dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
The majority has found the admission into evidence of a child victim’s recorded testimony in accordance with TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 38.071 (Vernon Supp.1986) violates the right to confrontation granted appellant by the United States and Texas Constitutions.
The majority of our sister courts that have treated this issue have held the statute adequately protects a defendant’s constitutional right to confrontation. However, some disagreement has arisen among them as to whether the sixth amendment requires that the statute provide a defendant the opportunity to cross-examine the complainant during the filming of the videotape statement. Cf Newman v. State, 700 S.W.2d 307, 312-13 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, pet. pending); Tolbert v. State, 697 S.W.2d 795, 798 (Tex.App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, pet. pending); Long v. State, 694 S.W.2d 185, 192 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1985, pet. granted) (holding the statute unconstitutional on sixth amendment grounds); Alexander v. State, 692 S.W.2d 563, 566-67 (Tex.App. — Eastland 1985, pet. granted); Jolly v. State, 681 S.W.2d 689, 695 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, pet. granted) (upholding the statute against a sixth amendment challenge).
The following provisions of the statute adequately protect the defendant’s right to cross-examine his accuser. The videotape statement can be admitted only after a showing that it was accurately made and has not been altered. The defendant or his attorney may view the recording before its admission into evidence. Finally, either party may call the child to testify, subject to complete cross-examination by the opposing party.
In my view, the child is “called” to the stand when the jury watches the video. Viewing the tape affords the jury the chance to observe the child’s demeanor, and judge his credibility. The defendant’s opportunity to view the recording beforehand serves as a tool in preparing his defense. Even if the videotape is admitted into evidence, the child must still be available to testify as either party’s witness. Furthermore, if the child does take the stand for the State, the defendant may thoroughly cross-examine the child regarding the taped statement presented to the jury.
I do not imply by my dissent that this statute would pass constitutional muster if applied to any class of witnesses other than child sexual assault victims. Given the youth and inexperience of these witnesses, however, the State has a compelling interest in protecting them from the trauma and emotional turmoil of testifying in open court.
For the reasons set forth above, I would join the majority of our sister courts that *652have upheld the constitutionality of this statute and affirm this conviction.