concurring and dissenting.
I emphatically agree with the court’s decision to apply the discovery rule in the alleged legal malpractice causes of action. However, I dissent from the court’s decision to nevertheless affirm the take-nothing judgment against Willis. I would remand for a new trial.
Willis’ cause of action arose because of the malpractice of the attorney handling her divorce. The jury not only found that Chilton Maverick was negligent but that he acted knowingly and with heedless and reckless disregard to the rights of Yvonne Willis. Based upon its conclusion that Willis had been wronged, the jury awarded damages in her favor. Notwithstanding that jury verdict, Willis has been unable to obtain a judgment because of the court of appeals’ conclusion that her action was barred by the statute of limitations.
Recognizing “the injustice of denying relief to unknowing victims,” this court now affirmatively and absolutely disapproves of the reasoning of the court of appeals. Nevertheless, the court goes on to affirm the take-nothing judgment against Willis for the reason that her trial attorney failed to request a discovery rule issue in substantially correct wording.
Thus, through fighting this legal battle for eight years, Willis has furthered the cause of justice for countless future victims of legal malpractice, but for Willis herself there is no justice. When she went to court to try to obtain a remedy for the wrong of her first attorney, Willis’ attorney at trial failed to request a jury issue in substantially correct wording. On this basis, the court holds that Willis still loses. The essence of what this court says to Willis is this: “Now turn the other cheek and swallow hard.” I doubt that Willis will derive much comfort from the purely academic knowledge that her persistence in trying to seek redress through the courts has resulted in a significant step forward in the jurisprudence of this state.
Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 180 expressly authorizes this court to reverse a court of appeals’ judgment and remand a cause to the trial court “if it shall appear that the justice of the cause demands another trial.” I am aware of case law construing this Rule in a narrow fashion; however, I would choose to simply follow the straight-forward language of the Rule. Because Willis has now been twice victimized by attorneys and because the court’s opinion in this case represents a change in the law, I would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and, in the interest of justice, remand it to the trial court for a new trial. Tex.R.App.P. 180; cf. Brown v. Republicbank First National, (Tex.1988) (Phillips, C.J., dissenting).
I would also hold that, on retrial, Willis should be allowed to submit jury issues as to her DTPA claims. This court has clearly held that a lawyer’s unconscionable conduct is actionable under the DTPA. DeBakey v. Staggs, 612 S.W.2d 924 (Tex.1981). Moreover, this court has not expressly rejected the notion that an implied warranty of good and workmanlike performance may apply to the provision of legal services. See Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349 (Tex.1987).
The court’s decision to affirm the take-nothing judgment against Willis produces a result that is “so absurd and so unjust" that it “ought not to be possible.” Hays v. Hall, 488 S.W.2d 412, 414 (Tex.1973). I would reverse the judgment of the court of *649appeals and, in the interest of justice, remand the cause to the trial court for a new trial on all causes of action.
ROBERTSON, J., joins in this concurring and dissenting opinion.