dissenting.
According to the majority, counsel was not ineffective for failing to inform applicant of *539the consequences of his guilty pleas because those consequences were collateral, not direct. However, in reaching that conclusion, the majority fails to conduct any analysis regarding what constitutes a direct versus a collateral consequence. After conducting such an analysis, it becomes clear that the majority opinion is flawed in two respects: first, the consequences of applicant’s guilty pleas were direct, not collateral; and, second, even if they were collateral, counsel was nevertheless ineffective for not advising applicant of those consequences.
I. Factual Summary
Applicant pled guilty to the instant charges while his capital murder case was pending on direct appeal, and was sentenced to three concurrent 50-year sentences. Applicant contends that counsel was ineffective in failing to advise applicant the pleas could be used against him in the event his capital murder case was reversed and retried.
We initially remanded this application to the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing. At the hearing, counsel testified that he did not think the pleas were dangerous and he did not see any potential adverse effects to them. Counsel also testified he did not tell applicant the pleas could be used for impeachment if applicant testified at the retrial of his capital case. Finally, counsel testified he did not tell applicant that the pleas could be used by the State at a retrial to argue that a life sentence would not constitute punishment because applicant was already serving a 50-year sentence. Another lawyer testified that counsel said he (counsel) did not consider the consequences of the pleas in the event the capital case was reversed and retried, and if he (counsel) had considered such consequences, he would not have advised applicant to plead guilty.
II. Consequences Not Collateral
The instant case presents an issue of first impression in Texas, but many foreign jurisdictions have addressed the issue. The Fourth Circuit has held that when a defendant pleads guilty, the trial court need only advise the defendant of the direct consequences of the plea and not any collateral consequences. Cuthrell v. Dir., Patuxent Inst., 475 F.2d 1364, 1366 (4th Cir.1973). The Cuthrell Court concluded: “The distinction between direct and collateral consequences of a plea ... turns on whether the result represents a definite, immediate and largely automatic effect on the range of the defendant’s punishment.” Id. Several state courts have followed the Cuthrell standard in determining whether a consequence is direct or collateral. See, e.g., Matter of Paschke, 80 Wash.App. 439, 444, 909 P.2d 1328, 1331 (Wash.App. Div. 3 1996); State v. Dugan, 193 Wis.2d 610, 618, 534 N.W.2d 897, 900 (Wis.App.1995); Adkins v. State, 911 S.W.2d 334, 350 (Tenn.Cr.App.1994); State v. Wika, 464 N.W.2d 630, 634 (S.D.1991); State v. Smith, 207 Conn. 152, 160, 540 A.2d 679, 685 (Conn.1988); Saadiq v. State, 387 N.W.2d 315, 325 (Iowa 1986). Professor LaFave notes that the Cuthrell test is the usual, “albeit not foolproof,” test for determining whether a consequence is direct or collateral. LaFave, Criminal Procedure, Vol. II, § 20.4(d).
While the line between direct and collateral consequences is not easily drawn, Torrey v. Estelle, 842 F.2d 234, 236, 238 (9th Cir.1988) (Canby, J., dissenting), and labels are not helpful in making the determination, People v. Pozo, 712 P.2d 1044, 1046 (Colo.App.1985)(noting that labeling a consequence as collateral “does not diminish its significance”), rev’d on other grounds, 746 P.2d 523 (Colo.1987), some consequences have been held to be collateral so the defendant need not be advised of them prior to pleading guilty. These include the loss of public or private employment, the effect on voting rights, a possible driver’s license suspension and possible dishonorable discharge from the military. State v. Heitzman, 209 N.J.Super. 617, 508 A.2d 1161, 1164 (1986), aff'd, 107 N.J. 603, 527 A.2d 439 (1987). Also included in this list is the loss of the right to travel abroad and the loss of the right to possess firearms. People v. Ford, 86 N.Y.2d 397, 403, 633 N.Y.S.2d 270, 272-73, 657 N.E.2d 265, 267-68 (N.Y.1995).
The majority mentions deportation, possible enhancement of punishment, institution of civil commitment proceedings, loss of good time and possible consecutive sentences as *540additional collateral consequences. Ante, at 536. And, I do not disagree that the situations listed in Heitzman, Ford and the majority opinion present collateral consequences of which a defendant need not be informed in order for his plea to be voluntary. Indeed, most of the aforementioned consequences are civil consequences only remotely related to the criminal case, and many of them are both indefinite and unforeseeable.
However, the instant case involves consequences quite different from those mentioned above. First, here we are faced with a pending criminal case, not some civil repercussion such as the loss of voting rights. Secondly, the criminal case was pending in the same county as the instant charges, and the same lawyer represented applicant on both the instant pleas and the pending criminal case. Undoubtedly, counsel was aware that applicant had a capital murder conviction and death sentence pending on direct appeal, and that applicant’s pleas in the instant cases presented a risk if the capital case was reversed. Further, the fact that the pending case was a capital offense increases its significance in terms of the severity of any consequences these pleas may have. Moreover, there was a good possibility the capital ease would be reversed on appeal.1 Thus, there was also a good likelihood that applicant’s pleas would later be used against him at the retrial of the capital case.
Because the consequences in the instant ease are so vastly different from those mentioned in Heitzman and Ford, the majority errs in relying on those eases to decide the instant issue. Considering the instant consequences on their own, it is clear they were consequences of which counsel was aware and they were not indirect, insignificant or unforeseeable. Therefore, they were not collateral. The majority errs to hold otherwise.
III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Even if these consequences were collateral, counsel still had the duty to advise applicant of them. Noteworthy in many of the eases cited in both the majority opinion and here are that they involve claims regarding the trial court’s failure to advise the defendant of the consequences of his plea. United States v. Lambros, 544 F.2d 962, 966 (8th Cir.1976); Hutchison v. United States, 450 F.2d 930, 931 (10th Cir.1971); United States v. Vermeulen, 436 F.2d 72, 75 (2nd Cir.1970); Paschke, 909 P.2d at 1331; Dugan, 534 N.W.2d at 900; Smith, 540 A.2d at 685. Several of the cases also involve a claim regarding counsel’s failure to advise, but the courts in those cases conduct no separate analysis between the duties of counsel and the duties of the trial court. Meaton v. United States, 328 F.2d 379 (5th Cir.1964); United States v. Cariola, 323 F.2d 180, 185-86 (3rd Cir.1963); Michel v. United States, 507 F.2d 461, 465 (2nd Cir.1974); Heitzman, 508 A.2d at 1164.
However, several courts have discussed counsel’s duties separately from the trial court’s duties, and the majority of those courts have limited the Cuthrell standard to trial courts and have used the standards enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985), to evaluate a claim that counsel erred in failing to advise the defendant of the consequences of his plea. Saadiq, 387 N.W.2d at 325; Torrey, 842 F.2d at 236; Ford, 633 N.Y.S.2d at 272, 657 N.E.2d at 267; see also, Pozo, 712 P.2d at 1046.
In People v. Garcia, 799 P.2d 413, 415 (Colo.App.1990), aff'd, 815 P.2d 937 (Colo.1991), the Court noted that, although a trial court’s duty is limited to advising the defendant of the direct consequences of his plea, “a challenge to a guilty plea based upon ... ineffective assistance of counsel involves examination of quite different considerations.” The Garcia court held: “Although a defendant need not be advised of all collateral consequences of a guilty plea, if counsel has *541reason to know that .particular collateral consequences are a concern to a defendant, but fails to conduct appropriate research, then failure to advise the defendant properly of those consequences may constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if the failure resulted in prejudice.” Id., 799 P.2d at 415.
An Illinois court agrees. That court has held that it is a lawyer’s duty to advise his client of the consequences of his guilty plea. In determining which consequences, the court concluded it was not necessary that it be a “certitude for it to be one defense counsel should discuss with the defendant before a guilty plea. Rather, it is only necessary that the consequence may be material to the client’s interests. A consequence is material if, under all of the circumstances, including both the severity and the likelihood of the particular consequence, it is one that may affect a client’s decision to plead guilty.” People v. Miranda, 184 Ill.App.3d 718, 133 Ill.Dec. 142, 147, 540 N.E.2d 1008, 1013 (Ill.App. 2 Dist.1989) (emphasis added).
Although the facts of the instant case are not common, my research has uncovered two cases involving very similar factual situations. Both cases are from Tennessee. See, Teague v. State, 772 S.W.2d 932 (Tenn.Crim.App.1988); Adkins v. State, 911 S.W.2d at 334. In Teague, the defendant was faced with a guilty plea while his conviction and death sentence in another case was pending on appeal. Counsel testified that he felt very good about the possibility that the death sentence would be reversed on appeal. The defendant asked counsel what effect, if any, his guilty plea would have if his death sentence were reversed, and counsel responded that it would have “absolutely no effect,” and the defendant pled guilty. The death sentence was subsequently reversed and the new conviction was used by the State at the punishment phase of the capital ease. Counsel testified that the advice he had given his client was “the worst advice I ever gave anybody.”
Six years later, the same court was faced •with a similar fact situation in Adkins. The defendant’s death sentence was on appeal, and his lawyer failed to read the death penalty statute or advise the defendant of the effect that a guilty plea could have if the death sentence was reversed. Counsel testified he knew the death sentence was on appeal, and admitted he did not review the death penalty statute or advise the defendant of the possible consequences of a plea of guilty on the other case. However, counsel also testified he would have advised the defendant to do exactly the same thing even if he had known of the potential consequences.
In Teague, the court granted relief, while in Adkins, the court denied relief. Significantly, in Teague, the court analyzed the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, relying on Hill, while the Adkins Court abandoned the Hill standard and relied instead on Cuthrell. As explained previously, Cuth-rell pertains to claims regarding the trial court’s failure to advise, not counsel’s.
The reasoning of the line of cases relying on the Strickland and Hill standard is both sound and persuasive. Therefore, I would hold that when a defendant raises a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to advise of the consequences of a plea the correct standard is that enunciated in Strickland and Hill, not Cuthrell; the defendant must show counsel’s performance was deficient, and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. This standard applies to challenges to guilty pleas; to prevail, applicant must show there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Hill, 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S.Ct. at 370. Factors to be considered in determining whether counsel was effective include: (1) the amount of time spent in preparation of the defense; (2) whether advice was given which would promote an understanding of the law in relation to the facts; (3) whether the advice was reasonably competent; (4) whether the advice permits an informed and conscious choice; and, (5) whether the lawyer attempted to ascertain if the plea was voluntary and knowing. Ex parte Morse, 591 S.W.2d 904, 905 (Tex.Cr.App.1980).
IV. Application and Conclusion
Applying the Hill standard to the instant case, it is clear counsel’s performance was *542deficient, and, but for counsel’s deficient performance, applicant would not have pled guilty. As in People v. Garcia, 799 P.2d 413, counsel had reason to know that the impact of these guilty pleas on the capital ease was a concern to applicant. Further, as in People v. Miranda, 184 Ill.App.3d 718, 133 Ill.Dec. 142, 540 N.E.2d 1008, this was a consequence which was material: the severity of the consequence was great because of the capital case pending on appeal and the likelihood that the pleas would be used against applicant at the retrial of the capital case was strong. Finally, under the factors of Ex parte Morse, 591 S.W.2d at 905, counsel’s advice to applicant did not permit an informed and conscious choice. Therefore, counsel erred in failing to advise applicant the pleas could be used against him at the retrial of the capital murder case. Accordingly, applicant’s pleas were involuntary as a result of counsel’s ineffective representation.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent to the majority’s decision to deny relief.
OVERSTREET, J., joins this opinion.. In the trial, the prosecutor posed a hypothetical question to a number of veniremen during the early portions of the voir dire which was clearly improper under Lane v. State, 743 S.W.2d 617 (Tex.Cr.App.1987), and Gardner v. State, 730 S.W.2d 675 (Tex.Cr.App.1987). Applicant preserved the error, and this Court's reversal followed. Morrow v. State, 753 S.W.2d 372 (Tex.Cr.App.1988).