*896OPINION
LAGARDE, Justice.Robert Allen Lee appeals from the trial court’s judgment revoking his community supervision. In two points of error, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation for failing to report to his probation officer and failing to pay a fine, costs, and fees. Concluding that appellant’s points of error are without merit, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
On February 15, 1993, appellant was indicted for aggravated sexual contact with a child under fourteen years of age. On the State’s motion, the trial court reduced the offense to sexual assault. Appellant waived a jury and pleaded guilty before the trial court. Pursuant to a plea bargain agreement, the trial court sentenced appellant to ten years’ confinement, probated for eight years, and a fine of seven hundred fifty dollars. The trial court ordered appellant to comply with certain conditions of probation, which included reporting to his probation officer, paying a fine, paying a monthly probation fee, paying a Crime Stoppers’ fee, paying a monthly sex offenders’ fee, and having no contact with anyone under the age of eighteen.
On July 27, 1995, the State moved to revoke appellant’s probation, contending that appellant met with his probation officer on or about July 7, 1995 and July 21, 1995, but refused to answer the probation officer’s questions, and that appellant did not pay any of the fine, costs, or fees. On September 7, 1995, appellant pleaded not true to the allegations in the motion to revoke and an inability to pay the fine, costs, and fees.
During the hearing on the State’s motion to revoke, appellant’s probation officer, Sandra Potter, testified that when she initially met with appellant in April of 1995, she reviewed the conditions of probation with appellant and appellant acknowledged that he understood these conditions. In June of 1995, appellant reported to Potter that during the summer, he was going door-to-door in residential neighborhoods and “witnessing” as a Jehovah’s Witness along with other members of his church. Appellant would not identify the neighborhoods, would not specifically define “witnessing,” and would not identify the church members who accompanied him. Potter concluded that through these activities, appellant could come into contact with children in violation of a condition of his probation. Upon receiving the probation officer’s report, the trial court conducted a hearing and ordered appellant to stop witnessing door-to-door.
Appellant apparently stopped witnessing door-to-door, but began witnessing by telephone. Potter became concerned that appellant was telephoning children. Potter also noted that appellant had not paid any of the fine, costs, or fees assessed against him. During their meetings on July 7 and July 21, 1995, Potter questioned appellant about these violations. Appellant refused to answer Potter’s questions about his religious activities, contending that his witnessing was none of her business. Appellant also refused to answer any of Potter’s questions regarding employment or disability, contending that Potter already had this information in her files. When Potter told appellant she did not have any employment information in her files, appellant still refused to answer. Potter advised appellant that refusal to answer was considered a failure to report. Appellant still refused to answer. Appellant’s refusal to answer Potter’s questions regarding whether he was having contact with children and his failure to pay left Potter unable to inform the trial court whether appellant was complying with the conditions of his probation.
Appellant also testified at the hearing on the State’s motion to revoke, stating that he understood the terms and conditions of his probation and stopped witnessing door-to-door in compliance with the trial court’s order. Appellant acknowledged that Potter did not forbid witnessing altogether, but instead told appellant that he could continue witnessing if he confined his activities to places without children such as nursing homes. Appellant testified that he did not witness in nursing homes because his church had not yet given him instructions on how to do so.
Appellant admitted he did not pay the fine, costs, or fees. Appellant recalled that when he told Potter he could not pay because he *897did not have a job, Potter called the Texas Rehabilitation Commission and advised appellant to make an appointment. Appellant complied, but his epilepsy prevented him from operating machinery or driving and the work he sought or the employment suggested to him involved contact with minors. Appellant, therefore, could not find a job and was unable to pay the fine, costs, and fees. Appellant contended he answered all of Potter’s questions except those about his religion and those for which Potter already had records.
On cross-examination, the State asked appellant if he knew of any place in Dallas County where he could work without coming into contact with minors. Appellant replied, “I don’t know if there is or not, ma’am.” Appellant acknowledged, however, that he could do janitorial work. Instead of trying to find a position as a janitor, appellant witnessed two days a week and stayed home doing nothing five days a week.
None of appellant’s fellow church members testified at the hearing.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court entered an order revoking appellant’s community supervision and imposing punishment of seven years’ confinement.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Probation may be revoked upon a finding that an appellant has violated the terms of his or her probation. Wilson v. State, 645 S.W.2d 932, 934 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1983, no pet.). Appellate review of a probation revocation proceeding is limited to a determination of whether the trial court abused its discretion. Bennett v. State, 476 S.W.2d 281, 282 (Tex.Crim.App.1972); Wilson, 645 S.W.2d at 934. To determine whether the trial court has abused its discretion, we look to whether the State has met its burden of proof. See Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493-94 (Tex.Crim.App.1984). The State meets its burden when the greater weight of the evidence before the court creates a reasonable belief that the probationer violated a condition of probation. Jenkins v. State, 740 S.W.2d 435, 437 (Tex.Crim.App.1983), disapproved on other grounds by Saxton v. State, 804 S.W.2d 910, 912 n. 3 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). In other words, the State’s burden of proof in a probation revocation hearing is by a preponderance of the evidence. Cobb v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871, 874 (Tex.Crim.App.1993).
In revocation proceedings, the trial judge is the sole trier of the facts, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight to be given the testimony. Taylor v. State, 604 S.W.2d 175, 179 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1980); Ross v. State, 523 S.W.2d 402, 403 (Tex.Crim.App.1975). It is the trial court’s duty to judge the credibility of the witnesses and to determine whether the allegations in the motion to revoke are true or not. Langford v. State, 578 S.W.2d 737, 739 (Tex.Crim.App.1979). This Court must therefore view the evidence presented at the revocation proceeding in a light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Garrett v. State, 619 S.W.2d 172, 174 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1981).
FAILURE TO REPORT
In his first point of error, appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his community supervision for failing to report to his probation officer. Appellant argues that the probation conditions merely ordered him to report, the conditions did not contain any language directing him to answer questions, and the undisputed evidence showed that he physically reported as directed.
To “report” means to convey or disseminate information. Lightfoot v. State, 128 Tex.Crim. 281, 284, 80 S.W.2d 984, 985 (1935). As long as the desired information is locked up in one’s breast and not disclosed, it is not a report. Id. Furthermore, mere physical presence at a meeting or program to which a probationer is ordered by the trial court will not establish compliance with the trial court’s order upon a showing that the appellant would not follow the rules and guidelines of the meeting or program or engaged in disruptive behavior during the meeting or program. See Figgins v. State, 528 S.W.2d 261, 263 (Tex.Crim.App.1975); Ott v. State, 690 S.W.2d 337, 339 (Tex.App.— Eastland 1985, pet. ref'd).
*898Appellant did physically appear at the meetings with Potter on the dates in question. However, appellant refused to answer Potter’s questions about his witnessing, telling Potter that his religious activities were “none of [her] business.” Appellant also refused to answer Potter’s questions about how he was “going to witness by phone.” These questions were designed to determine whether appellant was contacting minors in violation of a condition of his probation. Appellant also refused to answer Potter’s questions about whether he was trying to find a job, telling Potter, “I don’t have to answer your questions. I refuse.” Although appellant testified at the hearing that he attended sessions at the Texas Rehabilitation Center and participated in career assistance counseling in an attempt to find employment, Potter testified that at their meetings, appellant refused to answer her questions about whether he went to the Texas Rehabilitation Commission and to career assessment counseling as ordered. Potter also testified that when she told appellant that she had no reports of his activities with these agencies, appellant still refused to answer her questions regarding whether he was seeking employment. The trial court, in an exercise of its duty to judge the credibility of the witnesses, obviously chose to believe Potter. Because the evidence supports the trial court’s ruling that appellant physically appeared but did not cooperate due to his refusal to disseminate requested information to Potter, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking appellant’s probation for failure to report.
Appellant relies on Ivy v. State, 545 S.W.2d 827 (Tex.Crim.App.1977); Whitehead v. State, 556 S.W.2d 802 (Tex.Crim.App.1977), and Brewer v. State, 572 S.W.2d 719 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1978), to support his contention that he reported to his probation officer. These eases are not on point.. They address situations in which the defendant’s probation officer ordered the defendant to comply with conditions other than those imposed by the trial court’s order.
Here, the trial court ordered appellant to report to his probation officer twice monthly. At these meetings, Potter did not impo.se restrictions upon appellant differing from those within the trial court’s order. Potter did not order appellant to attend additional meetings with her or to supply irrelevant information to her. Instead, Potter asked appellant to report his activities pursuant to the court order. Appellant’s reliance on Ivy, Whitehead, and Brewer is therefore misplaced.
The dissent states that the pivotal issue in this case is whether a probationer may decline to answer a question regarding his religious activities without violating the reporting requirement of his probation. Appellant, however, has not presented this issue for our review. Almost every right, constitutional or statutory, may be waived by the failure to object. Borgen v. State, 672 S.W.2d 456, 460 (Tex.Crim.App.1984). Appellate courts will not consider any error that counsel for the accused could have called, but did not call, to the attention of the trial court at the time when such error could have been avoided or corrected by the trial court. Rogers v. State, 640 S.W.2d 248, 264 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1981) (Op. on State’s Second Mot. for Reh’g); Tex.R.App. P. 52(a). This general rule also applies to constitutional questions. Rogers, 640 S.W.2d at 264; see, e.g., In re Marriage of Rutland, 729 S.W.2d 923, 925(Tex.App.—Dallas 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (failure to object to admission of evidence regarding religious beliefs and practices waived any error regarding admission of that evidence), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 818, 109 S.Ct. 58, 102 L.Ed.2d 36 (1988). Furthermore, a brief of the argument on appeal must include such discussion of the facts and the authorities relied upon as may be requisite to maintain the point at issue. Tex. R.App. P. 74(f).
Appellant did not challenge the religious implications of Potter’s questions at his meetings with Potter, at the revocation hearing, or on appeal. Appellant has never contended that Potter’s questions were an invasion into his freedom of religion. Appellant invited Potter to church with him on at least one occasion, but Potter refused. Appellant not only failed to preserve the issue of freedom of religion for appellate review by his failure to object to these questions at the *899revocation hearing, but he also waived it by his failure to argue the issue in his brief on appeal. We decline to make appellant’s arguments for him; however, in the interest of justice, we will address the dissent’s contentions.
Probation restrictions are meant to assure that probation serves as a period of genuine rehabilitation and that the community is not harmed by the probationer’s being at large. See Harrison v. State, 929 S.W.2d 80, 83 (Tex.App.—Eastland 1996, pet. ref'd). Probationers, therefore, do not enjoy the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special probation restrictions. Id. at 82-83. The goals of probation require and justify the exercise of supervision to assure that these restrictions are in fact observed. Id. at 83. A probationer’s constitutional rights are not violated when the supervising probation officer asks the probationer if he is complying with the terms of probation. Id, Supervision would be an empty exercise if the supervisor could not question the probationer regarding the probationer’s activities. Id. Rehabilitation of the probationer and safety of the public demand that probation officers be allowed to interview and question the persons they are supervising. Id.
The dissent relies on both Simpson v. State and Macias v. State for its conclusion that the validity of a probation officer’s questions regarding a probationer’s religious activities should be determined under the guidelines for determining the validity of probation conditions. See Simpson v. State, 772 S.W.2d 276 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1989, no pet.); Macias v. State, 649 S.W.2d 150 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1983, no pet.). The dissent’s reliance on Simpson and Macias for this proposition is misplaced for three reasons. First, neither Simpson nor Macias discusses religious freedom. See Simpson, 772 S.W.2d at 276; Macias, 649 S.W.2d at 150. Second, neither Simpson nor Macias discusses a probation officer’s questions or analogizes probation conditions to a probation officer’s questions. See Simpson, 772 S.W.2d at 276; Macias, 649 S.W.2d at 150. Finally, if we were to undertake the novel task of analogizing the validity of a probationary condition to the validity of a probation officer’s questions regarding appellant’s religious activities under the standards set forth in Simpson and Macias, we would conclude that Simpson and Macias support the trial court’s judgment revoking appellant’s probation.
In Simpson, the Amarillo Court of Appeals stated that proper probationary conditions are those that contribute significantly both to the rehabilitation of the convicted person and to the protection of society. Simpson, 772 S.W.2d at 280. Accord Fielder v. State, 811 S.W.2d 131, 134 (Tex.Crim.App.1991); Gibbons v. State, 775 S.W.2d 790, 794 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1989), pet. ref'd, 815 S.W.2d 739 (Tex.Crim.App.1991); Fogle v. State, 667 S.W.2d 296, 298 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1984, no pet.). The Amarillo Court then held that a condition of probation is invalid if it: 1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, 2) relates to conduct that is not in itself criminal, and 3) requires or forbids conduct that is not reasonably related to the future criminality of the offender or does not serve the statutory ends of probation. Simpson, 772 S.W.2d at 280-81.
The probationary conditions imposed in Simpson required the appellant to, among other things, not change his marital status without his probation officer’s permission, carry an identification card, and maintain his hair in a neat and orderly manner. Id. at 277. The Amarillo Court held that the condition restricting the appellant’s right to change his marital status failed the three-part test and relegated to a nonjudicial officer the unrestricted right to make the decision about such an important and private right as an individual’s marital status. Id. at 281. The court held that the condition that the appellant maintain his hair in a neat and orderly manner failed the three-part test and was too subjective to let the appellant know what was expected of him. Id. However, the court upheld the condition requiring the appellant to carry an identification card, stating that this condition did not exceed the diminished expectation of privacy of a probationer allowed to remain at conditional liberty after conviction of a crime. Id.
*900In applying the three Simpson factors for determining whether probationary conditions are valid to a determination of whether Potter’s questions were valid, we note that Potter’s questions regarding appellant’s religious activities, although probably poorly phrased, were directly related to the crime of sexual assault, were directly related to criminal conduct, were designed to prohibit conduct that was reasonably related to future episodes of sexual assault, and served the statutory ends of probation that appellant successfully complete his probation without committing further acts of sexual assault. Potter was attempting to determine whether appellant was complying with the condition of his probation prohibiting contact with minors. Restricting a sex offender’s right to roam residential neighborhoods and telephone strangers contributes significantly both to the rehabilitation of the convicted person and to the protection .of society.
In applying Simpson’s analysis of this issue to our case, we note that Potter’s questions did not relegate to a nonjudicial officer the unrestricted right to make appellant’s religious decisions, were not subjective and ambiguous, and did not exceed the diminished expectation of privacy of a probationer allowed to remain at conditional liberty after conviction of a crime. Any convicted sex offender can expect questions from his probation officer regarding his or her contact with minors, even if this contact is made in connection with “religious activities.”
We reach the same conclusion regarding the validity of Potter’s questions from applying the analysis of Macias v. State. See Macias, 649 S.W.2d at 150. In Macias, the El Paso Court of Appeals held that a probation condition is not necessarily invalid simply because it affects a probationer’s ability to exercise constitutionally protected rights. Id. at 152. Instead, the El Paso court held that the test for determining whether a probation condition is unduly intrusive into constitutionally protected freedoms is that the condition must be reasonably related to the purposes of probation. Id. (citing United States v. Tonry, 605 F.2d 144 (5th Cir.1979)). The factors used to determine whether a reasonable relationship exists between the conditions and the purposes of probation are: 1) the purposes sought to be served by probation, 2) the extent to which constitutional rights enjoyed by law-abiding citizens should be accorded probationers, and 3) the legitimate needs of law enforcement. Macias, 649 S.W.2d at 152.
In applying the Macias factors to Potter’s questions, we note that Potter’s questions were reasonably related to the purposes of probation because they were designed to provide Potter with information necessary to determine whether appellant was contacting minors in violation of a condition of his probation. Potter’s questions also advanced the probationary purposes of protecting society from the wanderings of a sex offender and deterring appellant from using his religious activities as a means for finding potential victims. We conclude that application of the analyses of both Simpson and Macias to this case leads to the reasonable conclusion that Potter’s questions were not unduly intrusive into appellant’s religious freedom.
Viewing the facts presented in this record in the light most favorable to the verdict, as we are required to do, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking appellant’s community supervision for failure to report. Appellant’s first point of error is overruled.
FAILURE TO PAY
Proof of any one alleged violation is sufficient to support an order revoking probation. O’Neal v. State, 623 S.W.2d 660, 661 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1981); Moore v. State, 605 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1980); Moses v. State, 590 S.W.2d 469, 470 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1979). Although we conclude that the trial court properly revoked appellant’s probation for his failure to report to his probation officer, we discuss appellant’s second point of error in the interest of justice. In his second point of error, appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his community supervision for failing to pay the fine, costs, and fees. Appellant contends he was unable to pay, and therefore his failure to pay is not a valid ground for revoking his probation.
*901Inability to pay is an affirmative defense to revocation that the defendant must raise and prove by a preponderance of the evidence. Hill v. State, 719 S.W.2d 199, 201 (Tex.Crim.App.1986); Watts v. State, 645 S.W.2d 461, 463 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1983); Jones v. State, 589 S.W.2d 419, 421 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1979). The State has the burden of proving that an alleged failure to pay fees, costs, and the like was intentional. Stanfield v. State, 718 S.W.2d 734, 738 (Tex.Crim.App.1986). Facts and circumstances attending a given act or omission may reveal intent to pay or the lack thereof. Hill, 719 S.W.2d at 201. One who has the ability to pay that which he is required to pay but does not, without more, leaves a factfinder with a strong inference that his failure to pay is intentional. Id,
When a defendant raises the defense of inability to pay but the trial court as the factfinder finds that the defendant had the ability to pay, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. Jones, 589 S.W.2d at 421. This analysis does not involve the appellate court in any fact finding function. Hill, 719 S.W.2d at 201.
Appellant suffered from epilepsy before his conviction, yet agreed to the terms and conditions of his probation when the trial court originally placed him on probation. Appellant acknowledged when he first met with Potter that he understood the terms and conditions of his probation. Appellant admitted at the probation revocation hearing that he failed to pay any of the costs, fine, and fees as required by the terms of his probation. Appellant now argues that these conditions were too strict and that he cannot pay the fine, costs, and fees. Appellant submits that he intended to pay but was unable to do so because he has epilepsy, cannot drive, cannot operate machinery, and cannot find a job free from contact with minors. He also argues that the State did not meet its burden to prove that the failure to pay was intentional because the State did not offer evidence that appellant had the ability to work. We reject appellant’s contentions.
The record shows that appellant received permission from his probation officer to visit nursing homes. Furthermore, appellant testified on cross-examination that he could do janitorial work. Appellant could have applied at nursing homes for a janitorial position. Instead of applying for such a position, appellant sat idly at his mother’s house when he was not witnessing. We do not speculate on whether appellant could have obtained a job at a nursing home. However, appellant’s failure to even apply for such a position is evidence of his lack of intent to pay. And although minors are often visitors at nursing homes, Potter expressly gave appellant permission to go to nursing homes, advising him that this activity would not violate the terms and conditions of his probation. Appellant, therefore, failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the affirmative defense of inability to pay. The State met its burden to prove that appellant’s failure to pay was intentional by offering evidence that appellant had the ability to work, but instead sat at home doing nothing. The trial court’s resolution of the facts against appellant presents no abuse of discretion. We overrule appellant’s second point of error.
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
THOMAS, C.J., and KINKEADE, OVAED, MORRIS, WHITTINGTON, WRIGHT and HANKINSON, JJ., join in this opinion. JAMES, J., dissenting with opinion in which MALONEY, CHAPMAN, BRIDGES and MOSELEY, JJ. join.