Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by
Judge SIMPSON.I agree with the majority’s resolution of the Students’ special legislation challenge to Section 2134 of the School Code (Transition Statute).1 However, I respectfully dissent from the conclusions regarding a denial of procedural due process. For the reasons that follow, I would affirm the grant of summary judgment to the School District of Philadelphia.
First, the named Students2 failed to present a factual basis to prevail because they failed to prove any deprivation whatsoever.
By agreement, the case proceeded to summary judgment without any discovery and without any hearing. Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 3a-4a. Although the School District made an extensive submission in support of its motion, see Supplemental Reproduced Record, the named Students did not. Thus, there is neither testimony nor affidavit from any witness for the named Students, including from the named Students themselves.
At the summary judgment stage, a party may not rest on the pleadings but must identify expected proof. Pa. R.C.P. No. 1035.3. However, the named Students offer no proof to substantiate their claims that the statutory process is interrupting and disrupting their educational programs, that their placements pursuant to the Transition Statute are stigmatizing and injuring their reputations, or that the programs to which they are assigned are not comparable to those available in regular schools. Amended Complaint ¶¶ 101-03, R.R. at 14a. Moreover, they offer no proof at all that they belong in regular classrooms rather than in alternate placement.
The Students bear a heavy burden of overcoming the presumed constitutionality of the statute. DeFazio v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of Allegheny County, 562 Pa. 431, 756 A.2d 1103 (2000). Their failure to offer any factual support for their claims of deprivation is fatal.3
*422Second, the Students fail to identify an established interest the deprivation of which deserves procedural due process protection. In particular, the Students fail to allege and prove total exclusion from the educational process or removal from regular classes by operation of the Transition Statute.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States’ Constitution forbids a State to deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law. Protected interests in property are normally not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by an independent source such as state statutes or rules entitling the citizen to certain benefits. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 95 S.Ct. 729, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975); see Levine v. Dep’t of Educ., 79 Pa.Cmwlth. 357, 468 A.2d 1216 (1984) (to be entitled to a due process hearing, one must have suffered the loss of a property or liberty interest, and denial of a promotion to a college professor involved neither).
In Pennsylvania, a student may not be suspended or expelled without a hearing. Section 1318 of the School Code, 24 P.S. § 13-1318. Students must be afforded all appropriate elements of due process if they are to be excluded from school. 22 Pa.Code § 12.8(a). Students here, however, are not suspended, expelled or excluded from school by the Transition Statute. Instead, the Transition Statute only affects students already removed from regular class by the juvenile court.
The named Students cite no statute or regulation upon which a right to reenter regular class is based. My independent research discloses no source for such a right. In the absence of a property right to reenter regular class after removal by the juvenile court, due process does not attach. See Schmader v. Warren County Sch. Dist., 808 A.2d 596 (Pa.Cmwlth.2002) (15-minute disciplinary detention was not exclusion from school rising to constitutional deprivation); Adamek v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n, Inc. 57 Pa.Cmwlth. 261, 426 A.2d 1206 (1981) (no property right to participation in interscholastic athletics).4
Federal cases do not compel a different result. Thus, in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. at 576, 95 S.Ct. 729, the United States Supreme Court concluded that students’ “total exclusion from the educational process” implicated a property interest in education worthy of due process protection. This protection was extended somewhat by the district court in Everett v. Marcase, 426 F.Supp. 397 (E.D.Pa.1977) to a disruptive, involuntary transfer out of a regular class to another location. Neither of those situations is present here. Students are not totally excluded from the education process by the Transition Statute. Also, Students are not removed from a regular class by the Transition Statute. Instead, they are returning to the public school after removal by the juvenile court. See Dal-lam v. Cumberland Valley Sch. Dist., 391 F.Supp. 358 (M.D.Pa.1975) (property interest in education created by Pennsylvania is *423participation in the entire process, not each separate activity).
Third, the named Students distort the significance of the predicate disposition by the juvenile court. They argue that the adjudication of delinquency is remote in time and without information pertinent to a return to public school. However, it is not the adjudication of delinquency that is significant here; rather, it is the momentous disposition of removal from the community and commitment to a juvenile facility that is crucial to understanding why the Transition Statute operates reasonably.
In juvenile court proceedings, delinquency adjudication is the functional equivalent of establishment of guilt in adult criminal court. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 6341. After a finding that a child committed acts which would constitute crimes if committed by an adult, a juvenile court must also determine whether the child is in need of treatment, supervision or rehabilitation. 42 Pa.C.S. § 6341(b).
Thereafter, the juvenile court makes a decision regarding disposition. This is the functional equivalent of a sentence in adult criminal law. This is usually done with the aid of a comprehensive social study and investigation. 42 Pa.C.S. § 6339. The report covers “the child, his family, his environment, and other matters relevant to disposition of the case.” Id. (emphasis added). As such, it includes information about school attendance and performance.
Several disposition choices are available to the juvenile court, the most serious of which is removal from the family and community and commitment to an institution. 42 Pa.C.S. § 6352(a).5 The juvenile court chooses the disposition option:
determined to be consistent with the protection of the public interest and best suited to the child’s treatment, supervi*424sion, rehabilitation, and welfare, which disposition shall, as appropriate to the individual circumstances of the child’s case, provide balanced attention to the protection of the community, the imposition of accountability for offenses committed and the development of competencies to enable the child to become a responsible and productive member of the community.
Id. When confinement is necessary, the juvenile court shall impose the minimum amount of confinement that is consistent with the protection of the public and the rehabilitation needs of the child. Id.
The primary purpose of the Juvenile Act is the preservation of family unity whenever possible. 42 Pa.C.S. § 6301(b)(1), (3); In Interest of Justin S., 375 Pa.Super. 88, 543 A.2d 1192 (1988). So, it is improper to place a child in the custody of a state agency until the juvenile court considers and rejects alternative dispositions which would allow a child to remain with parents. In Interest of Ryan Michael C., 294 Pa.Super. 417, 440 A.2d 535 (1982). Consistent with this authority, residential placements are rarely the first disposition. Such placements separate a child from family, school, and community, and they are expensive. Those of us with juvenile court experience well know that residential placements are normally ordered as a last resort. As here, placements extend months, not days.
The juvenile court remains involved during the months of residential placement. The juvenile court must review such a placement every six months and shall hold a formal disposition review hearing at least every nine months. 42 Pa.C.S. § 6353(a). Further, as here, the juvenile court frequently remains involved after release through continuing probation and aftercare programs. Amended Complaint ¶ 41, R.R. at 15a.
Thus, it is not the adjudication hearing that is most significant in the present context. More important are the subsequent social study and report, disposition hearing, and disposition review hearings. During these stages all relevant, current information about a child, including educational information, is gathered, and determinations of the degree of restriction are made. The named Students fail to acknowledge the ongoing, comprehensive role of the juvenile court in disposition.
In essence, it is the severity of the predicate disposition, usually reserved as a last resort, rather than the fact of adjudication, which explains why the Transition Statute operates reasonably. The Transition Statute only applies to delinquent and criminal students in such extreme circumstances that they must be removed from family, school and community for an extended period. They are fully protected by the court.6 As discussed, there is a rational basis for the Transition Statute to operate in this manner.
For these reasons, I would affirm.
Judge LEADBETTER joins in this dissent.
. Section 2134 of the Public School Code of 1949 (School Code), Act of March 10, 1949, P.L. 30, as amended, added by the Act of June 29, 2002, P.L. 524, as amended, 24 P.S. § 21-2134.
. The docket entries fail to reveal that the mandatory class certification hearing was held or that a ruling was made on class certification. Reproduced Record (R.R.) at la-6a. This is significant for two reasons. First, because a court may not enter summary judgment against the class before ruling on class certification, the summary judgment here binds only the named Students. Pa. R.C.P. No. 1715(a); Pa. R.C.P. No. 1715(a) cmt. Second, the typicality of the named Students' claims and their right to represent the class is not established. Pa. R.C.P. No. 1702(3). In this regard, the named Students were not adjudicated delinquent on one of the offenses enumerated in the Transition Statute which precludes direct return to a regular classroom. Amended Complaint ¶¶ 12, 24, 35, R.R. at 11a, 13a, 14a. Therefore, they are not adversely affected by that provision and lack standing to challenge it in their own right. See Parents United for Better Sch., Inc. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of Educ., 166 Pa.Cmwlth. 462, 646 A.2d 689 (1994).
.Compare Everett v. Marcase, 426 F.Supp. 397 (E.D.Pa.1977), relied upon by Students, *422where hearings were held and an extensive record of deprivation was made.
. Named Students also claim a liberty interest in stigma-free reputation. In the absence of any offer to prove harm to reputation by operation of the Transition Statute, we need not decide whether such an interest warrants due process protection. This is especially true here, where the preexisting adjudication of delinquency and the exceptional disposition to a placement facility create obvious causation questions. See Roman v. Appleby, 558 F.Supp. 449 (E.D.Pa.1983) (discussing embarrassment from juvenile court proceedings).
. This section of the Juvenile Act provides in pertinent part:
(a) General rule. If the child is found to be a delinquent child the court may make any of the following orders of disposition determined to be consistent with the protection of the public interest and best suited to the child’s treatment, supervision, rehabilitation, and welfare, which disposition shall, as appropriate to the individual circumstances of the child’s case, provide balanced attention to the protection of the community, the imposition of accountability for offenses committed and the development of competencies to enable the child to become a responsible and productive member of the community:
(1) Any order authorized by section 6351 (relating to disposition of dependent child).
(2) Placing the child on probation under supervision of the probation officer of the court or the court of another state as provided in section 6363 (relating to ordering foreign supervision), under conditions and limitation the court prescribes.
(3) Committing the child to an institution, youth development center, camp, or other facility for delinquent children operated under the direction or supervision of the court or other public authority and approved by the Department of Public Welfare.
(4) If the child is 12 years of age or older, committing the child to an institution operated by the Department of Public Welfare.
(5) Ordering payment by the child of reasonable amounts of money as fines, costs, fees or restitution as deemed appropriate ....
(6) An order of the terms of probation may include an appropriate fine considering the nature of the act committed or restitution not in excess of actual damages caused by the child....
In selecting from the alternatives set forth in this section, the court shall follow the general principle that the disposition imposed should provide the means through which the provisions of this chapter are executed and enforced consistent with section 6301(b) (relating to purposes) and when confinement is necessary, the court shall impose the minimum amount of confinement that is consistent with the protection of the public and the rehabilitation needs of the child.
. In juvenile court, all hearings are conducted with full procedural safeguards, including notice, right to counsel, right to introduce evidence and cross-examine witnesses, and the privilege against self-incrimination. 42 Pa. C.S. §§ 6336-38.