dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. As the majority notes, Gielarowski’s tort action against PAT was separated from his first-party benefits claim. Gielarowski’s tort claim was subsequently settled and the tort claim against PAT was dismissed. PAT’s obligation to provide first-party benefits for injuries arising out of the maintenance and use of a motor vehicle is a statutory obligation arising under Section 1712 of the MVFRL,1 75 Pa.C.S. § 1712, which is contractual in nature and unrelated to whether PAT committed any negligent acts.
Section 8522(a) of the Judicial Code provides:
The General Assembly, pursuant to section 11 of Article 1 of the Constitution of Pennsylvania, does hereby waive, in the instances set forth in subsection (b) only and only to the *220extent set forth in this subchapter and within the limits set forth in section 8528 (relating to limitations on damages), sovereign immunity as a bar to an action against Commonwealth parties, for damages arising out of a negligent act where the damages would be recoverable under the common law or a statute creating a cause of action if the injury were caused by a person not having available the defense of sovereign immunity.
42 Pa.C.S. § 8522(a) (emphasis added). Gielarowski’s claim for first-party benefits is based solely on his injury in the course of his use of PAT’s vehicle and not on any negligent act of PAT’s. Accordingly, I would hold that PAT cannot claim sovereign immunity as a defense to Gielarowski’s claim for first-party benefits.
I would also hold that the requirement in Section 5522 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5522, that notice of a claim for damages against a Commonwealth agency, be given to the agency within six months from the date of the injury, is inapplicable to a claim for first-party benefits under the MVFRL which is solely contractual in nature. Section 5522 provides:
(a) Notice prerequisite to action against government unit.
(1) Within six months from the date that any injury was sustained or any cause of action accrued, any person who is about to commence any civil action or proceeding within this Commonwealth or elsewhere against a government unit for damages on account of any injury to his person or property under Chapter 85 (relating to matters affecting government units) or otherwise shall file in the office of the government unit, and if the action is against a Commonwealth agency for damages, then also file in the office of the Attorney General a statement in writing, signed by or in his behalf, setting forth
(i) The name and residence address of the person to whom the cause of action has accrued.
(ii) The name and' residence address of the person injured.
*221(iii) The date and hour of the accident.
(iv) The approximate location where the accident occurred.
(v) The name and residence or office address of any attending physician.
(2) If the statement provided for by this subsection is not filed, any civil action or proceeding commenced against the government unit more that six months after the date of the injury to person or property shall be dismissed and the person to whom any such cause of action accrued for any injury to person or property shall be forever barred from proceeding further thereon within this Commonwealth or elsewhere. The court shall excuse failure to comply with this requirement upon a showing of reasonable excuse for failure to file such statement.
42 Pa.C.S. § 5522(a)(1) and (2) (emphasis added). Gielarowski’s claim for first-party benefits does not arise out of any negligent act by PAT that is listed in the exceptions to sovereign immunity set forth in Chapter 85 of the Judicial Code. Consequently, Gielarowski was not required to give PAT notice of his first-party claim within six months of his injury.
I would further hold that Gielarowski’s injury arose out of the “maintenance and use of a motor vehicle,” so as to entitle him to first-party benefits under the MVFRL. In Tyler v. Insurance Company of North America, 311 Pa.Superior Ct. 25, 457 A.2d 95 (1983), the Superior Court held that a passenger alighting from a bus when injured was engaged in the “maintenance and use of a motor vehicle” for purposes of the No-Fault Act. Id. at 28-29, 457 A.2d at 96. In Tyler the Court noted:
In general, it can be said that a person who is alighting from a vehicle is still an occupant thereof. He continues to ‘occupy’ the motor vehicle until he severs all connection with it. The point of severance is reached when he becomes highway oriented as opposed to being vehicle oriented. Until then, the alighting passenger continues to be an *222occupant of the bus. Until such a person is on his or her own without reference to the bus, the person has not ceased to be a passenger or occupant____
Applying a vehicle oriented versus highway oriented test to the facts of the instant case, we conclude that at the time of the accident Carol Tyler had not severed her relationship with the bus from which she was alighting. The bus company had a duty, not only to carry her safely, but to afford her an opportunity to alight safely.
Id. at 31, 457 A.2d at 97-98 (citations omitted).
In the present case, I would conclude that Gielarowski’s alighting from the bus comes within “maintenance and use of a motor vehicle” for purposes of 75 Pa.C.S. § 1712. Gielarowski was not oriented to the icy conditions of the sidewalk when he fell. Accordingly, Gielarowski must be considered a passenger or occupant of the bus entitled to first-party benefits under 75 Pa.C.S. § 1712.
CRAIG, President Judge and PELLEGRINI, J., join in this dissenting opinion.. First-party benefits under the MVFRL are limited to medical benefits, income loss benefits, accidental death benefits and funeral benefits.