicial Ethics Comm., 2000 ME 83, 749 A.2d 1282; State ex rel. Carenbauer v. Hechler, 208 W.Va. 584, 542 S.E.2d 405 (2000); In re Fadeley, 310 Or. 548, 802 P.2d 31 (1990); Judicial Qualifications Comm’n v. Lowenstein, 252 Ga. 432, 314 S.E.2d 107 (1984); Adams v. Sup. Ct. of Pa., 502 F.Supp. 1282 (M.D.Pa.1980).
*354[¶ 39] The reasonableness of the burden imposed by section 312 on the Judicial Branch must also be considered in terms of the consequences resulting from our invalidation of the statute. Section 312 is not essential to advancing the legislative interest of assuring that every Maine citizen, including a judge of probate, who wishes to actively participate in the political process is able to do so. Section 312 aside, a judge of probate may unilaterally free her or himself from Canon 5(A)(3)’s barrier to political participation by resigning from office or by not seeking reelection. See Signorelli, 637 F.2d at 858 (“New York’s scheme ... confronts the prospective candidate with a choice: he may run for Congress if he is willing to resign his judgeship.”). Because a judgeship is in the nature of a public trust, it is unreasonable to permit a judge to subjugate that trust to her or his personal desire to actively participate in the political process.
[¶ 40] For these reasons, I join the Court’s conclusion that section 312 violates Article III of the Maine Constitution.
. In Hunter, the separation of powers inquiry was framed as follows: "Under the Maine Constitution, however, our inquiry is narrower: has the power in issue been explicitly granted to one branch of state government, and to no other branch? If so, article III, section 2 forbids another branch to exercise that power." 447 A.2d at 800.