OPINION ON APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
In our opinion on original submission, we stated:
“Appellant first argues that his liability was discharged and terminated on February 6, 1976, when the principal Brandenburg ‘was finally convicted and sentenced.’ There is nothing in the record to show that Brandenburg was sentenced on February 6, 1976, the date of his guilty plea, or that he has ever been sentenced.”
By supplemental transcript, the appellant has now brought forward certified copies of the judgment and sentence entered against the principal-defendant Brandenburg on February 6/1976, and reurges that his liability as surety was discharged at that time. As discussed in the opinion on original submission, the principal-defendant Brandenburg executed a “waiver of delay of sentencing” before he entered a plea of guilty. The waiver was premature and ineffective. Ex parte Dickey, Tex.Cr.App., 543 S.W.2d 99; Bailey v. State, Tex.Cr. App., 543 S.W.2d 653. In the absence of any other showing that the principal-defendant validly waived the 10 days for filing a motion for new trial or motion in arrest of judgment after conviction, the sentence entered on February 6, 1976, was not valid. Thus, the hearing on March 18, 1976, for the purpose of imposing sentence was a subsequent proceeding under Art. 17.09, V.A.C.C.P., and at the time appellant’s liability as surety on the bond in question had not been discharged.
Appellant’s motion for rehearing is overruled.