dissenting.
Believing the evidence at issue in this case to be admissible and material, I dissent. While I agree that in the absence of evidence that Shaw was aware of the charges, the subject matter of the reports and affidavits would not have been admissible to show bias, I cannot agree that the evidence would not have been admissible to show that Shaw was lying concerning the events that occurred on the morning of the offense for which applicant was convicted.
The offense reports at issue state that Shaw, the State’s key witness, committed a sexual assault at approximately 5:30 a.m. and committed two burglaries in the same apartment complex sometime around 7:00 a.m. on August 20, 1986, the morning of the offense for which applicant was convicted. At applicant’s trial, Shaw testified that on the night of August 19th he attended an all-night video party at the house of a fellow employee. He testified that he left the party the next morning “when the sun was on the horizon” and went directly home. When he pulled up to his apartment, he testified he could feel heat on applicant’s motorcycle. He further testified that when he went into the apartment he shared with applicant, applicant told him that “[i]f anybody asks you why the bikes are warm, tell them we just went out for breakfast.” By contrast, at the punishment phase of applicant’s trial and in the second eviden-tiary hearing on this writ application, applicant testified that Shaw came home on the morning of the 20th, woke applicant, and told him that he had just raped his ex-girlfriend and burglarized her home and another home, and instructed applicant that if anybody asked why his motorcycle was hot to say that they just got back from breakfast.1
The majority concludes that the reports would not have been admissible under Rule 608. I disagree. Rule 608, Evidence of Character and Conduct, provides as follows:
(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character. The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but subject to these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise.
(b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting his credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness nor proved by extrinsic evidence.
*705A distinction can be drawn between evidence of specific acts offered to infer that a person who engages in conduct of a certain type is not credible and evidence of specific acts offered to show that the witness has actually made a misrepresentation on direct examination in the instant case. As stated by Judge Miller:
As long as a party is correcting a false impression made by a witness I would allow that party, pursuant to Rule 607, to utilize for impeachment purposes a specific instance of the witness’s conduct. Although Rule 607 does not expressly address this exception, I do not believe the enactment of the Rules of Criminal Evidence abolished it.
Ramirez v. State, 802 S.W.2d 674, 677 (Tex. Crim.App.1990) (Miller, J., concurring) (discussing applicability of Rules 608 and 607 to impeachment with evidence of specific acts); accord Steven Goode, et al, S3 Guide to the Texas Rules of Evidence.-Civil and CRIMINAL § 608.1 at 418-19 (ed. 1988) (Rule 608 does not exclude evidence of specific acts for impeachment purposes when offered to rebut misleading statements made by the witness); id. at 142 (Supp.1992) (if purpose of inquiry is to rebut a misrepresentation made on direct examination the issue is not governed by Rule 608). I do not believe Rule 608 excludes evidence of specific conduct which directly rebuts or calls into question a statement made by the witness on direct examination.
That is the case here. Although the majority declines to consider the materiality of the reports because “the hearing record is unclear as to precisely how applicant would have used the materials to show that Shaw was ‘lying’ ”, the impeachment value of the reports is obvious. The reports could have been offered to rebut a misrepresentation made by Shaw on direct examination. Shaw testified that he went home after the all-night video party, at which time he had a conversation with applicant. According to Shaw, applicant incriminated himself by asking Shaw to provide an alibi for him. The reports at issue indicate that Shaw did not go directly home after the video party, but instead committed a sexual assault and burglaries sometime before going home. In addition, at the evidentiary hearing, defense counsel indicated that, if he had been in possession of the reports he would have called applicant at the guilt phase of trial to testify that it was Shaw who requested applicant to provide an alibi for him that morning.2 Because the reports directly contradict Shaw’s testimony, and call into question Shaw’s testimony regarding the content of the conversation at the apartment on the morning in question, they would have been admissible for impeachment purposes to rebut statements made by Shaw on direct examination. See Ramirez, 802 S.W.2d at 677 (Miller, J., concurring); Steven Goode, et al., 33 Guide to the Texas Rules of Evidence: Civil and Criminal § 608.1 at 418-19 (ed.1988) & 142 (Supp.1992).
As the State’s key witness, Shaw’s credibility was significant. Evidence showing that Shaw lied about his whereabouts prior to arriving home on the morning in question would have led the jury to question his testimony against applicant, particularly his testimony concerning the content of the conversation he had with applicant on the morning in question. In my opinion, in view of the critical nature of Shaw’s testimony, I believe there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence of criminal allegations involving Shaw on the morning in question been disclosed to applicant for purposes of impeachment, the result of the proceeding would have been different. I would grant relief.
MILLER and BAIRD, JJ., join.. The majority notes the trial court's finding that applicant and his attorney had knowledge of the facts which were the subject matter of the offense reports at issue. I would note the limited extent of such knowledge. At the second evidentiary hearing on this writ application, defense counsel testified that applicant had told him that "there was some information out there concerning some criminal charges.” Applicant testified that although Shaw told him when he arrived in the apartment on the 20th that he had raped his ex-girlfriend and burglarized her apartment and one other, applicant did not know who the girlfriend was or where she lived until the offense reports were revealed.
. Without the offense reports to corroborate such testimony, it would not appeared credible for applicant to testify to virtually the opposite of what Shaw had testified to — that Shaw told him to make up an alibi regarding going out to breakfast. However, Shaw’s testimony regarding that discussion would have had much less credibility if the reports had been offered together with applicant’s testimony.