(concurring).
I concur in the result reached, but feel compelled to state my reasons therefor.
As I view it, appellant’s complaint is that he was improperly impeached while testifying in his own behalf at the punishment hearing which he was afforded, although one was unnecessary since the plea of guilty in this felony case was entered before the jury. See Ring v. State, 450 S.W.2d 85 (Tex.Cr.App.1970).
It is appellant’s contention he should not have been impeached by a showing that he was charged with pending offenses which had not resulted in final convictions. Under the provisions of Article 38.29, Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P., the fact that a witness has been charged with an offense is inadmissible for the purpose of impeaching unless the charge has resulted in a final conviction. Stephens v. State, 417 S.W.2d 286 (Tex.Cr.App.1967); Hunter v. State, 168 Tex.Cr.R. 160, 324 S.W.2d 17 (1959); Tomlinson v. State, 163 Tex.Cr.R. 44, 289 S.W.2d 267 (1956). Furthermore, the final conviction must be for a felony offense or one involving moral turpitude, Mauldin v. State, 165 Tex.Cr.R. 405, 308 S.W.2d 36 (1957), and even then it must not be too remote, Stephens v. State, supra.
If, however, the appellant “opens the door” and makes blanket statements concerning his exemplary conduct, such as he has never been charged or convicted of any offense, then the State may refute such testimony despite the nature of the conviction or offense or its remoteness, Orozco v. State, 164 Tex.Cr.R. 630, 301 S.W.2d 634 (1957), and cases there cited. See also Heartfield v. State, 470 S.W.2d 895 (Tex.Cr.App.1971).
In the instant case, appellant has filed a motion seeking probation at the hands of the jury. See Article 42.12, § 3a, Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P. Appellant, who was in jail on the instant offense and was represented by appointed counsel, testified that he had served honorably in the military service. The record then reflects the following on direct examination:
“Q. Now, you signed a paper here saying you have never been convicted of *885a felony in this state or any other state. Now, is that correct?
“A. That’s correct.
“Q. Have you ever been in jail before?
“A. No, I haven’t.
“Q. You haven’t been in jail for any offense?
“No, sir.
“Q. But still you feel due to the fact you have never been in trouble before, that you should receive probation here?
“A. I feel that I realize that I have made a terrible mistake.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The underlined portion of the above quoted testimony and the questions asked left a distinct impression that the appellant had had no previous difficulty with the law. The State was entitled to refute such testimony since the door had been opened.
On cross examination, the State inquired particularly about certain pending felony charges in Harris County. Appellant denied knowledge of such charges and further stated he had never been previously charged “with anything.” At this time the first objection was interposed.
Thereafter the State proved there were outstanding arrest warrants for robbery and for assault to murder for the appellant from Harris County.
Appellant’s counsel called the prosecuting attorney as a witness and he confirmed the fact that there were arrest warrants from Harris County, although he did not know whether any indictments had been returned.
This would have been a stronger case had the evidence reflected that the arrest warrants had been executed thus showing appellant’s knowledge of the same before his testimony, but I conclude that since the appellant opened the door with testimony concerning his exemplary conduct the method of impeachment was not improper. See Barnett v. State, 445 S.W.2d 205 (Tex.Cr.App.1969). The granting of the motion in limine to prohibit the State from using charged offenses for impeachment purposes does not protect an accused where he subsequently opens the door.
ODOM, J., joins in this concurrence.