OPINION ON PETITION TO REHEAR
HENRY, Justice.Counsel for Bryant Air Conditioning Company and Tennessee Pipe and Supply Corporations, have filed courteous and dignified petitions to rehear.
While they essentially re-argue matters previously briefed and argued and basically rely upon the authorities heretofore presented, out of deference to the obviously sincere conviction of able counsel, we have elected to respond to the petitions.
The petition of Bryant Air Conditioning Company insists (1) that it had a vested right under the statute as it existed on May 20, 1969; (2) that the decision of this Court may not be made properly, independent of the statute; and (3) that under the 1969 amendment to Section 28-304 T.C.A., the cause of action accrued more than one year prior to the institution of this action and the 1969 amendment is controlling.
A careful reading of the opinion will reveal that these matters were considered and decided adversely to petitioner’s insistence. In the interest of clarity we restate, clarify and amplify this portion of the original opinion.
On 31 January 1969, when this Court filed its opinion in Jackson v. General Motors, 223 Tenn. 12, 441 S.W.2d 482 (1969), Section 28-304, T.C.A. simply provided that actions for personal injuries “shall be commenced within one (1) year after cause of action accrued”. In Jackson the Court, in effect, defined the phrase “the cause of action accrued”, to mean and be synonymous with “date of sale”.
Independent of any amendment, we receded from Jackson and held that the cause of action accrues “when the injury occurs or is discovered”.
Obviously, the 1969 amendment was enacted to meet the holding of Jackson. Under Section 1 of that amendment, the cause of action is made to “accrue on the date of the personal injury”. Under Section 2, it is provided that the amendment would “not apply to causes of action accruing prior to the effective date of this act”, which was May 20, 1969.
It should be noted that the cause of action in this case did not accrue until May 1, 1971, or almost two years after the 1969 amendment.
A major thrust of the petition to rehear is that the effect of Section 2 was to codify the Jackson “date of sale” rule with the result that the statute began to run from that date as opposed to the date of the injury or its discovery.
*493We reject this contention. The whole purpose of the 1969 amendment was to avoid the consequences of Jackson. The underpinning of the statute having been stricken by this Court, Section 2 of the amendment is stripped of all validity and vitality, if, indeed, it was ever clothed with such attributes.
Section 2 of the 1969 amendment must be read in the light of a cause of action that had already accrued and expired before it would stand as a bar to any suit. Again, in this case, the cause of action did not accrue until after the effective date of the 1969 amendment. The rule announced in Gird-ner v. Stephens, 48 Tenn. 280 (1870), relied upon by the petitioner, is not at variance with this holding and does not support petitioner’s insistence since it deals with a statute that “had otherwise expired”. Any other construction would operate to render this Section 2 unconstitutional. Petitioners had no vested right under the 1969 statute.
We did not address the issue of the retrospective application of laws since we applied no law retrospectively.
Petitioners insist that the 1969 amendment is controlling and simultaneously they assert that “the cause of action accrued, prior to May 20, 1969, when the date of the negligence or sale of the product occurred ”. This is in the very teeth of the amendment which fixes the accrual as being “the date of the personal injury not the date of the negligence or the sale of the product”. This construction can only follow if we ignore Section 1. Petitioner ignores this Section 1, and treats Section 2 as if it relates to and codifies the Jackson rule, and bears no relation to the other section of the amendment. We reject this insistence.
Petitioner insists that the Court has “legislated” in reaching its decision in defining or redefining the accrual date of the cause of action. We cannot assume that the Legislature would adopt a statute which would deny redress to a citizen by requiring that he sue prior to knowledge of his injury. We, therefore, adopted a discovery rule in order to validate the statute and prevent a plain deprivation of justice. While it was mere coincidence that the rule adopted by this Court closely parallels the 1972 amendment, it bolsters our belief that the Legislature and this Court were attempting to arrive at a just conclusion.
The petition of Tennessee Pipe and Supply Corporation raises additional questions.
First, it is insisted that so much of this action as sounds in breach of warranty should be dismissed. The only issue, as raised by the pleadings before this Court at this time, is that of the statute of limitations. The privity issue is not before the Court.
Next, this petitioner insists that the Court’s opinion permits the possible construction that a suit for personal injuries may be brought more than one year after the injury occurs in violation of the 1972 amendment to Section 28-304, T.C.A. The main opinion is clear. It requires the definite construction that a suit for personal injuries may be brought more than one year after the injury occurs, provided it is brought within one year after it is discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have been discovered. This is the sense of Section 28-304, in its present form.
Lastly, this petitioner insists that there is a conflict between Section 28-304, and Section 47-2-725, T.C.A. Perhaps so. But only to the extent that the demarcation between cases which are “essentially tort” and those which are “essentially warranty”, is sometimes blurred. As a general rule Section 28-304 T.C.A. is applicable to strict tort cases, whereas Section 47-2-725 applies to warranty actions.
We overlooked nothing in our main opinion. We have reconsidered the case in its entirety and have overlooked nothing in this opinion, although we have prepared it on a selective basis and have not dealt *494seriatim with the numerous assertions of the two rather elaborate petitions. We have dealt with the controlling issues.
The costs incident to these petitions are taxed against petitioners.
FONES, C. J., and COOPER and BROCK, JJ., concur.
HARBISON, J., did not participate.