(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the ruling that Moulton’s cause of action was barred on April 30, 1970, although his injury did not occur until July 5, 1970.
Moulton’s count for breach of warranty has been dismissed and nothing said herein applies to a breach of warranty cause of action that may be asserted in the hybrid action known as a products liability case.
The following principles are stated concisely in Hodge v. Service Machine Company, 438 F.2d 347 (6th Cir. 1971).
“[2-4] A cause of action accrues when a suit may be maintained upon it. Black’s Law Dictionary 37 (4th ed. 1951). A suit may not be brought upon a cause of action until it exists, and a cause of action does not exist until all its elements coalesce. In civil actions for damages, two elements must coalesce before a cause of action can exist: (a) a breach of some legally recognized duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff; (b) which causes the plaintiff some legally cognizable damage.”
To hold that a products liability action, which is a recognized legal right, is barred by a statute of limitations before any injury is sustained, deprives a person of the opportunity of redress for an injury done him in his goods or person by due process of law, contrary to our Constitution.
Article 1, Section 17 of the Constitution of Tennessee provides, as follows:
“Open courts — Redress of injuries— Suits against the State. — That all courts shall be open; and every man, for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial, or delay. . .”
I agree with the principle of Girdner, et al. v. Stephens, 48 Tenn. 280 (1870) that, once a cause of action is barred by a statute of limitations, the defendant acquires a vested right that cannot be disturbed by subsequent legislation. Absolutely essential to that principle, however, is the acquisition by the defendant of a vested right. In Girdner, plaintiff brought an action of trespass for alleged assault and battery and false imprisonment. It is elementary that in such an action the breach of legal duty and the injury occur simultaneously and are known to the plaintiff. His cause of action accrued on the date of the coalescence of the wrong and the injury, and the Courts were open to hear his complaint during the one year next following said date. Upon the expiration of that year, during which the Courts were open to redress plaintiff’s injury, the defendant acquired a vested right to the repose provided by the applicable statute of limitation.
In the case sub judice we have a different situation. Simply stated, Moulton sustained an injury on July 5, 1970, under cir*698cumstances which permit his assertion of a products liability action, sounding in tort, for which he is guaranteed his day in court by Article 1, Section 17 of the Constitution of Tennessee. It therefore cannot be said that his remedy for that right expired on April 30, 1970, denying him even one day’s access to the Courts. On April 30, 1970, defendant, Ford Motor Company, had acquired no vested right to the repose of a cause of action that did not come into existence until July 5, 1970.
I strongly embrace the principles underlying the judicial policy of stare decisis. But, it is not an inflexible policy and is deviated from where sufficient reason exists. 20 Am.Jur.2d 521, Courts, § 184. I believe that sufficient reason exists for this Court to cure the error of accruing a cause of action for personal injuries before the injury occurs, notwithstanding stare decisis, or the consequences thereof. The Legislature’s two attempts to eradicate the error have not, at this point in time, cured the unjust result of denying a litigant his day in Court. I would affirm the Court of Appeals for the reasons stated herein.