(dissenting).
As I understand the principal opinion, we start with the fact that the state has by Sec. 144.190 consented to be sued for sales tax refunds, but we then proceed to the court-made doctrine that such statutes are to be strictly construed and since Sec. 144.190 contains “no provision for refunds of sales tax to be claimed on behalf of a class of taxpayers”, it follows that “The legislature has not waived the State’s sovereign immunity to the extent of permitting such procedure.”
This approach is consistent with the general reluctance of the courts to encourage claims for tax refunds, but I do not believe it is justified in the situation before us. It is equally important that the taxpayer know that under a just government the tax collector will not be permitted to take advantage of him.
The state now admits the tax refunds are due plaintiffs Charles and Brierly. Yet the state did all it could to keep from having to make refunds to the thousands of other Missouri taxpayers who were in the same situation. We can all recall the wide publicity which accompanied the repeal of the federal manufacturers’ excise tax on new automobiles, occurring December 10, 1971, retroactive to August 15, 1971. We were told in oral argument, not challenged or denied by the state, that the Missouri Department of Revenue stated publicly that it would make no refunds of the amount of state tax paid on account of any dealer refunds of the federal tax. The Department of Revenue treated all taxpayers as a class to which it would make no refunds. It refused to give any information as to the *825procedure to be followed to obtain a refund or time within which claims should be filed or the documentation required, saying- none of this was necessary as the Department was not going to make refunds. The position taken by the Department was published in Prentice-Hall Inc.—State and Local Taxes Service, Missouri Vol. 2, Sec. 23,550.
Sometimes sales tax refunds, if allowed, would produce a windfall for the claimant, as in International Business Machines Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 362 S.W.2d 635 (Mo.1962), which is one of the reasons for the policy against suits to recover taxes. Here, however, the state is getting the windfall. Under these circumstances, I see no compelling need to go to the assistance of the state by invoking strict construction to hold the class action procedure is not available.1 Examination of Sec. 144.190 shows nothing which forbids the use of a class action here. All that it requires is that the claim for refund be made in duplicate, in writing, under oath, within one year from the date of overpayment, with a statement of the specific grounds upon which the claim is founded. Each of these requisites is satisfied by the class action claim before us. The statute does not require that the claim be made in any particular form.
The matter is uniquely suitable for a class action, as it involves a class of Missouri citizens who paid sales tax on the federal excise tax on purchases of new automobiles during the August 15 — December 10, 1971 period, far too numerous for practical joinder as individual plaintiffs. In every instance the tax is subject to refund for the same reason, the amounts involved are small as to each individual (too small to warrant cluttering the courts with individual claims and too small for the individual taxpayer to afford to hire counsel),2 and the defendant, with its computerized records, can quickly and easily determine the amount of each individual refund. There are questions of law or fact common to the class, the claims of the representative parties are typical of the claims of the class, and the representative parties will fairly protect the interest of the class. Additionally, the party opposing the class has refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class. Therefore, both subsections (a) and (b) of our rule 52.08 on class actions are met. The class is not too large to be manageable and the problem of the one year period of limitation is solved by the fact that the commencement of a class action commences the action for all of the class as subsequently determined, American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 94 S.Ct. 756, 39 L.Ed.2d 38 (1974).
In these instances where public authorities are remiss, as seems to be true of the conduct of the Department of Revenue in this case, and the taxpayer comes to the courts as his last resort, the credibility of our judicial system is involved and “[t]he class action is one of the few legal remedies the small claimant has against those who command the status quo. I would strengthen his hand with the view of creating a system of law that dispenses justice to the lowly as well as to those liberally endowed with power . . . ” Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 186, 94 S.Ct. 2140, 2156, 40 L.Ed.2d 732 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
*826In my opinion, basic fairness requires that the state refund these sales taxes, which it will not do unless this action proceeds, and therefore, I respectfully dissent. I would sustain plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and would order the trial court to proceed with notification to the other members of the class and then with assessment of their respective refunds after the class is closed.
. Gas Service Co. v. Morris, 353 S.W.2d 645 (Mo.1962) and Kleban v. Morris, 363 Mo. 7, 247 S.W.2d 832 (1952) are cited by the principal opinion in support of strict construction, but these eases are distinguishable. They involved attempted original actions against the state for money had and received from taxes allegedly illegally collected. Strict construction was resorted to in holding that the applicable refund statutes did not constitute state consent to direct actions. In the present ease the plaintiffs have observed all appropriate procedures to obtain judicial review and do not seek to institute a direct or unauthorized cause of action against the state.
. Por example, in the present cases, plaintiff Charles was awarded $7.63 and plaintiff Brierly $7.39, with costs taxed against them of $38.00, resulting in a net loss of $22.98 after payment of costs.