dissenting.
Unless it is proper to ignore completely, as does the majority opinion, Davis v. State, 506 S.W.2d 909, 910-11 (Tex.Crim.App.1974), the conclusion is inescapable that the conviction must be reversed because the prosecutor was permitted, on several occasions and over appellant’s timely and correct objections, to tell the jury that the State need only prove the elements of the offense. The prejudicial effect of such argument was increased by the fact that appellant’s objection, which was overruled several times was based on the undoubtedly correct rule that it was the State’s burden to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt any defense raised by the evidence. The effect of the court’s rulings was to tell the jury that appellant’s insistence that the State must disprove defenses was incorrect, and that the State’s argument was a correct statement of the law.
It is of no moment that the court’s charge, “when read as a whole, fairly and correctly instructs the jury on the issues of self-defense, burden of proof and reasonable doubt,” since the court’s rulings on appellant’s objections was a strong indication of disapproval of appellant’s contention that the State had the burden of disproving defenses. Viewing the various communications to the jury as a whole, the most charitable assessment of the situation is that the jury received conflicting theories and that the court seemingly approved the State’s position. At the very least, what we have are contradictory statements concerning burden of proof, with no consistent position being taken by the court. Necessarily, the result was one tending to confuse the jury.
If we accept the contention that all is well because the court’s charge was correct we are, in effect, saying that a prosecutor’s *944argument which is contrary to the charge is harmful only when the court's charge is incorrect and the prosecutor’s argument is a statement of the law. Such a theory, while admittedly novel, can be accepted only with some difficulty.
The majority opinion states, “We do not think that the court’s erroneous rulings were calculated to mislead the jury to such a degree that appellant was deprived of a correct application of the law.” This statement is an incorrect application of the law. According to TEX.R.APP.P. 81(b)(2), if, as the majority concedes, the record reveals error, we must reverse unless we determine “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error made no contribution to the conviction ...” A belief that the error was not prejudicial is insufficient.
I would reverse the conviction and remand the case for a new trial.