(dissenting).
With the utmost respect for my colleagues of the majority, I am constrained to dissent from the opinion of the Court in this case. In my view, the conclusion of the majority enunciates an innovation on the jurisprudence of Tennessee relating to the duty of care of a minor— that is, that in the operation of a motor vehicle upon the streets and highways of this State, a minor is onerated with the same duty of reasonable and ordinary care as that placed by the law on an adult person similarly engaged.
By way of isolating the question, I would agree with the action of the majority with respect to a supplemental instruction given by the Trial Judge; ■ and I would concede that the record in this case reflects that there was ample evidence introduced at the trial to support a jury verdict for either the plaintiffs or the defendants. The jury, in fact, found and returned the verdict for the defendants. Such verdicts were approved by the Trial Court. The action of the Trial Court was affirmed by the Court of Appeals of Tennessee, Western Section. The Writ of Certiorari was granted by this Court and the case has been ably and fully orally argued and briefed.
The pivotal question here, under the Assignment of Error, arises out of the Trial Court’s handling of instructions to the jury. In his charge, the Trial Judge *517instructed the jury with respect to the minor plaintiff’s duty of care, as follows:
“I charge you that a minor child, engaged in the operation of a motor vehicle upon the public roads and highways, is chargeable with the same degree of care as an adult person.”
The above instruction was supplemented by the usual general charge with respect to care, negligence and contributory negligence and the effect thereof. Further posing the issue presented, the Trial Judge refused plaintiff’s special request to instruct the jury as follows:
“Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury, I charge you that under the laws of this State a minor, whether in the act of operating a motor scooter or what, or some other act, is not to be held to the same degree of care in said operation as an adult of or over twenty-one years of age would be. Rather, under the laws of this State, the standard of care by which to measure the conduct of a minor, as regards the question of contributory negligence, is that degree of care ordinarily exercised by one of the same age, discretion, knowledge and experience under the same or similar circumstances. ’ ’
The Opinions of the Court of Appeals and of the majority of this Court announce a doctrine novel to Tennessee jurisprudence. The briefs of counsel, the Opinion of the Court of Appeals, and that of the majority of this Court, all seem to recognize this. It is, that in the operation of a motor vehicle on the streets and highways of Tennessee, the duty of care imposed by law upon a minor is the same as that imposed upon an adult person. It is the imposition of this standard *518of care on the minor plaintiff by the Judge of the Trial Court that this Court now approves. Apparently it is intended that this adult standard of care be applied both on the question of primary negligence, as well as the contributory negligence of the minor.
'The rationale of the Opinion of the Court of Appeals in this case, as I understand it, is that this adult standard of care is imposed upon the minor by virtue of the terms and provisions of the motor vehicle license statutes of Tennessee found in T.C.A. sec. 59-701 et seq., and especially T.C.A. sec. 59-704 and T.C.A. sec. 59-707. Stripping these sections of all but what is deemed to be pertinent to this ease, these statutes are as follows:
“59-704. Operator’s or chauffeur’s license required —Exceptions.—(a) No person, except those hereinafter expressly exempted, shall drive any motor vehicle upon a highway in this state unless such person has a valid license as an operator or chauffeur under the provisions of this chapter. No person shall operate a motor vehicle as a chauffeur unless he holds a valid chauffeur’s license.”
“(c) The application of any person under the age of eighteen (18) years for an instruction permit or operator’s license shall be signed and verified before a person authorized to administer oaths by the father, mother or guardian, or, in the event there is no parent or guardian, then by another responsible adult who is willing to assume the obligation imposed under this chapter upon a person signing the application of a minor. If, in the event the applicant for a driver’s license is a female and married, her husband may sign and verify the application provided such husband is a *519person capable of legally entering into contractual relationships.
(d) Any negligence or willful misconduct or violation of any motor vehicle law of this state or any municipality thereof by a minor under the age of eighteen (18) years when driving a motor vehicle upon a highway or street shall be imputed to the person who has signed the application of such minor for a permit or license, which person shall be jointly and severally liable with such minor for any damages or fines occasioned by such negligence, willful miscon- ■ duct, or violation, except as otherwise provided in the next succeeding paragraph.
(e) In the event a minor deposits or there is deposited upon his behalf proof of financial responsibility in respect to the operation of a motor vehicle owned by him, or if not the owner of a motor vehicle, then with respect to the operation of any motor vehicle, in form and in amounts as required under the motor vehicle financial responsibility laws of this state, then the department may accept the application of such minor when signed by the husband over twenty-one (21) years of age, or one (1) parent or guardian of such minor, and while such proof is maintained the husband, parent or guardian shall not be subject to the liability imposed under the preceding paragraph of this section.
(f) Any person who has signed the application of a minor for a license may thereafter file with the department a verified written request that the license of said minor so granted be cancelled. Thereupon the department shall cancel the license of said minor and the person who signed the application of such minor *520shall be relieved from the liability imposed under this chapter by reason of having signed such application on account of any subsequent negligence or willful misconduct of such minor in operating a motor vehicle.
(g) The department may issue to a minor between the ages of fourteen (14) and sixteen (16) years a special restricted license or permit to operate a motor driven cycle as defined in sec. 59-801, upon compliance by the minor or persons acting in the minor’s behalf with all of the other provisions of this chapter, and provided further that the actual demonstration of ability to exercise ordinary and reasonable control,-as provided in sec. 59-707 be made on a motor driven cycle, and provided further that the license or permit issued in accordance with this section shall show upon its face a restriction to the use of a motor driven cycle only, and any other restrictions which the department upon good cause deems necessary to impose as provided in sec. 59-708(c).”
“59-707. Examination of applicants — Exceptions.— The department shall examine every applicant for an operator’s or chauffeur’s license, except as otherwise provided in this section. Such examination shall in-elude a test of the applicant’s eyesight, his ability to read and understand highway signs regulating, warning, and directing traffic, his knowledge of the traffic laws of this state, and shall include an actual demonstration of ability to exercise ordinary and reasonable control in the operation of a motor vehicle.”
The Opinion of the majority of this Court appears to go further than that of the Court of Appeals. That is to say, that the Opinion appears to me to hold that this Court would apply the adult duty of care both under the *521motor vehicle license statutes of Tennessee and a “rule of reason” based npon the minor engaging in an “adult activity”.
With respect to the supposed statutory change of the duty of care of a minor, the majority of this Court take greatest comfort from the language in each of these sections which provides, in substance, for the making by the minor of an “actual demonstration of ability to exercise ordinary and reasonable control” of his motor driven cycle. This requirement is one of several essentials to he met in the statutory process of obtaining a license. I do not find the word “care” used anywhere in the Tennessee Motor Vehicle License statutes. These statutes seem to me to he intended to do only that which their title indicates — that is, provide for preliminary precautionary steps in the process of obtaining various types of motor vehicle licenses, in order to operate various types of vehicles on the streets and highways of the State. These steps relate to a showing of mental and physical qualifications to operate.
Attention has been heretofore focused upon those provisions of the statutes thought to be pertinent. That these statutes do not expressly attempt to accomplish the result which the majority Opinion ascribes to them seems perfectly plain. It must be borne in mind that these statutes, as thus construed, would legislate in derogation of the common law. It thus seems to me to inescapably follow that the majority Opinion in this ease does violence to the long-established rule that such statutes are to be strictly construed. Southern Railway Co. v. Maples (1956), 201 Tenn. 85, 296 S.W.2d 870; Harbison v. Welch (1958), 195 Tenn. 191, 258 S.W.2d 755. As long ago as Horne v. Memphis & O. R. Co. (1860), 41 Tenn. 72, this *522Court laid down the salutary admonition that “it is not to be intended that the common law was to he altered further, or otherwise, than the Act expressly declared, or it would have so said. ’ ’ This statement I believe to be pointedly applicable to the instant case.
The rule of reasonable and ordinary care applied to minors in negligence cases in this State over the years, and in many decisions, is as stated in Standridge v. Godsey (1949), 189 Tenn. 522, 226 S.W.2d 277, and cases therein cited, as follows:
“Under all the authorities the standard by which to measure the conduct of a minor, as regards the question of contributory negligence, is that degree of care ordinarily exercised by one of the same age, discretion, knowledge and experience under the same or similar circumstances. ’ ’
I must state again, that a thorough reading of these licensing statutes fails to convince that they bear any such interpretation as placed upon them by the majority; and that such construction is critically violative of the rules just above stated. I find no justification whatever in them for so drastic and dramatic a change of the jurisprudence of this State as is announced in the majority Opinion. It nowise can be said that these statutes will bestow any maturity upon minor vehicular operators. Neither can or will they serve to alter the fact of life that minors will remain impetuous and less carefully apprehensive of potential peril.
As noted before, the majority Opinion seems also to approbate the so-called rule of reason based upon the “adult activity” theory. This, to my mind, is to kneel at the feet of the Golden Calf in the form of a soporific *523phrase. After prolonged consideration, I am unable to demarcate tbe beginning or tbe ending of tbe import or the impact of this dubious phrase.
Much weight is placed in the majority Opinion upon a theory that if the usual standard of care placed upon a minor was “adopted as the law of this State, then we would have a double standard of care for the adult and the minor driver of a motor vehicle.” Beyond any peradventure of a doubt, we have had this so-called double standard for many generations. It has almost forever been embedded in the common law of this State.
Also, much is said in the majority Opinion about necessary growth of the law. Again, in my opinion, if what occurs here is growth of the law; then, the law is overgrown.
In conclusion, I am convinced that if this basic fundamental rule is to be changed, that such a change should be wrought by the Legislature and not by this Court. I would reverse and remand for new trial; and I am authorized to say that Chief Justice Hamilton S. Burnett joins with me in this Opinion.