A grievance committee of the State Bar of Texas instituted this action in El Paso to disbar Richard B. Ingram, an attorney. A jury was waived, and the case was tried to the' court. The court found that the attorney had appropriated $401.50 of his client’s funds and was guilty of unethical and unprofessional conduct. There is no evidence that any criminal charges had been filed against the attorney or that he has been convicted of any criminal offense.
The judgment of the court was that the attorney be prohibited from practicing law in any form, and from receiving any attorney’s fees, for a period of three years.
The attorney did not appeal, but the grievance committee did. It contends that it was an abuse of the trial court to fail to completely disbar the attorney. The court of civil appeals at El Paso affirmed the judgment of the trial court, one justice dissenting. 502 S.W.2d 595. We also affirm.
As relevant here, the attorney represented Mrs. Mary E. Barker and her daughter. There had been an automobile accident. The agreed attorney’s fee was a one-fourth contingent interest.
The case was settled for approximately $3,000. The attorney, after withholding his one-fourth fee and $250 for a divorce, also withheld from the settlement funds to pay his client’s garage bill of $99.33; and the garage was paid. The attorney also held $401.50 to pay the two doctor’s bills, one for Mrs. Barker and one for her daughter. The bills were not paid, and this gave rise to this action. The attorney testified upon the trial that he thought he had written a check and that it had been mailed to the doctor. No check was received, and the attorney admitted that no *253letter containing the check was returned to him. A member of the grievance committee testified that the attorney told the committee under oath that he had retained the money in a trust account. There was no trust account.
The trial court did not believe the attorney as to the doctor’s bills. The trial court ordered the attorney to pay the $401.50 to the doctor, and the money was paid in court prior to the judgment. As stated, his judgment was that the attorney be suspended from all practice of law for three years.
A statute provides that:
“. . . Upon proof of final conviction of any felony involving moral turpitude or of any misdemeanor involving theft, embezzlement, or fraudulent appropriation of money or other property, where probation has not been given or has been revoked, the district court of the county of the residence of the convicted attorney shall enter a judgment disbarring him.” 1 [Emphasis ours]
The statute also provides that:
“An attorney who has been given probation after such conviction [of a felony involving moral turpitude or a misdemeanor involving theft, embezzlement or fraudulent appropriation] shall be suspended from the practice of law for the period of his probation.” [Matter in brackets added by us.]
The Legislature has thus provided that if any attorney is criminally charged and is convicted, he shall be disbarred; provided, that if the sentence is probated, he shall be suspended during the probation. It has not provided, therefore, that a conviction in all instances means an automatic disbarment. It has provided for some discretion in the trial judge to suspend the sentence and to bring about a corresponding suspension of the license to practice.
Mr. Ingram, the attorney here, has not been criminally charged or convicted of any crime. Whether he should have been disbarred or suspended, therefore, was a matter addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. O’Dowd, 158 Tex. 348, 312 S.W.2d 217 (1958); State v. Pevehouse, 483 S.W.2d 565 (Tex.Civ.App.1972, writ ref’d n. r. e.); 7 Am.Jur.2d 52-53, Attorneys at Law § 18; and see State v. Murrell, 74 So.2d 221 at 223 (Fla.1954); In re Mackay, 416 P.2d 823, on rehearing 416 P.2d at 840 (Alaska, 1966).
The grievance committee concedes that the punishment affixed for Mr. Ingram was a matter for the exercise of the sound discretion of the trial court. The committee contends, however, that it was a gross abuse of discretion for the trial court not to completely disbar Mr. Ingram. We do not agree. Members of this court, if sitting as the trial judge, might have imposed a different sentence upon Mr. Ingram. The grievance committee points to a lack of evidence of mitigating circumstances to call for a sentence of other than disbarment. On the other hand, it appears that this was an isolated instance. It was the first and only time Mr. Ingram had been called before the grievance committee; and while the appropriation of $401.50 of a client’s funds and failing to tell the grievance committee the truth about it is a very serious matter, so is the complete loss of three years of one’s professional life. Since Mr. Ingram could not practice at all for three years, whatever clients he had will doubtless go elsewhere; and the stigma of the suspension will certainly not be helpful to him in any respect.
A judgment of a trial court in a disciplinary proceeding may be so light, or so heavy, as to constitute an abuse of discretion. We agree with the court of civil appeals that the three year suspension from the practice of law was not such an abuse of discretion in this case.
*254The judgments of the courts below are affirmed.
Dissenting opinion by STEAKLEY, J., in which REAVLEY and JOHNSON, JJ., join.. Art. 320a-l, Section 6, Vernon’s Annotated Civil Statutes.