(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent and believe that it is my obligation and responsibility as a judge of this Court to set forth the basis of a dissent in cases decided by the Supreme Court when sitting en banc.
Art. IV, § 3, Constitution of Missouri 1945, provides: “The governor shall be at least thirty years old and shall have been a citizen of the United States for at least fifteen years and a resident of this state at least ten years next before election.”
The issue here is whether or not interve-nor was a resident of Missouri continuously from November 7, 1962, for only then would he have been a resident of Missouri for the ten years next preceding November 7, 1972, the date of the general election this year.
The first question in this case is whether or not intervenor chose to and did become a citizen and resident of Georgia while he was living there.
On this issue this Court has received into evidence documents that all parties, including intervenor, have stipulated and agreed to as authentic. One of these documents is an application to the Superior Court of Fulton County, Georgia, which was completed and signed by intervenor petitioning that court to certify him to the State Board of Law Examiners of Georgia as approved to take the Georgia Bar examination. This, of course, was in order to become licensed to practice law in Georgia. It was not necessary for intervenor to become a licensed attorney in Georgia to perform his duties as clerk for a judge of the U. S. Court of Appeals. This is obviously correct because intervenor did not receive his Georgia law license until after he completed his one-year clerkship.
Admission to the practice of law in Georgia is governed by the statutes of that state. On April 9, 1963, the Georgia legislature repealed certain sections of the law relating to the right to practice law in Georgia and enacted in lieu thereof Ga. Code, § 9-103 (House Bill 386, Act No. 366, Ga.Laws 1963, Vol. 1, pp. 458-460), which provides as follows:
“(a) Any citizen . . . who meets the educational and residence requirements provided in this section may be admitted to the practice of law provided such citizen has successfully passed an examination as provided in this Chapter.
[Subsections (b), (c), and (d) are not relevant.]
*650“(e) Notwithstanding any other statute or rule of law, any graduate of a law school which is accredited by the American Bar Association shall be permitted, upon satisfactory proof of compliance with all pertinent requirements of this section other than the residence requirement, to apply for and to take the examination as provided in this Chapter; Provided, that no such applicant shall be admitted to the practice of law until such applicant shall have been a bona fide resident of the State of Georgia for a period of 12 consecutive months immediately preceding the date of such admission, even though such applicant shall have successfully passed such examination.
“(f) Any applicant who shall, pursuant to subsection (e) of this section, apply to take the examination and to be admitted to the bar as provided in this Chapter shall file with his application a certificate of a member of the bar of the Supreme Court of Georgia reading in substance as follows : ‘I do hereby certify that I am a member of the bar of the Supreme Court of Georgia in good standing; that I know the above applicant personally; that I know of my personal knowledge that said applicant is a graduate of a law school accredited by the American Bar Association and is now a bona fide resident of the State of Georgia; and that I verily believe that said applicant intends to and will continue such residence continuously hereafter until -, at whch time said applicant will have been a bona fide resident of the State of Georgia for a period of 12 consecutive months.’ ”
The only way that intervenor could have been allowed to take the Georgia Bar examination and thereafter be admitted to the Georgia Bar under the Georgia statutes was to be a citizen and bona fide resident of the State of Georgia at the time he applied to take the Georgia Bar examination and for a period of 12 months immediately prior to receiving a license to practice law in Georgia.
In January of 1964 intervenor admittedly completed and signed and submitted an application to the Superior Court of Fulton County, Georgia, in which the following questions, answers and assertions appear:
“2.
“That the home address of applicant is: 55 Pharr Rd, NW, E-106, Atlanta 5, Georgia.
“3.
“That applicant is a citizen of the State of Georgia, and has resided in Georgia at above address, for 6 months next preceding the filing of this application. Prior to such residence in Georgia, applicant resided at: 14 S. Jefferson Road, Mexico, Missouri. Attached hereto as Exhibit ‘A’ is a certificate of a member of the Bar of the Supreme Court of Georgia certifying that applicant is a bona fide resident and citizen of Georgia for at the time of this application as required by Ga.Code Sec. 9-103(e) and will continue such residence until said applicant has been a bona fide resident of the State of Georgia for 12 consecutive months.
“4.
“That applicant is a resident of this County. ...”
Pursuant to Ga.Code § 9-103(f), inter-venor filed with his application a certificate of a member of the Bar of the Supreme Court of Georgia by which the member of the Bar of the Supreme Court of Georgia certified, “ . . . that I know of my personal knowledge that said applicant is a graduate of a law school accredited by the American Bar Association and is now a bona fide resident of the State of Georgia; and that I verily believe that said applicant intends to and will continue such residence hereafter until July 1, 1964, at which time said applicant shall have been a bona fide resident of the State of Georgia for a period of 12 consecutive months.”
*651On the basis of the foregoing application and certification, together with other data not pertinent to the issue of residency in Georgia, there was an order entered by a judge of the Superior Court, Atlanta Judicial Circuit, Fulton County, Georgia, on April 20, 1964, whereby the application of intervenor to take the forthcoming Georgia Bar examination was officially approved by that court.
Intervenor successfully passed the Georgia Bar examination sometime between April 20, 1964, and June 8, 1964, for on June 8, 1964, the State Board of Bar Examiners certified to the Superior Court of Fulton County, Georgia, Atlanta Judicial Circuit, that intervenor had passed that examination. However, as of June 8, 1964, intervenor had not yet been a bona fide resident of the State of Georgia for 12 consecutive months and, consequently, he could not yet be admitted to the practice of law in that State. Ga.Code § 9-103(e). His full 12-months’ bona fide residency in Georgia would not occur until about July 1, 1964.
On August 3, 1964, the record of the Fulton County, Georgia, Superior Court, Atlanta Circuit, stipulated to by intervenor as being authentic, shows that intervenor presented his application for admission to the Georgia Bar, together with other necessary documents to that Court. The order and judgment of that Court recites the filing of those documents “with the Clerk of the Superior Court of Fulton County, it being the County of the applicant’s residence”, and thereupon ordered that inter-venor be admitted to the practice of law in Georgia upon his taking the required oath. On that same date intervenor did take the required oath to, inter alia, support and defend the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of Georgia, whereupon, his right to practice law in Georgia became final.
The order of the Superior Court of Fulton County, Georgia, granting the right to practice law in Georgia to intervenor constitutes a judgment of that Court.
During the early part of 1964, intervenor made arrangements to practice law with a Washington, D. C., law firm in Washington, D. C., and later arranged to delay his arrival in Washington, D. C., until early November of that year because he was working in a political compaign in Missouri, on behalf of two candidates seeking the office of U. S. Representative in Congress and that of U. S. Senator. In that year he did vote in Mexico, Missouri, at the August primary and November general elections. He thereafter lived in Washington, D. C, from November 1964 until November 1967. During this period he returned to the home of his parents in Mexico, Missouri, from time to time particularly for the opening of dove hunting season in September of a year and holidays.
He first registered to vote in Audrain County, Missouri, (Mexico) when he was 21 years old and his residency in Missouri at that time is not questioned. He voted in the primary election of 1960. He did not vote in any elections in Missouri in 1961, 1962, 1963, or 1965. In addition to voting in Missouri in the August primary and November general elections in 1964, he voted in Audrain County, Missouri, in the primary and general elections of 1966 and in the city general election and a special election in Mexico in 1967.
The subsequent years of 1968 to present are not relevant for he was unquestionably a resident of Missouri again beginning at the latest in November 1967 when he and his wife returned to Missouri.
On May 12, 1967, intervenor and his wife applied for and received a marriage license in Fayette County, Kentucky. At that time intervenor was practicing law and living in Washington, D. C. The register of marriage, stipulated to as being authentic, and executed by intervenor under oath, contains, inter alia, the following: “Full names of parties, Husband Christopher Bond” “Husband’s Place of Birth St. Louis Mo,” “Residence Washington D.C.”
*652The stipulation entered into by the parties, including intervenor, with respect to the filing of income tax returns for the years 1963 through 1967 is relevant and material to the question of residency insofar as the acts of intervenor in the filing of such returns is consistent or inconsistent with residency in Missouri or somewhere else. However, it must be considered in the light of the Missouri income tax laws and consideration should be given to inter-venor’s knowledge or lack of knowledge of such laws because the relevancy of this evidence is on the issue of intent with respect to residency.
Sec. 143.010, subd. 1, RSMo 1969, became law in 1959. H.B. 395, Laws of Mo. 1959, 70th General Assembly of Mo. It provides:
‘T. Every single individual, a citizen or resident of this state having a gross income in excess of one thousand two hundred dollars, and every married couple, citizens or residents of this state having a gross income in excess of two thousand four hundred dollars, shall file an income tax return or returns and pay a tax upon net income received, from all sources during the preceding year in excess of the exemptions herein provided.
[2. sets forth rate of tax — not relevant to this case.]
“3. Every individual, not a citizen or resident of this state, shall file an income tax return and pay a tax at the rate prescribed in subsection 2 of this section on the net income received from all sources within this state during the preceding year in excess of the exemptions.
[4. not relevant.]”
Rather than to summarize or paraphrase the stipulation entered into by intervenor and filed in this case, fairness indicates the stipulation relating to the filing of income tax returns be set forth as filed. It speaks for itself and is as follows:
“1. Intervenor signed, and in 1964, filed, a 1963 Missouri income tax return in the State of Missouri and a 1963 Georgia income tax return in the State of Georgia; during the calendar year 1963, Interve-nor had unearned taxable income in excess of $2,400.00 from trusts whose situs was in Missouri and which were administered by a Missouri Trustee; he also had other unearned taxable income during said calendar year; income and deductions were allocated on each of said returns on the basis of the time that Intervenor lived in each of said jurisdictions during said calendar year and the tax was paid to each of said taxing authorities on the same basis; that on the tax return he filed with the State of Missouri, Intervenor stated that his address was 14 S. Jefferson Road, Mexico, Missouri, that he indicated on said return that he had resided in the State of Missouri for less than twelve months in 1963, to-wit, for six months; that on the tax return he filed with the State of Georgia, he stated his address was 55 Pharr Road, Atlanta, Georgia.
“2. Intervenor signed, and in 1965 filed, a 1964 Georgia income tax return in the State of Georgia, and a 1964 District of Columbia income tax return in the District of Columbia; that attached to the Georgia income tax return was a Form W-2 of the United States Treasury Department, Internal Revenue Service, showing Inter-venor’s employment by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Supreme Court Building, Washington, D. C., and giving his address as 14 South Jefferson Road, Mexico, Missouri; during the calendar year 1964, Intervenor had unearned taxable income from trusts whose situs was in the State of Missouri and which were administered by a Missouri Trustee; that he also had other unearned taxable income during .said year; that income and deductions were allocated on each of said returns on the basis of the time that Intervenor lived in each of said jurisdictions during said calendar year and the tax was paid to each of said taxing authorities on the same basis; that on both returns his address was given as 2325 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, *653D. C.; that on the Georgia return, he stated that he was not a resident of the State of Georgia during the entire taxable year, but that the dates of his residence in Georgia were from July 1, 1963 through October 31, 1964; that the District of Columbia return indicates that he moved into the District of Columbia on November 1, 1964; that Intervenor filed no Missouri state income tax return for the year 1964 and has paid no income tax to the State of Missouri on any of his income for said year.
“3. During the calendar years 1965 and 1966 when he was living in Washington, D. G, Intervenor had unearned taxable income from trusts whose situs was in Missouri and which were administered by a Missouri corporate Trustee in excess of $2,400.00 for each of said years; that the Intervenor also had unearned taxable income during each of said years from other sources; that the Intervenor signed and filed a District of Columbia tax return for the calendar years 1965 and 1966 in which he reported all of the aforesaid income and paid the tax thereon to the District of Columbia; that in each of said returns, he stated that his address was 2325 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D. C.; that the said Intervenor filed no Missouri income tax return for the calendar year 1965 or in 1966 or for any fiscal year including all or part of said years, and has paid no income tax to the State of Missouri on any of his income for said year.
“4. Intervenor signed, and in 1968 filed, a 1967 District of Columbia income tax return in the District of Columbia, and a 1967 Missouri income tax return in the State of Missouri; during the calendar year 1967, Intervenor had unearned taxable income in excess of $2,400.00 from trusts whose situs was in Missouri and which were administered by a Missouri Trustee; that he also had other unearned taxable income during said calendar year; that income and deductions were allocated on said returns on the basis of the time that Inter-venor resided in said jurisdictions during said calendar year and the tax was paid to said taxing authorities on the same basis; that in the tax return filed in the District of Columbia, Intervenor’s address is given as 1515 Kentucky Road, Mexico, Missouri; that the said return indicates that he moved out of the District of Columbia in 1967 and his dates of residence in D.C. were from January 1, 1967 to October 30, 1967; that Intervenor’s Missouri income tax return for said year indicates that he did not reside in Missouri during the entire twelve months of said calendar year, but for only two months thereof.”
With respect to intervenor’s knowledge of the Missouri law relating to the filing of Missouri income tax returns, he testified before this Court:
“Q. All right. Now, you were aware that the Missouri tax law requires that all residents of Missouri file Missouri income tax if their income is over a certain number of dollars, are you not?
“A. Yes.”
And at another point in intervenor’s testimony, the following appears:
“Q. Were you familiar with the language of the Missouri income tax statute which says that all residents of Missouri must file an income tax return if their income exceeds $1200, as a single person, and $2400, as a married person?
“THE WITNESS: I am aware of it, and I have read the Missouri income tax laws.”
With respect to the application to take the Georgia Bar examination, intervenor testified in this Court, inter alia, as follows :
“Q. Mr. Bond, on your Georgia application to take the bar exam, you made a statement that you were a resident of Georgia; is that correct?
A. Yes.
*654Q. And that you were a resident for some period of time and would remain a resident for a full year?
A. Yes, I said I was living in the state of Georgia, and I would live in the state of Georgia for a period of 12 consecutive months, and that I was at 55 Pharr Road during that year.
Q. I understand your answer, but isn’t it true, Mr. Bond, that that application didn’t contain the word ‘live,’ it said residence, asked what your residence was at that time ?
A. Yes, that is what that said.
Q. Was that sworn to or not?
A. I don’t recall. I know that there is the application. It doesn’t have an attestation on it, but if I said it on the application, it’s true. It doesn’t matter whether it is sworn or not. It is true.
Q. It is true that that was your residence ?
A. What I said on there is true.”
With respect to the status intervenor claims to have maintained while in Georgia and Washington, D. C., he testified, inter alia, as follows:
“Q. Did you, as a resident of Missouri, file a Missouri return during the year 1964?
A. No.
Q. And you are claiming that you were a resident of Missouri during that period ?
A. I am claiming that I was domiciled in the State of Missouri.”
State ex rel. Sathre, Atty. Gen., v. Moodie et al., 65 N.D. 340, 258 N.W. 558, involved the question of whether the governor-elect of that state, Mr. Moodie, had been a resident of North Dakota for the five years next preceding his election. The North Dakota Supreme Court heard the evidence itself and held that Mr. Moodie had lost his North Dakota residence by establishing himself as a legal resident of Minneapolis, Minnesota, for a period of what appears to be about 16 months of the first part of the requisite five-year period. The court ousted Mr. Moodie from the position of governor-elect of North Dakota even though the court found that “. . . Mr. Moodie did intend to return to the state of North Dakota some time. His testimony, his statements to the witnesses in Minneapolis, and the fact that he did return, all indicate an intention to return some time. On the witness stand his truthfulness was apparent to everyone. He answered all questions without hesitation when the answers were unfavorable as well as when they were favorable.” 258 N.W. loc. cit. 565.1
A person can have but one legal residence at any given time. State on inf. Reardon v. Mueller, Mo.App., 388 S.W.2d 53.
In the case of In re Toler’s Estate, Mo., 325 S.W.2d 755, the court said, loc. cit. 759-760 [6, 7]: “In order to effectuate a change of domicile it is necessary that there shall be actual personal presence in the new place and also the present intention to remain there, either permanently or for an indefinite time, without any fixed or certain purpose to return to the former place of abode. The fact of physical presence and the intention must concur, and if they do so, even for a moment, the change of domicile takes place. Nolker v. Nolker, Mo.Sup., 257 S.W. 798; Phelps v. Phelps, 241 Mo.App. 1202, 246 S.W.2d 838; Barth v. Barth, Mo.App., 189 S.W.2d 451; In re Ozias’ Estate, Mo.App., 29 S.W.2d 240; Finley v. Finley, Mo.App., 6 S.W.2d 1006; Hays v. Hays, 221 Mo.App. 516, 282 S.W. 57. While physical presence is required, it *655is not necessarily essential that there be established a home, in the generally accepted meaning of that term, in a particular building. ‘Thus where a man, never settling down in one place, lives at hotels or clubs in a certain place, he may nevertheless acquire a domicil there.’ Beale, The Conflict of Laws, § 16.3; Restatement, Conflict of Laws, § 16.”
At 760 [8]: “The question of intent is to be gathered largely from the acts and utterances of the person whose domicile is under question, In re Lankford’s Estate, 272 Mo. 1, 197 S.W. 147, and the declarations of the person made before, at, and after the time the domicile is in dispute may be considered. Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. West, Mo.App., 260 S.W.2d 866.”
And at 761: “In Restatement, Conflict of Laws, § 22, it is stated that ‘If the new dwelling-place is acquired with the necessary intention of making it a home, it becomes a domicil of choice although there may be a special . . . motive in making the change.’ Under this statement, in what is designated as an ‘illustration,’ is the following: ‘A changes his dwelling-place for the purpose of diminishing his taxes or avoiding the payment of a debt or for the purpose of securing a divorce. He intends, however, to make the new place his home. A’s domicil is changed.’ See also Beale, The Conflict of Laws, § 22.1, and also, Stevens v. Larwill, 110 Mo.App. 140, 84 S.W. 113. Mr. Toler was a lawyer and a graduate of Vanderbilt University School of Law. It can therefore be reasonably assumed that he appreciated and understood the legal significance of his utterances concerning residence, not only for tax purposes but for all purposes.”
Intervenor represented to the Georgia Court that he was a “bona fide resident” of Fulton County, Georgia. In Alburger v. Alburger, 138 Pa.Super. 339, 10 A.2d 888, 890, the court held, “ ‘Domicile’ is a matter of intention; ‘residence’ is a physical fact, and the term ‘bona fide residence’ means residence with domiciliary intent, i. e., a home in which the party actually lives.” See also Black’s Law Dictionary, Rev. 4th Edition, p. 224.
Whatever may be the similarities or distinctions between “domicile” and “residence” as those terms appear in the case law of this State, it seems clear that if in-tervenor did become a “bona fide resident” and “citizen” of the State of Georgia, he did, by that act, relinquish his Missouri legal residence, for “citizenship” and “bona fide residency” encompasses the whole of residence and domicile.
The Court, in this rather unusual case, and due to the exigencies of time and the importance of the issues to intervenor and the people of Missouri, has itself heard the evidence. The effect of this procedure is that the Court is both judge and jury and must resolve mixed questions of fact and law presented in the case.
Intervenor arrived in Atlanta, Georgia, around July 1, 1963. It was not necessary that he be admitted to the practice of law in Georgia in order to perform his duties as a clerk for a judge of the U. S. Court of Appeals. He was first in his law class at the University of Virginia Law School. He had clerked in a law firm in Atlanta, Georgia, during the summer of 1962. On January 10, 1964, he freely and of his own choosing represented to the Superior Court of Fulton County, Georgia, that he was at that time a citizen and resident of the State of Georgia and had been such for the previous six months, and that he was a resident of Fulton County, Georgia. He supported his application with a certificate of a member of the Bar of the Supreme Court of Georgia attesting to the fact that intervenor was a bona fide resident and citizen of Georgia at the time of the application to take the bar exam and would continue as such until he had been a bona fide resident of Georgia for 12 consecutive months. “Bona fide” is a well-recognized and understood term, particularly to a lawyer. “Bona fide” is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary (Revised 4th Edition, p. 223), as “In or with good faith; honestly, *656openly, and sincerely; without deceit or fraud . . Webster’s Third New International Dictionary gives substantially the same definition of that phrase. The phrase is used in our own rules for admission to the Bar of Missouri. S.Ct.Rule 8.-13 states: “No person shall be admitted to practice law in this State unless he is a bona fide resident of this State, or a resident of an adjoining county in an adjacent state who in good faith intends to maintain an office for the full-time practice of law in this State.” The right to practice law in a given state is a valuable right. Inter-venor sought and obtained this right in Georgia based, in part, on his representations to the Georgia court that he was a citizen and bona fide resident of the State of Georgia, and the Georgia court believed him. These applications and supporting certifications constituted a solemn declaration freely made and resulted in intervenor being a citizen and resident of Georgia.
In this Court intervenor testified that what he said in his application to take the Georgia Bar examination and to be admitted to the practice of law in Georgia was true. If the assertions were true when made, as intervenor has testified, and which I believe to be true, then any question of intent on the part of the intervenor to constitute himself a citizen and bona fide resident of Georgia at the time he was in Georgia is concluded and there can exist no conflict with reference to his then existing intent regarding citizenship and residence in Georgia. The conclusion that he did thereby become a citizen and bona fide resident of Georgia is inescapable and follows directly from his own testimony.:
Since a person can have only one bona fide residence at any given point in time, the very act of becoming a citizen and bona fide resident of Georgia constituted the relinquishment of his prior status as a Missouri resident. In re Toler’s Estate, Mo., 325 S.W.2d 755.
The subsequent action of intervenor in the filing of income tax returns as set forth in the stipulation is consistent with an intent that Georgia be his residence for the last six months of 1963 and until October 31 of 1964. It is also consistent with his application to take the Georgia Bar exam and to be admitted to practice law in Georgia. The non-filing of Missouri income tax returns for the years 1964, 1965, and 1966 is consistent with intent to maintain residency outside Missouri and in the District of Columbia. It is inconsistent with Missouri residency during those years.
Intervenor’s action in filing income tax returns for 1967 in the District of Columbia and Missouri wherein he allocated income to the District of Columbia for the first ten months and to Missouri for the last two months is consistent with interve-nor being a resident of the District of Columbia for those first ten months and is consistent with an intent on the part of in-tervenor to again establish residency in Missouri beginning in November 1967.
Intervenor’s certification on the application for a marriage license in the spring of 1967 that his residence was Washington, D. C, is a statement by intervenor that is consistent with an intent that such place was his residence at that time and is inconsistent with Missouri residency at that time.
I have weighed carefully the testimony and evidence of intervenor and others that he always intended to return to Missouri, and other testimony, oral and documentary, offered in support of intervenor’s contentions that he always intended Missouri to be his residence, the substance of which is set forth in the majority opinion, and I believe he, intervenor, did intend to return to Missouri at some indefinite future time. However, the admittedly authentic documentary evidence and intervenor’s testimony in this Court convinces me that interve-nor did intentionally become a citizen and bona fide resident of Georgia at the times that he so stated to the Georgia court that such was his status, and that after leaving Georgia in 1964 he became a resident of *657the District of Columbia and thereafter he re-established residency in Missouri, and consequently he will not have been a resident of the State of Missouri for ten years next before November 7, 1972.
For the foregoing reasons I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion in this case.
. This case is not cited for procedural authority with respect to the right of persons who have been elected to a constitutional office in this State to continue to hold such office.