concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion in Part II of its opinion that the motion court’s verbatim adoption of the prosecutor’s proposed findings of fact does not require reversal and remand for a new hearing. While Missouri courts have repeatedly held that such adoption of a party’s findings does not automatically mandate reversal, they have also cautioned that they will reverse where evidence is presented that the findings so adopted do not reflect the independent judgment of the court. That is what I believe to be the case here. In addition, I believe that the court below failed to give Kenley’s counsel adequate notice of his intent to amend his findings.
A Inadequacy of Motion Court’s Initial Judgment Rejecting 29.15 Motion
A more detailed discussion of the judge’s actions in ruling on the 29.15 motion is helpful in understanding the basis of my disagreement with the majority. The 29.15 motion was filed following a second penalty phase trial at which the jury again recommended the death penalty and the judge again sentenced Kenley to death. At the 29.15 hearing, Kenley’s counsel argued that his penalty phase counsel had been ineffective in failing to present additional evidence of his mental condition and diminished capacity which might have mitigated his punishment. Counsel presented three expert witnesses on these issues and further presented the testimony of Karen Kraft, who along with co-counsel had represented Kenley dining his second penalty-phase trial. The only issue at the 29.15 hearing was whether penalty phase counsel was ineffective in failing to present this mitigating evidence and in committing other errors which might have affected the jury and judge’s decisions to impose the death penalty.
Following the 29.15 hearing, the State asked the motion court whether it could prepare proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court informed both parties that it would prepare its own ruling and did not require proposed findings from either party. In accordance with this direction of the court, neither party initially prepared proposed findings.
Six days after the conclusion of the 29.15 hearing, the court issued a four-page judgment. The vast majority of the judgment simply recited the allegations of error raised by Kenley and the standard which counsel must meet in a 29.15 proceeding to show entitlement to a new trial. The total of the court’s analysis of the issue whether penalty phase counsel was ineffective and whether that ineffectiveness may have affected the decision to impose the death penalty was as follows:
Clearly, counsel made certain choices at trial. Under the law of Strickland, this court is unable to find a constitutional inadequacy in Movant’s defense at trial.
Movant presented the testimony of two psychologists and a psychiatrist at this hearing. The thrust of their testimony was that Kenneth Kenley came from a dysfunctional family and had a difficult childhood. Such is hardly a defense to intentional murder.
One of the two defense counsel testified. She obviously was very distressed that her client had received the death penalty. However, her testimony failed to show that there was inadequate performance of counsel.
A brief mention of the facts of the offense indicated Mr. Kenley took a gun into a bar and killed a man who looked at him because he was afraid the man would be able to identify him. It is difficult to imagine a more cold blooded, needless act.
The motion of the Movant and all parts thereof is denied.
This ruling was clearly inadequate, and had it stood, it would have been reversed on appeal for this reason. It failed to deal with most of the issues raised by Kenley and gave those issues it did address such a broad-brush treatment that review of the ruling is *278rendered extremely difficult. Toney v. State, 730 S.W.2d 295 (Mo.App.1987) (judgment which denies post-conviction relief based on conclusory statements that movant is not entitled to relief without addressing all issues presented is inadequate and must be remanded).
From the limited information which can be gleaned from the ruling, however, it appears that the judge did not adequately understand either the facts of the case or the relevant law. In regard to the facts, the judge stated that Kenley killed the victim because Kenley was afraid the victim would be able to identify him. To the contrary, and as the majority notes, the evidence showed that Kenley shot the victim to establish his control over the bar when he saw that the victim and others failed to immediately obey him. There was absolutely no evidence that a desire to avoid identification motivated the killing. Indeed, there was no evidence of previous acquaintance of Kenley and the victim, and there were dozens of other people in the bar with Kenley and the victim who could and did later identify Kenley. While, had the judge accurately determined Kenley’s motive for the killing, he may still have ruled that it was difficult to imagine a more cold blooded and needless act, such a determination should, and must, be made on the actual facts, not on inaccurate ones.
The court’s analysis of the defendant’s extensive expert testimony was equally inadequate. He summarized “the thrust” of that testimony as being “that Kenneth Kenley came from a dysfunctional family and had a difficult childhood. Such is hardly a defense to intentional murder.” Indeed, the court was right that a difficult childhood is not a defense to intentional murder. The issue the court was to address, however, was not whether Kenley had a defense to intentional murder but whether he received ineffective assistance in the penalty phase trial, a trial addressed not to Kenley’s guilt or innocence but to whether he should receive the death penalty or life imprisonment.
The fact that Kenley came from a dysfunctional family and had a difficult childhood is very relevant to whether he should receive the death penalty. In fact, it was in large part due to the very failure to present evidence addressed to these issues in the first trial that the Eighth Circuit ordered that the State either sentence Kenley to life imprisonment or hold a second penalty phase trial. Kenley v. Armontrout, 937 F.2d 1298, 1308 (8th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Delo v. Kenley, 502 U.S. 964, 112 S.Ct. 431, 116 L.Ed.2d 450 (1991). The focus of the evidence at Kenley’s second penalty phase trial was purposely addressed to his dysfunctional family and difficult childhood. In the 29.15 hearing, the defendant’s position was that this testimony would have been strengthened by further expert evidence as to his deficient psychological and allegedly brain-damaged state at the time of the crimes and as to his alcohol and drug abuse problem. If believed, then this is the very type of evidence which might, indeed, be a defense to imposing death as the penalty for Kenley’s intentional murder of the victim. Yet, the trial court thought it was irrelevant since it was not a defense to Kenley’s guilt of the murder itself.
B. Adoption of Attorney General’s Proposed Amended Findings Violated Rule 75.01 and Kenley’s Right to Notice
The attorney general’s office was certainly aware of these and other inadequacies of the court’s initial ruling, for after receiving the judgment, the assistant attorney general who had handled the hearing wrote a very unusual letter to the judge. The letter stated in relevant part:
I have received your Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in the Kenley case. While I certainly agree with your ruling, I do have some concerns.
As I am sure you are aware, death-penalty cases often receive a heighten [sic] level of scrutiny and are subjected to a more rigorous review process. Having experienced the phenomena first-hand, I find myself looking at the findings and conclusions in this case with a more critical eye than usual. This is especially true given the manner by which this case arrived in your court. In any other case, I would consider your findings and conclusions to be more than adequate, and they would *279not give me any pause. I believe in a ease such as this, however, that more detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law would benefit all concerned parties. As a result, I would ask you to consider more comprehensive findings and conclusions in this case.
I hope the Court understands that this suggestion is not intended as a criticism, and I hope that you will not interpret it that way. I am only interested in this case progressing in a timely fashion and, given the close scrutiny this case has received in the past, I do not want it delayed for procedural reasons. Therefore, I hope it is understood that this letter is not a criticism.
The assistant attorney general attached to this letter a 29-page set of findings of fact and conclusions of law. They were not labeled as proposed, and they had a place for signature by the judge. The judge adopted these findings verbatim.
Kenley now argues on appeal that in so doing the trial court violated his constitutional rights, and further violated Missouri Rule 75.01. That rule states in relevant part:
The trial court retains control over judgments during the thirty-day period after entry of judgment and may, after giving the parties an opportunity to be heard and for good cause, vacate, reopen, correct, amend, or modify its judgment within that time.
Rule 75.01 (emphasis added).
The majority finds that Kenley has waived his right to object to the motion court’s adoption of the State’s findings because his counsel was given notice of the State’s intention to submit proposed findings and was supplied a copy of the State’s proposed findings, yet failed to propose any findings of his own or object to the State’s proposed findings.
I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that this issue was not preserved. First, the only written notice Kenley’s counsel received of the attorney general’s intent to submit proposed findings was when she read the cover letter to which the proposed findings were attached. That letter was dated April 22,1996.
The attorney general’s letter itself recognized that the trial court could not just adopt her proposed findings without giving Ken-ley’s counsel a chance to prepare her own proposed findings. The final paragraph of her letter to the motion court thus stated:
I have already contacted Mr. Kenley’s attorney, Loyce Hamilton, and informed her of my intention to ask you to amend your findings. I also requested that she submit proposed findings and conclusions for your consideration. After receiving Ms. Hamilton’s proposed findings, I would ask that the Court issue more detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law in this case prior to May 7,1996, the date on which the Court will lose jurisdiction over the case. I appreciate your assistance in this matter.
The letter does not state when the attorney general contacted Kenley’s counsel to indicate that she would ask the court to amend its findings. We cannot presume from the language of the letter that this was anything more than a courtesy call made on or shortly before the date that the attorney general sent the court her letter and proposed findings. In any event, the letter makes it evident that the attorney general anticipated that the court would wait for Kenley’s counsel to offer her own proposed findings before deciding whether to adopt those submitted by the attorney general.
It is questionable whether Kenley’s counsel had any obligation to respond to the attorney general’s letter and proposed findings at this point, for Rule 75.01 requires the court to give the parties an opportunity to be heard before it amends its findings. The last indication from the court on this issue was that it did not want the parties to submit proposed findings, but preferred to prepare its own. It then did just that, entering its judgment denying the Rule 29.15 motion. It was only at this point, after judgment, that the assistant attorney general sent unsolicited findings to the court and took it upon herself to tell opposing counsel she was free to do likewise. It would be reasonable in this situation for opposing counsel not to offer its own findings until it was informed by the court that it was considering amend*280ing its judgment and wanted to give the parties an opportunity to be heard on that issue. In other words, notice that the court was considering amending its judgment should and must come from the court, not the attorney general.
Even if we were to believe that Kenley’s counsel should have somehow known that it was incumbent on her to offer alternative findings without any notice by the court that it intended to amend its judgment, however, the record makes it clear that Kenley’s counsel was not given adequate time to prepare any alternative findings. As noted, the attorney general’s proposed findings were mailed on Monday, April 22, 1996. At best, Ms. Kenley’s counsel would have received these proposed findings on Wednesday, April 24, 1996. Assuming three days for mailing, as required by Rule 44.01(e),. they would not have been received by Kenley’s counsel until Thursday, April 25, 1996. The letter and proposed findings do not have a file-stamped date, and thus we do not know, if they were mailed or hand-delivered. If mailed, they may not have been received by the court until April 25,1996, either.
The court entered its amended findings and conclusions, by signing the pleading sent to it by the attorney general without a single change, on Friday, April 26, 1996. This was one to two days after the attorney general’s proposed findings would have even been received by Kenley’s counsel, and perhaps by the court. This did not give Kenley’s counsel time to even respond to the attorney general’s proposed findings, much less to draft and offer a set of proposed findings of her own. It also reflects a failure by the motion court to comply with the minimum time limits for responding to a motion set out in Rule 44.01(d). That rule states in relevant part, “ written motion, other than one which may be heard ex parte, and notice of the hearing thereof shall be served not later than five days before the time specified for the hearing-” Rule UU-01(d). Certainly the attorney general’s letter is in the nature of a motion to amend, thus invoking Rule 44.01(d)’s time limits. These limits could not be avoided by the mere fact that the attorney general’s office sought to soften the effect of its motion by cloaking it in the informality of a letter rather than properly putting it in pleading form.
In these circumstances, I disagree that Kenley has failed to preserve his objections to the judge’s adoption of the attorney general’s proposed findings. I believe that the Court should reach the merits of Kenley’s complaint under Rule 75.01. I believe that the complaint has merit on two grounds, the first of which grows out of the facts just discussed. As there noted, Rule 75.01 states that the court can amend its judgment within the 30 days after judgment only after giving the parties an opportunity to be heard. For all of the reasons just stated, Kenley did not have an opportunity to be heard before the judgment was amended. The last communication from the court on the issue was his direction that the parties not submit proposed findings. When the assistant attorney general sua sponte prepared proposed findings in response to what she realized were inadequate findings of the motion court, she also recognized that, and advised the court that, opposing counsel needed time to offer alternative findings. No time was given. Within just a few days, without notice and before opposing counsel was given an opportunity to be heard, the court adopted the attorney general’s proposed findings verbatim.
This was error. Our courts have repeatedly recognized that Rule 75.01 requires that before a court can enter an order setting aside or amending a judgment it must give notice to the parties and an opportunity to be heard. The Eastern and Western Districts of the Court of Appeals have disagreed as to whether an order entered without affording the parties an opportunity to be heard is void or merely voidable, but both have recognized that it cannot stand. Compare State ex rel. Kairuz v. Romines, 806 S.W.2d 451 (Mo.App. E.D.1991) (holding such an order void) with Todd v. Todd, 762 S.W.2d 449 (Mo.App. W.D.1988) (holding an order made without notice voidable). As Kairuz noted, the last Missouri Supreme Court to address this issue on the merits held that an order entered without notice and an opportunity to be heard is null and void. Hewitt v. Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co., *281426 S.W.2d 27, 29 (Mo.1968), citing Albert J. Hoppe, Inc. v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 361 Mo. 402, 235 S.W.2d 347 (banc 1951). Applying Hewitt, I would hold the motion court’s amended judgment void here. Should the majority determine that such an order is merely voidable, however, the result would be the same. The amended judgment should be held for naught. This has the effect of reinstating the motion court’s initial judgment. As that judgment is patently inadequate, I would remand with directions that the court either hold a new hearing on the Rule 29.15 motion or, at a minimum, enter a new, detailed, judgment after providing both parties with an opportunity to be heard and to submit proposed findings. I would further admonish the motion court to carefully consider the issues raised and, in light of the procedural history of this case, to prepare its own findings rather than adopt those proposed by either party.
C. The Trial Court Failed To Exercise Independent Judgment In Adopting the Attorney’s General’s Proposed Findings Verbatim.
I would also remand for new findings for an additional, independent reason. As the majority notes, this Court has in the past recognized that it has become commonplace for courts to adopt findings and conclusions proposed by the parties. While judges often make at least some changes or additions to these proposals, this is not necessarily required. Nonetheless, the Court has repeatedly expressed its dislike for the practice of adopting findings and conclusions without change.
Thus, as the Court stated in State v. Griffin, 848 S.W.2d 464 (Mo. banc 1993), “For obvious reasons, when a court adopts in its entirety the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law of one of the parties, there may be a problem with the appearance. The judiciary is not and should not be a rubber-stamp for anyone.” Id. at 471-72.
Similarly, in Massman Constr. Co. v. Missouri Highway & Transp. Comm’n, 914 S.W.2d 801 (Mo. banc 1996), the Court noted that:
the trial judge followed the often troublesome practice of adopting, without modification, significant portions of a proposed order prepared by respondent’s counsel. Advocates are prone to excesses of rhetoric and lengthy recitals of evidence favorable to their side but which ignore proper evidence or inferences from evidence favorable to the other party. Trial judges are well advised to approach a party’s proposed order with the sharp eye of a skeptic and the sharp pencil of an editor.
Id. at 804.
Nonetheless, the fact that a trial court has adopted the findings offered by one party does not require reversal. Instead, as the Court stated in State v. White, 873 S.W.2d 590 (Mo. banc 1994):
As long as the court thoughtfully and carefully considers the parties’ proposed findings and agrees with the content, there is no constitutional problem with the court adopting in whole or in part the findings of fact and conclusions of law drafted by one of the parties. Once the trial court determines that it agrees with one of the parties’ findings and signs the order, the court has in effect adopted that party’s findings as its own.
It is clear from the record that the prosecutor drafted some or all of the August 1, 1990, findings of fact and conclusions of law. We find no constitutional violation regarding this practice as long as the trial court is satisfied that its findings of fact and conclusions of law reflect its independent judgment. Because there was no evidence presented that the findings and conclusions did not reflect the court’s own independent judgment, this point is denied.
Id. (emphasis added).
Thus, where, as here, the motion court has adopted the findings of the State verbatim, the issue becomes whether evidence has been presented that the findings and conclusions did not reflect the court’s own independent judgment. Of course, it is difficult to develop such proof.
One way proof of lack of independent judgment can be shown is by demonstrating that *282the findings and conclusions are not supported by the record, in that they include factually inaccurate findings or findings as to which there is no substantial evidence. This-is the issue addressed by much of the majority’s opinion. It reviews the findings signed by the court, and concludes that there was evidence in the record which supports each finding. For example, it finds that, based on the record, the trial court could have disbelieved a particular expert, or could have disbelieved evidence of Kenley’s alleged alcohol and drug dependence, and so forth.
I agree with the majority’s analysis, as far as it goes. The amended judgment submitted by the State systematically summarizes all of the evidence favorable to the State in the form of findings of fact. Every time it mentions evidence favorable to Kenley, it systematically rejects it, each time leading off its analysis with the statement that it did not find that particular defense witness credible. Yet, as the majority notes in its excellent and thorough analysis of the record, there is evidence in the record which, if believed, supports each finding in the form of judgment submitted by the attorney general and adopted by the trial court.
The majority ends its analysis here, however. It, in effect, concludes that because a judge exercising independent judgment could have adopted these findings and conclusions, the judge below must have exercised independent judgment. While I agree with the former proposition, I do not agree that this means that the court does not need to go on and consider whether this particular judge in fact exercised independent judgment. This is particularly true where, as here, the issue before us is whether to affirm the imposition of the death penalty. The Florida Supreme Court noted this principle in remanding for a new penalty phase hearing in a ease in which the judge who heard the original penalty phase trial died before he could rule. Florida rules provide that in such circumstances another judge should review the record and then pass sentence. In holding that this rule, while normally adequate to protect a party’s rights, is improper in a death penalty case, the Florida court stated:
[I]n adopting this rule, we did not take into account death penalty eases and the very special and unique fact-finding responsibilities of the sentencing judge in death eases. The trial judge has the single most important responsibility in the death penalty- process. Under this process, a trial judge may not impose the death penalty unless he or she articulates in writing his or her factual findings and reasons for imposing the death penalty. We have recognized the unique responsibilities of the sentencing judge in this regard and the necessity for independent evaluations and written factual findings concerning aggravating and mitigating circumstances in imposing the death sentence.
... We conclude that fairness in this difficult area of death penalty proceedings dictates that the judge imposing the sentence should be the same judge who presided over the penalty phase proceeding.
Corbett v. State, 602 So.2d 1240, 1243-1244 (Fla.1992).
A similar approach has been espoused by the United States Supreme Court in reviewing procedures for imposition of the death penalty. The Court has upheld such procedures in numerous cases precisely because it has found that under the relevant state’s law, for instance, “[i]f a death sentence is imposed, the sentencing authority articulates in writing the statutory reasons that led to its decision.” Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 259, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 2970, 49 L.Ed.2d 918, 926 (1976). This, the Court has noted, allows for meaningful review and ensures that the penalty is not imposed indiscriminately or arbitrarily. Id.
In Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977), however, application of these principles required the Court to reverse a death sentence imposed by a judge after the jury had recommended life imprisonment. The judge’s order simply stated that the judge believed that mitigating factors were outweighed by aggravating ones, but did not identify what these factors were. The Court said that this was inadequate, rejecting the argument that “trial judges can be trusted to exercise their discretion in a responsible manner, even though *283they may base their decisions on secret information. However acceptable that argument might have been before Furman v. Georgia [408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972)], it is now clearly foreclosed.” 430 U.S. at 360, 97 S.Ct. at 1206, 51 L.Ed.2d at 403.
Similarly here, because we deal with a death penalty case, I do not believe the Court can rely on the assumption that the motion court’s findings must have reflected the judge’s independent judgment, nor can we even assume that the judge’s wholesale adoption of the State’s proposed findings necessarily means that he agreed with each of them. I do not believe we can affirm simply by deciding that a reasonable judge could reach the findings and conclusions set out in the court’s judgment. We must determine whether the judge below, the judge who actually heard the evidence, exercised his or her independent judgment in adopting the attorney general’s findings. In order to do this, it is incumbent upon us to review the remainder of the record to see whether there is other evidence that the judge did not exercise independent judgment.
In undertaking this analysis, we should be guided by the fact that proof of a lack of independent judgment will usually be circumstantial. Here, however, in addition to much circumstantial evidence, we have the exceptional presence of direct evidence—two written judgments, the one prepared independently containing findings and conclusions unsupported by the record and inadequate to support the denial of post-conviction relief; the other prepared by an advocate without opportunity for response by the adverse party containing numerous factual propositions the court did not mention in its initial, independently-prepared judgment and omitting material contained in its initial judgment. That initial judgment was four paragraphs in length and showed little understanding of the complexities of the issues before the court. By contrast, the amended judgment was 29 pages, and the majority itself devotes the first 30 pages of its opinion to issues dealing with the facts, the findings in the amended judgment, and whether they were supported by the evidence.
I also note that the initial judgment did not find any of the defendant’s witnesses not to be credible, but instead seemed to credit defense testimony, but simply misconceived the issue as whether the proffered evidence demonstrated lack of guilt of the crime charged rather than whether there was ineffective assistance of counsel in the penalty phase of the trial which followed the guilty verdict. For this reason, apparently, the court focused on whether Kenley was competent to be held guilty for murder despite his difficult childhood. That was not the issue before him, however. In any event, the initial judgment fails to accurately set out either the nature of the testimony which Ken-ley says should have been presented at his penalty phase trial, or the most basic facts of the murder. By contrast, the amended judgment is directed to the evidence that was presented and the issues before the court. It finds each defense expert not credible, and properly analyzes how their testimony fits with the defense and prosecution theories.
The contrast between the two judgments necessarily creates doubt that the court exercised independent judgment while so fundamentally shifting the basis for its decision and reaching such different conclusions and such a broad reorientation of his understanding of the issues in the brief period after receipt of the attorney general’s letter.
These doubts might be allayed if the motion judge had kept and studied the State’s proposed findings for a reasonable period of time, and either marked them up and adopted some while rejecting others, requested and considered proposed findings from Kenley, or waited for objections to the State’s proposals, or at least notified Ken-ley’s counsel that the court was considering amending its findings and adopting those proposed by the state. None of these events occurred, however. Instead, the court adopted the State’s findings and conclusions four days after they were mailed, without notice to Kenley and without notice that it would amend its findings or an opportunity for Kenley to be heard, whether by submitting alternative findings and conclusions or by submitting objections to those proposed by the State. In fact, even if Kenley’s coun*284sel had prepared proposed findings or objections and mailed them the next day, they would not have reached the judge before he ruled.
Finally, we must consider that the court adopted the State’s proposed findings absolutely verbatim. This would not be surprising in a simple case involving a few simple issues, where most people might agree on what findings and conclusions were needed to reach a particular result. Here, however, the proposed findings covered 29 pages. They were extremely complex, going over detailed aspects of the record and the law. They also uniformly found every State’s witness to be credible, and every defense expert not to be credible, findings absent from the initial, independently-prepared judgment and which, defense counsel suggests in this Court, the attorney general may have purposely included in the proposed findings so as to preclude later federal habeas corpus review of key issues raised below. This finding of lack of credibility also justified the motion court, and justifies this Court in reviewing the motion court’s ruling, in ignoring or giving no weight to defense evidence. While I agree with the majority that a rational judge might have made each of these determinations, I find it exceedingly indicative of a lack of independent judgment that the motion court made all of them in exactly the terms suggested by the attorney general.
A similar situation faced the Maine Supreme Court in a civil context in Clifford v. Klein, 463 A.2d 709 (Me.1983). The judge in Clifford solicited proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law only from defense counsel. He then adopted them verbatim without giving prior notice to the plaintiffs counsel of his intent to do so or of his request to defense counsel. The court first stated that, while it did not disapprove of adoption of findings proposed by a party, it would “remand for new findings in those instances where this Court is uncertain whether the judicial function has been adequately performed.” Id. at 712-13. It found it had such uncertainty in the ease before it, stating:
Not only did the trial justice solicit proposed findings from only one party, thereby depriving himself of the opportunity to weigh the views of counsel for both parties, but more importantly, in soliciting proposed findings from the prevailing party, the justice failed to give counsel for that party any indication of the rationale for his decision. This is not the type of case in which the basis for the justice’s decision was readily apparent. The evidence adduced at trial was extensive and in part conflicting. The proposed judgement drafted by counsel for the prevailing party attempted to review this testimony at length and in the process rejected selected portions of it. We believe it highly unlikely that counsel=s perception and the portrayal of this testimony would have been identical to that of the presiding justice. The evidence adduced at trial was too extensive and too complex for counsel to have been able to divine the rationale supporting the decision of the court.
Id. at 713 (emphasis added). See also, Ramey Constr. Co., Inc. v. Apache Tribe of Mescalero Reservation, 616 F.2d 464, 467 (10th Cir.1980) (noting that verbatim adoption of findings proposed by party mandates their review with a more critical eye and that here, “[ajlthough the trial court may well have performed its judicial function in this ease, viewing the findings and the record with a critical eye, we cannot be sure that it did so.”).
Nearly every doubt attending the judgment in Clifford is present here; only one party’s views were considered;1 that party prepared its proposed findings without receiving input from the judge as to the basis of his views; the evidence was so complex and the evidence so extensive that it is “highly unlikely that counsel’s perception and the portrayal of this testimony would have been identical to that of the presiding judge.” Clifford, 463 A.2d at 713. For all of these reasons, as did Clifford, I believe that the facts necessarily raise considerable doubt (if *285not outright disbelief) that the motion court exercised independent judgment in adopting the State’s proposed findings and conclusions.
Whether or not such doubt that the amended judgment reflects independent judgment would be a sufficient basis to remand in a non-capital case, it certainly does provide a sufficient basis to remand in this capital case. As the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly noted:
[T]he penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, however long. Death, in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from one of only a year or two. Because of this qualitative difference, there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 805, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 2991, 49 L.Ed.2d 944, 961 (1976).
Moreover, precisely because of the qualitative difference between death and other forms of punishment permitted under our laws:
although not every imperfection in the deliberative process is sufficient, even in a capital case, to set aside a state-court judgment, the severity of the sentence mandates careful scrutiny in the review of any colorable claim of error.
Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 884-85, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2747, 77 L.Ed.2d 235, 255 (1983) (citing Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305, 96 S.Ct. at 2991, 49 L.Ed.2d at 961). Applying such scrutiny to a death penalty case in which the trial court simply told the state’s attorney that he believed the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances and left it to the state’s attorney to draft findings in accordance with that decision, the Florida Supreme Court remanded for a new sentencing hearing, stating “the trial judge’s action in delegating to the state attorney the responsibility to identify and explain the appropriate aggravating and mitigating factors raises a serious question concerning the weighing process that must be conducted before imposing a death penalty.” Patterson v. State, 513 So.2d 1257, 1262 (Fla.1987).
Here, too, because the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the State’s proposed findings raise not just colorable, but substantial, doubt as to the independence of the judgment exercised by the motion court, we should reverse and remand for a new 29.15 hearing and for independent findings of fact and conclusions of law.
For these reasons, I dissent from the majority’s decision to affirm the judgment below.
. Of course, in Clifford, the judge actually solicited proposed findings from only one party. Here, by contrast, the court received unsolicited findings from the State, but then adopted them without giving notice or an opportunity to respond to the defendant. The effect of these two departures from proper procedure is the same.