Chief Justice. Appellants Edward Gay, et ah, challenge the annexation of four tracts of land by the City of Springdale, Arkansas. We hold that the land was properly annexed and affirm.
In 1983, the City of Springdale annexed approximately 7,000 acres of contiguous land pursuant to Ark. Stat. Ann. §§19-301 — 19-339 (Repl. 1980), currently Ark. Code Ann. §§ 14-40-201 — 14-40-607 (1987). The Washington County Circuit Court upheld the annexation. This court reversed the decision of the trial court, holding that the proof was insufficient that the annexed land met any one of the five criteria required for annexation by Ark. Code. Ann. § 14-40-302(a) (1987). See Gay v. City of Springdale, 287 Ark. 55, 696 S.W.2d 723 (1985).
On September 22, 1987, the Springdale City Council adopted an ordinance pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 14-40-301 (1987) by which it set a special election to determine whether four tracts of land contiguous to the City, totalling approximately 7,300 acres, should be annexed. This land, which is the subject matter of the present appeal, is in the same general area as the land involved in the 1983 proposed annexation. At a special election, the voters approved the annexation. Thereafter, appellants, owners of land in the four tracts that were annexed, filed a complaint in circuit court challenging the annexation. At trial, the following facts were established concerning the annexed tracts:
Tract one: Tract one consists of fruit orchards, poultry houses, vineyards, grassland, commercial enterprises, residential subdivisions, and an industrial subdivision. AeroTech Corporation has bought land in tract one where it plans to build a 50,000 square foot building.
Tract two: Tract two consists of farm land and two residential subdivisions.
Tract three: Tract three consists of twenty-nine poultry houses, thirty-two homes, two residential subdivisions, and large areas of bare land.
Tract four: Tract four consists of bare land, a hog farm, a chicken operation, pasture land, a seventy-acre industrial park currently being developed, and 300 acres of roughly wooded land with ravines and gullies. There are no subdivisions in tract four. However, there is property that has recently been purchased for a subdivision.
After hearing testimony from sixteen witnesses and reviewing numerous exhibits, the trial court found that all four tracts met at least two of the criteria contained in Ark. Code Ann. § 14-40-302(a)(2) — (a)(5) (1987). The court also found that the tracts met the requirement of Ark. Code Ann. § 14-40-302(b)(1)(A) (1987), that the lands have a highest and best use and fair market value for other than agricultural or horticultural purposes. As a result, the circuit court denied the petition, holding that the appellants failed to meet their burden of proof for exclusion of their lands from the annexation. From this order, appellants appeal.
Appellants contend that the trial court erred by failing to deny the petition for annexation when a substantial portion of the lands to be annexed failed to meet any of the five criteria set forth in Ark. Code Ann. § 14-40-302(a). We disagree.
Our law concerning annexation is well established. A majority of electors voting in favor of annexation makes a prima facie case for annexation, and the burden rests on those objecting to produce sufficient evidence to defeat the prima facie case. Gay, supra. Holmes v. City of Little Rock, 285 Ark. 296, 686 S.W.2d 425 (1985); City of Crossett v. Anthony, 250 Ark. 660, 466 S.W.2d 481 (1971). Appellants have the burden of showing the area in question should not be annexed. Chastain v. Davis, 294 Ark. 134, 741 S.W.2d 632 (1987). By the very nature of this type of litigation, there is a wide latitude for divergence of opinion and, consequently, a high degree of reliance must be placed upon the findings of the trial judge. Lewis v. City of Bryant, 291 Ark. 566, 726 S.W.2d 672 (1987).
We do not reverse the trial court’s findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. In viewing such findings, we consider all evidence in a light most favorable to the appellee. Jernigan v. Cash, 298 Ark. 347, 767 S.W.2d 517 (1989).
Section 14-40-302(a) provides that a city may annex lands contiguous to the city if the lands are either:
(1) Platted and held for sale or use as municipal lots;
(2) Whether platted or not, if the lands are held to be sold as suburban property;
(3) When the lands furnish the abode for a densely settled community or represent the actual growth of the municipality beyond its legal boundary;
(4) When the lands are needed for any proper municipal purposes such as for the extension of needed police regulation; or
(5) When they are valuable by reason of their adaptability for prospective municipal uses.
The five criteria listed in this provision are disjunctive, and the annexation may be proper when any one of the five conditions is met. Gay, supra; Lee v. City of Pine Bluff, 289 Ark. 204, 710 S.W.2d 205 (1986); Faucett v. Atkins, 248 Ark. 633, 453 S.W.2d 64 (1970). If one of the several tracts is found to be improperly included, the entire annexation must fail. Gay, supra; Herrod v. City of North Little Rock, 260 Ark. 890, 545 S.W.2d 620 (1977).
The fact that land is agricultural and the owner does not want it developed does not determine its fate as to annexation. Lee, supra; Planque v. City of Eureka Springs, 243 Ark. 361, 419 S.W.2d 788 (1967). Annexation is not prohibited solely because a tract is rather rugged or heavily wooded with sparse population. Chappell v. City of Russellville, 288 Ark. 261, 704 S.W.2d 166 (1986); Holmes, supra. It is proper for a city to annex property if it is needed for the purpose of making improvements and if the value of the land is derived from actual and prospective use for city purposes. Holmes, supra. Brown v. Peach Orchard, 162 Ark. 175, 257 S.W. 732 (1924).
The trial court found that all four tracts met the fourth criterion of Ark. Code Ann. § 14-40-302(a). To meet this criterion, lands must be needed for any proper municipal purposes such as for the extension of needed police regulation. Several witnesses testified in this regard. Tom Reed, an expert witness for defendant-appellees, testified that all four tracts are needed for proper municipal purposes and that the City had a 16% increase in residential building permits between 1985 and 1986 and a 29% increase between 1986 and 1987. Bob Harlan, an employee of the Northwest Arkansas Planning Commission and a planner for Springdale, testified that Springdale is expected to grow 20 % in the next seven years; that the City has proper municipal purpose for controlling orderly growth in all four tracts; and that annexation would serve that purpose.
Andre Houser, the City’s administrative assistant to the Mayor, testified that the lands in tracts one and two, which contain “enterprise zones,” are needed by the City for the proper municipal purpose of providing new and expanded employment opportunities. An “enterprise zone” provides businesses and industries located therein certain state income tax exemptions for employees as well as certain sales and use tax refunds for material and machinery used in expansion or construction. Before an enterprise zone may be “activated,” it must be inside the city limits.
Daniel White, the Springdale Fire Chief, testified that if the tracts are annexed, the fire department can provide fire service to the annexed areas. In addition, he asserted that the department has had trouble responding to calls because it is often difficult to tell whether a caller is in the City or in tract four. Trumann Brewer, the Springdale Chief of Police, testified that if the tracts are annexed, the department can provide police service to annexed area. .He also stated that it will be easier to provide service if the area is annexed since the police will know whether or not callers are in the City.
Rene Langston, Executive Director of the Springdale Water and Sewer Department, testified that the City needs to annex the area for sewer and water planning purposes. Roy Bowman, a Springdale City Councilman, stated that there is growth in all four tracts and that Springdale needs the annexation for orderly growth and development and police and fire protection. Harold Vowell, a local developer, testified that there is a shortage of lots in Springdale and that no land suitable for a subdivision is available in the City limits.
In light of this extensive testimony that the lands are needed for proper municipal purposes, we conclude that the trial court’s finding that all four tracts met the fourth criterion is not clearly erroneous. Since the tracts must meet one of the criteria of Ark. Code Ann. § 14-40-302(a) for annexation to be proper, we find it unnecessary to address the trial court’s findings regarding the other criteria.
Appellants also contend that the trial court’s finding that they failed to prove their lands to have a fair market value at the time of the adoption of the ordinance of lands used only for agricultural or horticultural purposes and the highest and best use of the land is for such purposes is contrary to the law when applied to the facts and testimony in evidence. We disagree.
Section 14-40-302(b)(l)(A) provides that contiguous lands shall not be annexed if they:
Have a fair market value at the time of the adoption of the ordinance of lands used only for agricultural or horticultural purposes and the highest and best use of the lands is for agricultural or horticultural purposes.
Appellants’ point of contention is that the defendant-appellees’ expert witness, Tom Reed, was “forecasting” land use and values when he claimed that the highest and best use and fair market value of the annexed land at the time of the adoption of the ordinance was for other than agricultural or horticultural purposes. Reed’s overall testimony reflects otherwise.
Tom Reed testified that after examining sales in the annexed areas in the last two years, he found that (1) there have been numerous residential and commercial sales in all four tracts; that (2) an investor cannot buy land in the tracts for agricultural or horticultural use and get a positive return; that (3) many investors are speculating by buying land for investment purposes and putting chickens on the land for interim use; that (4) the prices paid, as indicated by the prices in the real estate market, do not indicate the land in the four tracts to have a fair market value for agricultural or horticultural purposes or the highest and best use for such purposes; that (5) the highest and best use for some of the landowners is agricultural; that (6) the highest and best use is a market concept, not an individual concept; that (7) highest and best use is a long-term concept, not a present concept; that (8) he is forecasting; that (9) he is not talking about the future, but the highest and best use at the time the ordinance was passed; and that (10) some of the land in the annexation is not ready for immediate development and has an interim agricultural use until the growth, trends, and supply and demand cause it to change.
Although Reed during the course of his testimony characterized his opinion as “forecasting,” he-specifically stated that he was not talking about highest and best use in the future but at the time the ordinance was passed. The trial court, faced with this apparent inconsistency, had no trouble concluding that his testimony and the evidence established that the highest and best use and the fair market value of the land in all four tracts was for other than agricultural or horticultural purposes. Under the circumstances, we defer to the judgment of the trial court. We cannot say that the trial court’s finding is clearly erroneous.
Finally, appellants contend that Ark. Code Ann. § 14-40-302 violates the due process clause of the United States and Arkansas Constitutions in that it (1) permits the “taking” of property without just compensation and (2) impermissibly dilutes the voting rights of residents in the area to be annexed since an annexation can be approved even if a majority of the voters in the area oppose annexation.
Since appellants neither cite authority nor make convincing argument in support of this point of error, we do not consider it. It is well established that we do not consider arguments on appeal that are unsupported by convincing argument or authority, unless it is apparent without further research they are well taken. McGuire v. Bell, 297 Ark. 282, 761 S.W.2d 904 (1988).
Affirmed.
Hickman and Purtle, JJ., dissent.