Pennsylvania State Corrections Officers Ass'n v. State Civil Service Commission

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY

Judge FRIEDMAN.

Like the majority, I agree with the State Civil Service Commission (Commission) that the seniority provisions of the State Civil Service Act, Act of August 5, 1941, P.L. 752, as amended, 71 P.S. §§ 741.1-741.1005 (Civil Service Act) conflict with Article 27, Section 2 of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) negotiated between the Corrections Officers union and the Department of Corrections (Department) on behalf of the H-l Bargaining Unit. (Majority op. at 1002.) However, unlike the majority, I also agree with the Commission that, due to the conflict, the Civil Service Act, not the CBA, controls whether Dennis N. Jenkins, Sr., retains or loses his fifteen years of seniority in this case.1

I. Section 703

Section 703 of the Public Employe Relations Act (Act 195), Act of July 23, 1970, P.L. 563, as amended, 43 P.S. § 1101.703, provides:

The parties to the collective bargaining process shall not effect or implement a provision of a collective bargaining agreement if the implementation of that provision would be in violation of, or inconsistent with, or in conflict with any statute or statutes enacted by the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania or the provisions of municipal home rule charters.

Our supreme court set forth the meaning of section 703 of Act 195 in Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board v. State College Area School District, 461 Pa. 494, 510, 337 A.2d 262, 270 (1975), stating that section 703 only excludes items from bargaining “where other applicable statutory provisions explicitly and definitively prohibit the public employer from making an agreement as to that specific term or condition of employment.” The court explained, even providing an example.

We believe that section 703 only prevents the agreement to and implementation of any term which would be in violation of or inconsistent with any statutory directive. [This] ... is best illustrated by an example. Under section 1142 of the Public School Code, a minimum salary scale is set forth. Section 1151 provides that school boards may pay salaries in excess of the minimum salary. [Thus,] section 1142 created a duty not to pay below the minimum scale and section 1151 granted the employer the prerogative to pay more than the minimum rate. Clearly, the parties are precluded ñ'om agreeing to a rate lower than the minimum scale but even though the statute vested in the public employer the prerogative to pay a higher rate, to do so as a result of collective bargaining is not “in violation of, or inconsistent with, or in conflict with” the statute in question.

Id. at 508-09, 337 A.2d at 269 (emphasis added). The majority does not discuss this example of a statutory directive, but, obviously, this means that, although public employees may bargain over salaries, the result cannot conflict with the statutory *1012minimum salary scale directed by the legislature.

Here, like the minimum salary scale, the legislature established seniority rules for public employees, stating that “Seniority is established for the classified service, classification series and for each class.” Section 807.2(a) of the Civil Service Act, added by the Act of June 1, 1945, P.L. 1366, as amended, 71 P.S. § 741.809(a) (emphasis added). If there is any doubt that section 807.2 is a statutory directive, that doubt is dispelled by section 903 of the Civil Service Act, which provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

[A person] who wilfully or through culpable negligence violates any of the provisions of this act [the Civil Service Act] or of any rules made thereunder, shall for each offense be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be sentenced to pay a fine ... or to serve imprisonment ... or both, in the discretion of the court.

71 P.S. § 741.903.1 cannot imagine a more forceful statutory directive than to criminalize a violation of the seniority rules. In my view, section 903 constitutes an explicit and definitive prohibition against negotiating a CBA that, in any part, conflicts with the seniority rules in section 807.2 of the Civil Service Act. Thus, to the extent that the seniority provisions of the CBA conflict with the Civil Service Act, the CBA cannot control in this case.

II. Article 33, Section 1

The majority notes, without discussion, that Article 33, Section 1 of the CBA contains language that is similar to section 703 of Act 195.

In the event that any provisions of this Agreement are found to be inconsistent with existing statutes or ordinances, the provisions of such statutes or ordinances shall prevail, and if any provision herein is found to be invalid and unenforceable by a court or other authority having jurisdiction, then such provision shall be considered void, but all other valid provisions shall remain in full force and effect.

(Majority op. at 1002 n. 6) (emphasis added). Here, the seniority provisions in Article 27, section 2 of the CBA are “inconsistent with” the statutory directive contained in section 807.2 of the Civil Service Act. Therefore, section 807.2 of the Civil Service Act prevails.

Accordingly, for this reason, I would affirm the Commission.

Judge SMITH-RIBNER joins in this dissent.

. Under the CBA, Jenkins loses his fifteen years of seniority; under the Civil Service Act, Jenkins retains his seniority.