The petitioner applied for a writ of habeas corpus and it was issued. Following the return by the respondent the parties elected to report the case to this Court upon an agreed statement of facts and the certificate of the Justice. R. S., 1954, Chap. 103, Sec. 15.
The petitioner was born on December 17, A. D. 1940. On August 26, A. D. 1957 he was arraigned in the juvenile court for having feloniously uttered and published as true, a false, forged and counterfeit instrument on August 19, A. D. 1957. He was tried, found guilty of juvenile delinquency and committed to the reformatory for men. He charges that he is unlawfully deprived of his liberty.
The issue is whether a youth more than 16 years of age but less than 17 may be legally sentenced and committed, to the reformatory for men by a judge of a juvenile court for juvenile delinquency.
R. S. 195J/. c. 27, § 66, as amended by P. L. 1955, c. 318, § 1, is, in pertinent part, as follows:
“The state shall maintain a reformatory in which all males over the age of 16 years, except as pro*8vided in section 80, and under the age of 36 years who have been convicted of or have pleaded guilty to crime in the courts of this state or of the United States, and who have been duly sentenced and removed thereto, shall be imprisoned and detained in accordance with the sentences or orders of said courts and the rules and regulations of said reformatory. The provisions for the safekeeping or employment of such inmates shall be made for the purpose of teaching such inmates a useful trade or profession, and improving their mental and moral condition.----” (italics supplied)
Save for the addition of the clauses, “and under the age of thirty-six years” and “except as provided in section 80,” the statute quoted has existed quite as it was enacted in 1919. P. L. 1919, c. 182, § 1.
On August 26, A. D. 1957 this petitioner could not have been convicted of crime nor could he have pleaded guilty to crime. His youth precluded both possibilities in as much as the charge against him was not a crime the punishment for which may be imprisonment for life or for any term of years. R. S. 1954, c. 146, § 2, c. 133, § 1, P. L. 1955, c. 29; Wade v. Warden, 145 Me. 120.
R. S. 1954, c. 27, § 66, the statute authorizing the reformatory for men, as amended, taken from its context of statutes and read literally would appear to eliminate the possibility of legal commitment to, or confinement of the petitioner in, the reformatory. To ascertain the effects of the act, however, it is necessary to consider it with other existing and kindred laws. Of the latter there are several.
In 1919 the legislature placed boys between the ages of 8 and 16 years under a disability or incompetency to commit crime save for the gravest types.
“Act of Juvenile Delinquency.
When a boy between the ages of eight and sixteen years is convicted before any court or trial justice *9having jurisdiction of the offense, of an offense punishable by imprisonment in the state prison, not for life, or in the county jail, or in the house of correction, such court or justice may order his commitment to the state school for boys or sentence him to the punishment provided by law for the same offense---The record in the event of conviction in all cases shall be that the accused was convicted of juvenile delinquency, and the court shall have the power at the hearing of any such case to exclude the general public other than persons having a direct interest in the case. The records of any such case by order of the court may be withheld from indiscriminate public inspection, but such records shall be open to inspection by the parent or parents of such child or lawful guardian or attorney of the child involved.” (italics supplied) P. L. 1919, c. 58.
The maximum age of the boy was advanced from 16 to 17 in 1921 (P. L. 1921, c. 129) and has remained at 17 to the present time. (P. L. 1955, c. 211, § 1) By this law a boy under 17 has been incapable of committing all crimes save murder or treason since 1921, and from 1935 to August 28, A. D. 1957 all crimes save murder, treason and kidnapping. Juvenile delinquency is not crime and a delinquent child is not a criminal. Wade v. Warden, 145 Me. 120, 125, 128.
In 1919 the same legislature which passed the “Act of Juvenile Delinquency” (P. L. 1919, c. 58) enacted the following law:
“When a male over the age of sixteen years is convicted before any court or trial justice having jurisdiction of the offense, of an offense punishable by imprisonment in the state prison, or in any county jail, or in any house of correction, such court or trial justice may order his commitment to the reformatory for men, or sentence him to the punishment provided by law.---” (italics supplied) P. L. 1919, c. 182, § 7.
*10In 1928 an age limit of 36 years was imposed by amendment. (P. L. 1923, c. 58, § 2). Otherwise, for the purposes of our present analysis, the act (P. L. 1919, c. 182, § 7) has remained as it is presently. (R. S. 1954, c. 27, § 67, P. L. 1955, c. 318, § 2) And again we comment that from 1921 to 1935 (P. L. 1921, c. 129) a boy under 17 was incapable of committing any crime except murder or treason and from 1935 to August 28, A. D. 1957 any crime except murder, treason and kidnapping. The act just quoted above (P. L. 1919, c. 182, § 7) has never been altered to advance the minimum age to 17. Since 1921 there has been an overlapping of ages, between 16 and 17, in the juvenile delinquency age range and the minimum age in this reformatory sentence act. The above act speaks of “a conviction ---of an offense” but includes offenses punishable by jail and house of correction confinement. In 1923 the legislature passed the following act:
“If, in the opinion of the trustees of juvenile institutions, any boy, under the guardianship of the state school for boys or who may hereafter be committed thereto, who has attained the age of sixteen yecurs, is incorrigible, they may certify the same on the original mittimus---whereupon said boy shall be transferred from said state school for boys to the reformatory for men---It shall be the duty of the officers of the reformatory for men to receive any boy so transferred and the remainder of the original commitment shall be executed at the reformatory for men---” (italics supplied) P. L. 1923, c. 28.
This statute without consequential change has continued as law and is now R. S. 1954, c. 27, § 87. It provides for the commitment of incorrigible 16 year old boys to the reformatory.
In the Revised Statutes of 1930 are two more acts treating of incorrigibles at the State School for Boys, R. S. 1930, c. 154, §§ 5 and 6.
*11“Every boy committed to said school shall be there kept, disciplined, instructed, employed and governed, under the direction of the board of trustees, until the term of his commitment expires, or he is discharged as reformed, bound out by said trustees according to their by-laws, or remanded to some penal institution under the sentence of the court or transferred to the reformatory for men as incorrigible, upon the information---” (italics supplied) R. S. 1930, c. 154, § 5.
This act has remained in being except for amendments not affecting our present consideration. See R. S. 1954, c. 27, § 79, P. L. 1957, c. 387, § 15.
“When a boy is ordered to be committed to said school and the trustees deem it inexpedient to receive him, or his continuance in the school is deemed injurious to its management and discipline, they shall certify the same upon the mittimus by which he is held, and the mittimus and boy shall be delivered to any proper officer who shall forthwith commit said boy to the jail, house of correction, or state prison, or if he has attained the age of sixteen years, to the state reformatory for men according to his sentence---” (italics supplied) R. S. 1930, c. 154, § 6.
This law, with amendments of no moment to our current study, has persisted until at present it reads:
“---or if he has attained the age of 15 years, to the State Reformatory for Men according to his sentence.” (italics supplied) R. S. 1954, c. 27, § 80, P. L. 1955, c. 318, § 3.
Thus we have a provision for committing 15 year old boys to the reformatory.
In 1931 the legislature by act conferred upon judges of municipal courts exclusive, original jurisdiction over all offenses committed by children under the age of 15 years with the following qualification:
*12“Unless the offense is aggravated or the child is of a vicious or unruly disposition no court shall sentence or commit a child to jail, reformatory, or prison, or hold such child for the grand jury.” (italics supplied) P. L. 1931, c. 241, § 4.
In 1933 the legislature, by amendment, raised the age of children subject to such exclusive, original jurisdiction to 17 years generally but at the same session it amended the sentence quoted immediately above to read thus:
“Unless the offense is aggravated or the child is of a vicious or unruly disposition no court shall sentence or commit a child under the age of 15 years to jail, reformatory, or prison, or hold such child for the grand jury.” (italics supplied) P. L. 1933, c. 18; c. 118, § 5.
In 1937 this same sentence was once more amended:
“Unless the offense is aggravated or the child is of a vicious or unruly disposition no court shall sentence or commit a child under the age of 17 years to jail, reformatory, or prison or hold such child for the grand jury.” (italics supplied) P. L. 1937, c. 197.
In 1943 the legislature amended the law excepting capital or otherwise infamous crimes, providing for the holding of children for the grand jury, abolishing the sentence set out above as to vicious, unruly children a,nd adopting these words:
“---and no municipal court shall sentence a child under the age of 17 years to jail, reformatory or prison.” (italics supplied) P. L. 1943, c. 322.
In 1947 there followed an amendment changing crimes excepted: “except for a crime the punishment for which may be imprisonment for life or for any term of years.” P. L. 1947, c. 334, § 1.
In 1951 we have this change:
“---and no municipal court shall sentence a child under the age of 17 years to jail, reformatory or prison; —” P. L. 1951, c. 84, § 4.
*13The law which was P. L. 1931, c. 241, with the amendments reviewed above and others not now memorable here, is R. S. 1954, c. 146, §§ 2 and 6. It will be discerned from this 1931 enactment as extended that from 1919 when juvenile delinquency was recognized until 1937 boys over 16 years of age could have been committed to the reformatory. From 1937 to 1943 vicious and unruly boys over the age of 16 years could have been so committed. From 1951 to the present such a commitment for all boys under 17 years down the range of the juvenile scale has been permissible, due to the above amendment of 1951.
Prior to that 1951 amendment to what is now R. S. (1954) c. 146, § 6, as amended, the statute (then R. S. (1944) c. 133, § 6; P. L. 1947, c. 334) read as follows:
“A municipal court may---make such other disposition as may seem best for the interests of the child and for the protection of the community--- and no municipal court shall sentence a child under the age of 17 years to jail, reformatory or prison;---” (emphasissupplied)
It is manifest that the power of the municipal court, above, was stated as quite plenary and then was restricted by prohibiting any sentence “to jail, reformatory or prison.” When, therefore, the legislature by the amendment of 1951 (P. L. c. 84, § 4) struck out the word, “^íer-Baaéefy” the legislature intended to remove one prohibition then existing, to the foregoing and quite plenary power of the court and at least by plain implication made sentences to the reformatory permissive. It is further very pertinent to our inquiry to find that the legislature adopted the above amendment of 1951 (P. L. c. 84, § 4) as section 4 of an act entitled: “An Act to Clarify Certain Provisions of the Institutional Service Law” in which section 2 contained an amendment to what is now R. S. (1954) c. 27, § 67, as amended, the reformatory commitment statute. See P. L. 1951, c. 84. The Legislature by such 1951 amendments discovered it*14self as allocating and mindfully treating juvenile sentencing and reformatory commitment as kindred matters in one reform chapter or measure. Very arguably may it be urged that the act of 1951 (P. L. 1951, c. 84) by clear implication also amended the reformatory creation statute which is now being construed, R. S. (1954) c. 27, § 66, as amended.
This synopsis of statutes exposes shortcomings in the correlation of the acts. But such a defect is only of form. The legislature in 1919 established the reformatory for men seemingly for criminals if the creative act were to be read and considered literally and exclusively. The enactment does not state that the reformatory shall be maintained only for criminals but it must be conceded that a meticulous interpretation of it apart from laws in pari materia might fortify such an inference. However, in the prolongation of the law through a span of 38 years the legislature by various statutes hereinbefore reviewed and adopted during the same period of time has affirmatively provided for the commitment of juvenile delinquents, over 16 years and under 17 years, to the reformatory for men. Indeed, one act authorizes such commitments for 15 year old delinquents. There can be no doubt that the legislature acted in each instance with a full comprehension of its doings and it is the prerogative of the legislature alone to enact our laws.
Our court has on many occasions set forth the canons of sound statutory interpretation wisely decisive of any scruples one might be disposed to entertain here. We quote from 2 well known authorities:
State v. Koliche, 143 Me. 281
@ 283. “The fundamental rule in the construction of a statute is legislative intent. Craughwell V. Mousam River Trust Co., 113 Me. 531; 95 A. 221. It is also a recognized rule of construction that a penal statute is to be interpreted strictly in favor of the respondent. State V. Wallace, 102 Me. 229; 66 A. 476. Although ‘Penal laws are to be *15strictly construed, they are not to be construed so strictly as to defeat the obvious intent of the Legislature.’ State V. Cavalluzzi, 113 Me. 41; 92 A. 937, 938; State V. Bass Co., 104 Me. 288, 71 A. 894; 20 L. R. A., N. S. 495. To arrive at legislative intent the statute must be construed as a whole, and different sections of the same statute may be read together to ascertain legislative purpose and intent. Rackliff V. Greenbush, 93 Me. 99; 44 A. 374; State V. Frederickson, 101 Me. 37; 63 A. 535; 6 L. R. A., N. S. 186; 115 Am. St. Rep. 295; 8 Am. Cas. 48.”
State v. Frederickson, 101 Me. 37
@ 41. “But under the established rules of construction the two sections of the statutes should be construed together. Both sections are part of the same body of revised laws. We see no good reason why chapters of the same statute should not be construed with reference to each other as well as sections of the same chapter. Chief Justice Shaw in Com. V. Goding, 3 Met. 103, says: ‘In construing the Revised Statutes, we are to bear in mind that the whole were enacted at one and the same time, and constitute one act; and then the rule applies, that in construing one part of a statute, we are to resort to every other part to ascertain the true meaning of the legislature in each particular provision. This rule is peculiarly applicable to the Revised Statutes in which, for the convenience of analysis, and classification of subjects, provisions are sometimes widely separated from each other in the code, which have so immediate a connection with each other, that it is quite necessary to consider the one, in order to arrive at the true exposition of the other.’
“The suggestion in the above quotation that ‘the whole were passed at one and the same time’ was not intended we apprehend to in any degree limit the rule of comparing statutes, whenever enacted, in pari materia, a principle well established by our own as well as other courts. Gould V. B. & P. R. R., *1682 Maine, 126; Cotton V. W. W. & F. R. R. Co., 98 Maine, 511; Com. V. Sylvester, 13 Allen, 247.
“Black on Interpretation of Laws, page 6, in discussing this principle says: ‘The phrase ‘statute in pari materia’ is applicable to private statutes or general laws made at different times, and in reference to the same subjects.’.....”
Since 1919 two of the noteworthy reforms adopted and developed by our lawmakers have been the moral and social regeneration of criminal malefactors, both adolescent and adult. The young are preserved from the disgrace of criminal record and devoted efforts are made to right their lives. Wade v. Warden, 145 Me. 120. The mature are rehabilitated, rather than punished, where there is deemed to be some hopeful promise and considerations of public weal at all permit. Gosselin, Petitioner, 141 Me. 412. For males in this noble uplift are two major public institutions, the state school for boys and the reformatory for men. It is a truism that the contemporary youth in this country generally is more sophisticated than were his forebears, due in large measure to the greater dissemination of information and goods, condensation of population and increase in travel. The line of demarcation between childhood and adulthood has receded. No two males are completely identical. The legislators and those who staff our institutions well know that some older “teenagers” feel undignified and are not so disposed to be receptive to reform when grouped with younger children. Older boys may be restive to be accepted as young men. Some are quite sociopathic and are subjects for resocialization in the more virile climate of the men’s reformatory where, particularly, there is greater security provided. The intention of the legislature to bridge a transition between the school for boys phase of enlightenment, suasion and discipline and that of the senior reformatory for men is unmistakable and intelligible. The reformatory act and the juvenile delinquency statute under which the *17petitioner was sentenced and committed are not repugnant but actually complementary.
The petitioner is not unlawfully deprived of his liberty. The mandate must be:
Petition for habeas corpus, dismissed, writ discharged.