In this workmen’s compensation case, the problem is whether the plaintiff, who had a heart attack while on the job, suffered a compensable accidental injury. The trial court entered a judgment upon a jury verdict for the plaintiff. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed and rendered a take-nothing judgment because there was no showing of any strain, exertion, traumatic shock, or particular exciting mental stimulus which precipitated the heart attack. 466 S.W.2d 373. We affirm.
The facts are set out in the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals. The plaintiff did not perform manual labor as that term is usually understood. Previous to his heart attack, he was not subject to any particular physical strain or overexertion. He was the subject of three or four irritating or frustrating experiences on the job over a period of 19 days. These occurrences caused him to be nervous, disturbed, exasperated, and annoyed. These manifestations may be characterized as mental stimuli. But no attempt was made to connect any one of them to the heart attack which the plaintiff had.
For there to be an accidental injury, or an industrial accident, there must be an undesigned, untoward event traceable to a definite time, place, and cause. Solomon v. Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Company, 347 S.W.2d 17 (Tex.Civ.App. *8601961, writ refused) ; Frazier v. Employers Mutual Casualty Co., 368 S.W.2d 955 (Tex.Civ.App.1963, writ ref., n. r. e.); Whitaker v. General Insurance Co. of America, 461 S.W.2d 148 (Tex.Civ.App.1971, writ ref., n. r. e.). This court, in Middleton v. Texas Power & Light Co., 108 Tex. 96, 185 S.W. 556 (1916), in dealing with the purpose of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, said,
“. . . the character of injuries, or wrongs, dealt with by the Act becomes important. Notwithstanding the breadth of some of its terms, its evident purpose was to confine its operation to only accidental injuries, and its scope is to be so limited.” 185 S.W. at 560.
The cases allowing recovery for heart attacks, strokes, and traumatic neuroses have involved particular events. See for example Insurance Co. of North America v. Kneten, 440 S.W.2d 52 (Tex.1969), (heart attack after electric shock); Hood v. Texas Indemnity Co., 146 Tex. 522, 209 S.W.2d 345 (1948), (traumatic neurosis following injury to foot and elbow) ; Bailey v. American General Ins. Co., 154 Tex. 430, 279 S.W.2d 315 (1955), (traumatic neurosis by a worker on a scaffold after seeing a fellow worker plunge to his death from the scaffold) ; Midwestern Ins. Co. v. Wagner, 370 S.W.2d 779 (Tex.Civ.App.1963, writ ref., n. r. e.), (heart attack after particular strain and overexertion); Aetna Insurance Co. v. Hart, 315 S.W.2d 169 (Tex.Civ.App.1958, writ ref., n. r. e.), (stroke suffered by a lady immediately after being violently berated by a customer and after experiencing fear of being shot or physically harmed by him); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Garcia, 417 S.W.2d 630 (Tex.Civ.App.1967, writ ref., n. r. e.), (neurosis after experiencing armed robbery and being “scared to death,” and where shock treatments were required); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Scruggs, 413 S.W.2d 416 (Tex.Civ.App.1967, no writ), (heart attack following strain in lifting 40 foot steel rods); Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Gant, 346 S.W.2d 359 (Tex.Civ.App.1961, no writ), (heart attack while lifting several 53 pound packages).
As stated by the late Justice Norvell, the Legislature has not provided health insurance, but has designed the law to provide for compensation for incapacity flowing from an accidental personal injury. Houston Fire & Casualty Co. v. Biber, 146 S.W.2d 442 (Tex.Civ.App.1940, writ dism., judgm. cor.), (cerebral hemorrhage on the job unrelated to strain or physical exertion). As above noted, this court has been liberal in construing both the word “accidental” and the word “injury” in cases involving heart attacks, strokes and traumatic neurosis cases, and in holding that there was some evidence of a particular strain, overexertion or shock which caused the incapacity. But, except in the case of the occupational diseases designated by the Legislature, it has adhered to the requirement that there be an accidental injury traceable to a definite time, place, and cause. This element is lacking here.
The judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals is affirmed.