dissenting.
Please, dear reader, believe me: Contrary to what you might surmise from this Court’s majority opinion, the law that addresses corporate criminal liability, as reflected by the many law review articles and court decisions on the subject, is one big mess. I must, however, sadly report: The majority opinion actually does absolutely nothing to clear the air in this area of the law. In fact, I find that the majority opinion will actually add to the confusion that presently exists in this area of our law.
Without any limitation whatsoever, this Court granted the State’s petition for discretionary review in order to review the decision of the Texarkana Court of Appeals in Vaughan and Sons, Inc. v. State, 649 S.W.2d 677 (Tex.App.-6th 1983), which declared that a private corporation in Texas could not be prosecuted for the offense of criminally negligent homicide that had been previously committed by one or more of its employees or agents. Contrary to the court of appeals’ decision, the majority opinion of this Court holds generally that a private corporation doing business in Texas can be held strictly and automatically criminally liable for the personal negligent acts of its employees or agents, provided that at a later date the trier of fact finds that the employees’ or agents’ personal negligent acts were actually criminal. Given this Court’s unlimited grant, what the court of appeals stated and held, and what the State argues in its petition for discretionary review, I respectfully dissent to the majority opinion’s failure to “put some meat on the bones of that old corporation dog” that it has now discovered exists. I also dissent for other reasons that I will give.
Although I dissent, I nevertheless acknowledge that the law that addresses the civil and criminal liability of a private corporation in Texas and elsewhere has come a long way since the year 1250 when Pope Innocent IV decreed that because a corporation, although apparently then a “person”, did not have a soul that could be damned, it could not be excommunicated from the Church. See Brickley, Corporate Criminal Liability, at page 7 (1986 edition).
As to what the boundaries of civil corporate liability might be in the future, this Court must, of course, defer to the Supreme Court of Texas. However, see El Chico Corporation v. Poole et al., 732 S.W.2d 306 (Tex.1987). Given what the majority opinion states, it should be obvious to almost anyone that this Court will or should in the future subscribe to and apply where possible the principles of law that the Supreme Court announces in this area of the law.
Also, after the members of the Legislature have thoroughly digested the majority opinion, I predict that we will soon see more strict and automatic criminal liability statutes enacted. For example, the next *816session of the Legislature should be able to enact a strict and automatic criminal liability statute making any natural parent or legal guardian or custodian of a young child strictly and automatically criminally liable for the personal negligent wrongs of the child, provided that a trier of fact finds that the child's negligent acts arejriminal.
It is actually not the reasoning that the majority opinion uses to reach its conclusion, that a private corporation doing business in Texas falls within the statutory term “person”, that concerns me. What actually concerns me lies in the fact that the majority opinion fails to give the bench and bar of this State any guidance as to how the concept of strict and automatic criminal liability, which it approves, either expressly or implicitly, is to be applied to future criminal cases involving corporate criminal defendants.
Although the appellant corporation in this cause did not expressly challenge in the trial court or on direct appeal the constitutionality of V.T.C.A., Penal Code, § 7.22(a)(1), upon which the majority opinion relies to hold the appellant corporation strictly and automatically criminally liable for the personal negligent acts of its employee-truck driver, which negligent acts were later determined by the trier of fact to be criminal acts of negligence, nevertheless, I find that if the issue is not before this Court expressly, it is at least before this Court implicitly. In any event, in the interest of judicial economy, this Court should address this issue at this time. However, because of reasons I will give, I would not first declare § 7.22(a)(1) to be unconstitutional, either facially or as applied, because it is violative of the due process and due course of law clauses of the respective Constitutions, but would, at this time, only declare that the information in this cause was subject to the appellant corporation’s motion to quash. Alternatively, however, I would vote to declare § 7.22(a)(1) unconstitutional, both facially and as applied, because it is violative of the due process and due course of law clauses of the respective Constitutions.
The facts of this cause reflect that what has happened to many of us also happened to the appellant corporation’s truck driver in this cause, namely, his assigned motor vehicle quit running; at the most unexpected and undesirable time and place — a little after noon in what is now a feeder lane that often terminates on what will ultimately be, we hope, the 290 North Freeway in Houston, which I can personally attest is not, because of the amount of traffic that travels this stretch of the road both day and night, where, if one’s motor vehicle has to quit running, one would like to see his motor vehicle quit running. Several hours later, approximately six, after unsuccessful rescue efforts by other company employees and agents to locate appellant and his truck had occurred, which delay occurred because the driver of the truck gave them the wrong location, he missed his then location by several miles, another vehicle drove into the back of the truck, causing the untimely and unfortunate deaths of its driver and a passenger. The driver of the truck, who was then in the truck’s cab, was only slightly injured. The driver was charged but not prosecuted for committing the misdemeanor offense of criminally negligent homicide, apparently because he testified for the State. Another employee, who was several miles distant from the location where the accident occurred, was also accused of committing the same offense but was not prosecuted because he was given immunity from prosecution and testified for the State. Based upon the truck driver’s and the employee at the company’s headquarters negligent acts, the coloration was also charged, prosecuted, and convicted for committing the offense of criminally negligent homicide. A $5,000 fine was assessed as punishment, which I assume has been or will be passed on to consumers of the appellant corporation. The trial judge, however, did not also see fit to assess a “scarlet letter” type of punishment, such as requiring the corporation to place on the sides of all its trucks such signs stating “Killer corporation” or “BEWARE — CAUTION: THIS CORPORATION HAS BEEN FOUND GUILTY OF KILLING ANOTHER HUMAN BEING”. See and compare Goldschmitt v. State, 490 So.2d 123 (Fla.App., 2 Dist.1986), where that court approved, as a condition of probation, the trial court’s requirement that the convicted defendant in that cause affix to the bumper of his motor vehicle the label “CONVICTED D.U.I. — RESTRICTED LICENSE”. After today, I assume that some of our innovative trial judges will, after a corporation has been found strictly and automatically criminally liable for committing a similar offense as was committed here, criminally negligent homicide, assess a “scarlet letter” type of punishment in addition to any fine. See, § 12.51(d), which appears to expressly authorize a trial judge to assess this type punishment in addition *817to any fine assessed. Such should, of course, be the equivalent of assessing the death penalty for such a corporation.
V.T.C.A., Penal Code, § 7.22(a)(1), the majority opinion’s authority for its holding, provides that a corporation may be held strictly and automatically criminally liable for the misdemeanor criminal negligent act or acts of its employees or agents. There are no exceptions under this procedural statute. A copy of the information that was filed against the appellant corporation is attached hereto as “Appendix A”. As easily seen therein, no act of negligence, that was allegedly committed by either of the two named employees of the corporation, was facially an act that would constitute gross negligence. Furthermore, but contrary to Art. 21.15, V.A.C.C.P., which expressly requires that the act or acts of negligence that the State is going to rely upon to establish criminal negligence against the accused must be alleged in the information, and that “in no event shall it be sufficient to allege merely that the accused, in committing the offense, acted with ... criminal negligence”, it was only alleged in this information that the accused corporation committed the offense of “criminal negligence”. Without more, this accusation is totally insufficient to accuse the appellant corporation with committing the criminal wrong of criminally negligent homicide. See Graham and Utecht v. State, 657 S.W.2d 99 (Tex.Cr.App.1983); Cole v. State, 556 S.W.2d 343 (Tex.Cr.App.1977). And, there is no more. Given the plain wording of Art. 21.15, supra, it should be obvious to almost anyone that the information in this cause did not allege the offense of criminally negligent homicide against the appellant corporation, and for this reason the conviction should be reversed and the information ordered dismissed. The majority opinion, however, does not discuss the fact that the appellant corporation, either expressly or implicitly, attacked in the trial court the information for its defects of omission.
In order to convict the appellant corporation of criminally negligent homicide, see V.T.C.A., Penal Code, § 19.06, the State relied totally upon alleged personal negligent acts of the corporation’s employees and the trier of fact’s implicit finding that the negligent acts were in fact criminal negligent acts, which finding was then automatically imputed to the appellant corporation pursuant to § 7.22(a)(1). However, Art. 21.15, supra, does not provide for the automatic imputation of negligent acts by a third party to the accused, and the appellant corporation was not shown to be “a party”, see V.T.C.A., Penal Code, § 7.01 and § 7.02. This information is clearly void.
In dissenting, it does not follow that I disagree with the majority opinion’s primary, albeit general, holding, that a private corporation operating in Texas may be criminally prosecuted for the criminal wrongs of its agents or employees who, when they commit the criminal wrong, are at that moment in time acting on behalf of the corporation and within the course and scope of their employment. That would, of course, comport with the former law of this State that governed “accomplices and accessories”, which is no more. Today, however, liability of a third person for the criminal acts committed by another person is now governed by the law of parties, see V.T.C.A., Penal Code, § 7.01 and § 7.02, which provision of our law is not implicated in this cause. My disagreement with the majority opinion lies in how the broad general holding that it makes is going to be applied in the future and not run afoul of the due process and due course of law clauses of the respective Constitutions. Without violating those sacred provisions, I do not believe that it can be done, and that is the reason I would, as an alternative measure, vote to declare § 7.02(a)(1) unconstitutional, both facially and as applied.
Given the plain and clear wording of § 7.22(a)(1), it is clear to me that in the type misdemeanor offense as here, criminally negligent homicide, I agree with the court of appeals that the Legislature did not clearly intend that a private corporation in Texas could be held strictly criminally liable solely for the personal negligent wrongs committed by its employees or *818agents, which personal negligent acts are later determined by a trier of fact to have been criminal, or, if it did, its legal faux pas lies in the fact that in enacting the above statute it overlooked the requirements of due course and due process of law.
Professor Hamilton, whose law review article the majority opinion so heavily relies upon for authority, stated the following therein: “I could see no reason why corporations should be treated differently from individuals in this regard (that corporations should not have the benefit of all the protections of the criminal process).” Hamilton, “Corporate Criminal Liability”, 47 Texas Law Review at 76. And yet, under § 7.22(a)(1), any private corporation doing business in Texas will always be treated differently from a human person. Does this not, in itself, cause § 7.22(aXl) to be unconstitutional because it violates the respective equal protection clauses of the Constitutions?
Under § 7.22(aXl), when does a private corporation in Texas know that it committed a criminal wrong? The answer is easy. Much like one who has been struck by lightning will know, the corporation will know exactly at the moment in time when a trier of fact returns a verdict implicitly or expressly stating that because the corporation’s employees or agents were found to have personally committed a misdemeanor offense, which it has now determined to be criminal, the corporation is to be strictly and automatically criminally liable for committing that wrong.
In criminal law, the term “strict criminal liability” embraces the concept that a person who commits an act in violation of the law may be held criminally liable even though he might be innocent of any criminal intent. For example, in Texas, in the instance where an individual violates a traffic law, such as driving while intoxicated or speeding, a culpable mental state is not a requisite for charging the accused with committing those offenses. If the individual commits the act, he is, ipso facto, held strictly criminally liable. See Honeycutt v. State, 627 S.W.2d 417, 421, fn. 4 (Tex.Cr.App.1982) (On original submission.) Texas, however, as reflected by the fact that strict criminal liability has been imposed only in the instance of a violation of a traffic law, as is true in most jurisdictions, has always looked upon strict criminal liability with disfavor because, as Professor Hippard, see “The Unconstitutionality of Criminal Liability Without Fault: An Argument for a Constitutional Doctrine of Mens Rea,” 10 Houston Law Review at 1040, among others, has pointed out: “The imposition of criminal liability without proof of criminal blameworthiness not only flouts a basic premise of our criminal law, [that the criminal law is to be used to condemn and punish someone who has personally acted in a criminally blameworthy manner], but violates our constitutionally supported belief in the significance and dignity of each individual and in his ability to choose his own destiny.”
A noteworthy exception to the rule that strict criminal liability statutes are looked upon with disfavor is “public welfare offenses”, which offenses represent society’s attempts to regulate nuisances that might affect or be detrimental to the general health, safety, and welfare of the citizenry.1 These statutes are, of course, enacted pursuant to the police power of the government. These crimes are actually regulatory measures, regulating sensitive areas such as the distribution of food and drugs to the general public, and are enacted to protect the public and maintain social order over which the general public is unable to control itself. These regulatory offenses are usually malum in se and not just ma-lum prohibitum type offenses. The burden of the hazards inherent in dealing with such sensitive areas must be allocated in the interest of the “larger good” to those who are in the best position to prevent the harm. See Arkin et al., Business Crime, Vol. 4, Chapter 16. Also see and compare Sayre, “Public Welfare Offenses,” 33 Co-lum.L.Rev. 55 (1933).
*819Professor Hippard, in his above well written law review article, implicitly advocates that there should be no exceptions, and no law should ever be enacted that would permit the use of criminal laws to punish the blameless. (1052). Although I am in agreement with his general proposition that criminal laws should not be used to punish the blameless, I must part company with him when it comes to the “public welfare”. I am unable to subscribe to Hip-pard’s viewpoint because I do not find where the general public is equipped to protect itself from the distribution of such things as impure drugs or tainted food; not even through strict civil liability, stringent licensing requirements, and strong inspection regulations, as easily seen on the “Marvin Zindler” show that is telecast in Houston most nights of the week. Distribution of impure drugs or tainted food is, in my view, a malum in se act, and such is a proper subject for regulation through our criminal law, which can effectively deal the violating corporation the death penalty. However, excepting “public welfare” offenses, I wholeheartedly agree with Professor Hippard that it is constitutionally impermissible to enact strict criminal laws that criminalizes any “person” without fault, as § 7.22(a)(1) obviously does. In that instance, there should be a “means rea” requirement, which § 7.22(a)(1) does not require.
Furthermore, in this instance, the Legislature of Texas did not enact § 7.22(a)(1) under its police power as legislation that would criminalize a private corporation for the negligent conduct of another. Here, the criminal liability of the appellant corporation is established and determined solely through the enactment of a strict and absolute criminal procedural law.
The majority opinion, without taking into account the distinction between an offense created on behalf of the public welfare and an offense that is totally unrelated to the public welfare, i.e., making it criminal for a private corporation to be strictly and automatically held criminally responsible for the personal negligent acts of its employees or agents that are later determined by some trier of fact to be criminal negligent acts, holds that the Legislature may enact non-police power legislation to hold a private corporation criminally liable by imputing to the corporation acts of ordinary and personal negligence of jts employees that are later determined by some trier of fact to be criminal negligent acts. I find that such cannot occur without violating the due process and due course of law clauses of the respective constitutions because such is unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious. As previously stated, because § 7.22(a)(1) permits private corporations to be treated differently than humans, it is patently violative of the equal protection clauses.
I am unable to understand how any criminal law can effectively cause our “absent minded” acts, negligence if you will, to cease to exist. If that were possible, I would advocate that such a law be immediately enacted by our Legislature.
Again, I emphasize: The criminal liability of the corporation in this instance is not based upon some form of regulatory criminal type statute which can be classified as a “public welfare statute”, and I can find no public policy justification in § 7.22(a)(1) that might warrant the finding that the corporation’s liability is predicated upon a “public welfare statute.” I find and conclude that to strictly criminalize a private corporation doing business in Texas for the personal criminal negligent acts of its employees or agents, pursuant to § 7.22(a)(1), amounts to arbitrariness and nonsense. Even if the word “knowingly” were read into § 7.22(a)(1), I still could not understand how that would justify criminalizing a private corporation for personal negligent acts of its agents or employees, which are later determined by some trier of fact to be criminal; civilly liable, yes; criminally liable, no.
Based upon the majority’s reasoning, the Legislature of this State is now free to enact legislation that would impute criminal negligent activity by a third person who is under the control of another individual or person, such as a parent. If that is the law, then the law is truly an ass. If that is the law, El Chico Corporation and Joleemo Corporation, see supra, get *820ready for things to come because you ain’t seen nothing yet. Parents of negligent children, you may also get ready because once the members of the Legislature have completely digested the majority opinion I predict it will not be long before a child’s negligent acts, which are later determined to be criminal by some trier of fact, will be imputed to the child’s parents, who are, at that instant in time, to be criminalized solely because his, her, or their child committed a personal criminally negligent act.
It should be obvious to anyone that now that the water has passed under the bridge it is time for the author of the majority opinion to restart the motor on this Court’s majority opinion, which apparently has unexpectedly and untimely quit running, and more clearly explain how the personal negligence of a corporation’s employees can be imputed to the corporation, and solely for that reason criminalize and stigmatize the corporation.
What I find that the court of appeals forgot to state in its opinion is the following: “We should make haste slowly when it is in the direction of imputing to an individual or a corporation the personal negligent acts of another, which are later determined to be criminal, which automatically criminalizes the individual or a corporation.”
In this instance, the issue is whether a private corporation can be held summarily criminally liable for any personal negligent act committed by an employee or agent, that turns out to be criminal, and there be no necessity to show that the corporation had any connection whatsoever with the commission of the actual personal criminal negligent act that the employee or agent committed. This, of course, is strict and automatic criminal liability at its best.
After having read the decisions of other jurisdictions that are cited in the majority opinion, one certainly cannot disagree with Professor Hamilton’s following statements: “On the other hand, practically all other common-law jurisdictions recognize corporate criminal liability. This unanimity, however, is less impressive than might first appear. Most cases upholding criminal liability are as devoid of reasoned analysis as are the Texas cases rejecting liability: They either assume without discussion that corporations should be criminally responsible or merely argue that a corporation falls within the term ‘person’ used in some criminal statute.” See, for example, the inferior Pennsylvania court’s decision of Commonwealth v. Mc Ilwain School Bus Lines, 283 Pa.Super. 1, 423 A.2d 413 (1980), which the majority opinion relies upon so heavily. A case from Pennsylvania that is much closer in point is that State’s Supreme Court’s decision of Commonwealth v. Koczwara, 397 Pa. 575, 155 A.2d 825 (Pa.1959), in which that court held that vicarious absolute liability, which is based upon the tort doctrine of respondeat superi- or, must be limited to “petty misdemeanors involving only light monetary fines.” Given the possible punishment that may be assessed a private corporation, in this State, see § 12.51(d), there is no misdemeanor crime for which a corporation is found guilty that can be categorized or classified as a “petty misdemeanor”. As Justice Spaeth of the Pennsylvania Superior Court put it in the concurring opinion that he filed in Commonwealth v. Koch, 297 Pa.Super. 350, 443 A.2d 1157, 1162 (1982): “But to label [a corporation], not only a tortfeasor but a ‘criminal killer’ — for that is how one convicted of [criminally negligent homicide] is labeled — seems to me to serve no useful purpose. It doesn’t compensate the victim. It won’t deter anyone [from being negligent in the future] ... It can only humiliate the defendant and inflict upon him the economic losses and damage to reputation incident to having a criminal record ...”
Given the fact that the issue here does not involve the application of the police powers of the State, and also given the fact that imposition of criminal liability usually requires proof that the Appellant corporation itself did something personally criminally wrongful, I ask: As far as the personal act of negligence that caused the death of the victim in this cause, what personal-negligent act did the appellant corporation commit, which personal negligent act was later determined to be criminal? How was the corporation put on notice that its *821truck was going to quit running when it did and at the place it did, after its driver had successfully made a delivery? How could the corporation have predicted that the driver would not take every reasonable precaution to remove the truck from the highway? How could the corporation have predicted that a collision would occur, much less that death would result? Predictability or foreseeability, alas, is nowhere to be found in the majority opinion, which should be entitled “Private Corporations, Beware. Another Almanza the Terrible has been turned loose by an aggressive and assertive majority of this Court to do dastardly deeds to you!!!”
In the trial court, the appellant corporation, through its attorney, asserted in support of the motion to quash the information that he filed, that “The Grand Jury of Harris County, Texas attempts to charge Defendant corporation with the offense of Criminally Negligent Homicide, which is an offense not capable of commission by a corporation or business association by reason of the requirement in the Criminally Negligent Homicide Statute that there exists a personal state of mind at the time of occurrence of the incident which gives rise to the charge.” Unfortunately, the motion to quash does not contain any discussion, argument, or authorities. It did not expressly challenge the constitutionality of V.T.C.A., Penal Code, § 7.22(a)(1), either facially or as applied. However, I find that it implicitly made that challenge.
On direct appeal, the Sixth Court of Appeals in Vaughan v. State, 649 S.W.2d 677 (Tex.App.—6th 1983), only addressed the appellant corporation’s first point of error, which was phrased as follows: “Penal code provisions of corporations and other artificial legal entities do not extend to any type of criminal homicide. Therefore the trial court erred in failing to grant appellant’s motion to set aside the information.” (Page 4, appellant’s brief.) The appellant corporation’s attorney on appeal reached the following conclusion: "For the reason that corporations should not be subject to prosecution for any type of homicide, the conviction of Appellant herein should be reversed and the Information dismissed.” (Page 9, appellant’s brief.) Therefore, given the above, it is obvious to me that the. appellant corporation implicitly at a minimum contended on direct appeal that a private corporation doing business in Texas cannot be held strictly criminally liable solely for the personal negligent acts of its employees and agents, which are later determined to be criminal. The court of appeals sustained the appellant corporation’s point of error.
This Court’s majority opinion has disagreed with the court of appeals holding, and holds that because the offense of criminally negligent homicide may be committed by a “person”, and because, by definition, a corporation is a “person”, and a “person” can commit the offense of criminally negligent homicide, ergo, a private corporation can be prosecuted for the offense of criminally negligent homicide. Having reached that conclusion, the majority opinion’s motor, much like the corporation’s employee’s truck’s motor did in this cause, unexpectedly and untimely quits running. I have concluded that given the issues that are implicated in this case, the majority opinion quits too soon, and needs to be cranked up and driven a few more miles. Otherwise, I fear that the majority opinion will be the linchpin for much bad law regarding corporate criminal liability in this State.
I agree with the court of appeals’ implicit holding that there is nothing in § 7.22(a)(1) that might reflect or indicate a legislative intent that a “person” might be held vicariously strictly criminally liable for the negligent acts of another “person”.
In Standard Oil Company of Texas v. United States, 307 F.2d 120 (5th 1962), Circuit Judge Brown agreed that “a servant is not acting within the scope of his employment unless his acts are motivated by a purpose to benefit the master or ... to further the master’s business.” If this is true, and I believe it is, I must ask: How does a private corporation benefit from negligent acts of an employee, to the extent that the personal vicarious acts of negligence of the employee are sufficient, standing alone, to be imputed to the corporation so that the corporation is held strictly, absolutely, and automatically criminally *822responsible for the employee’s personal negligent acts, which are later determined to be criminal? I also must ask: What law is there in this State that holds a private corporation criminally liable for the personal negligence of its employees or agents, wholly unrelated to knowledge, actual or constructive? Again, we are not dealing with a “public welfare crime”, such as the distribution of harmful drugs, narcotics, food, etc., to the general public, where injury to the public interest comes from the act or thing quite without regard to the antecedent circumstances, motivation or conduct; we are dealing with the situation where a private corporation is held absolutely, strictly, and automatically criminally liable solely for the personal negligent acts of its employees and agents. Where is there in § 7.22(a)(1) the indication that the Legislature intended a “person” to be held strictly criminally liable through the commission of an “absent minded” act by another? As Judge Brown pointed out in Standard Oil Corporation of Texas, supra, “The spirit of the doctrine [of statutory construction] which denies to the federal judiciary power to create crimes forthrightly admonishes that we should not enlarge the reach of enacted crimes by constituting them from anything less than the incriminating components contemplated by the words used in the statute ...”
Today, this Court should exercise its constitutional authority and hold that the Legislature in this instance violated the due process and due course of law clauses of the respective constitutions when it enacted § 7.22(a)(1). At a minimum, this Court should resist the temptation, outside of “public welfare offenses”, to put the judicial gloss of approval to the overuse of strict and automatic criminal liability in situations as we have at Bar. E.g., Perkins, “Essay: Criminal Liability Without Fault: A Disquieting Trend”, 68-2 Iowa Law Review (1982/83). In the type of act we are dealing with here, a personal negligent act, that is later determined to be criminal, this Court is actually subscribing, to the concept that “without fault there is a criminal wrong.” See Perkins, supra. Also see Erlinder, “Mens Rea, Due Process, and the Supreme Court: Toward a Constitutional Doctrine of Substantive Criminal Law”, 9 American Journal of Criminal Law 163 (1981). This is wrong, wrong, wrong, oh so terribly wrong.
I find that the majority opinion, in creating the beast of “criminal no fault”, when it comes to private corporate criminal liability, may have actually created a far larger and more uncontrollable beast than it did when it created “Almanza the Terrible”.
Here, however, I find it is unnecessary to declare § 7.22(a)(1) unconstitutional, either facially or applied. Given the plain wording of Art. 21.15, supra, I would simply hold that the offense of criminally negligent homicide has not been properly alleged against the appellant corporation, and therefore would remand the cause to the court of appeals to first decide this issue. Alternatively, however, I vote to declare § 7.22(a)(1) unconstitutional, both facially and as applied, because it violates both due process and due course of law.2
For the above and foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent to the majority opinion.
*823NO. 553194 APPENDIX A
FILED: APRIL 19,1979
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I.
On or about November 23, 1978, Johnny Hendricks was the agent of the Defendant and while acting in behalf of the Defendant and within the scope of his employment, the said Johnny Hendricks operated a motor vehicle owned by the Defendant and, while so doing, caused the vehicle in which the Complainants were traveling to collide with the Defendant's vehicle thereby causi* the deaths of the Complainants by the following criminally negligent conduct:~
By parking and leaving the Defendant's vehicle standing upon the paved and main-traveled part of a highway outside of a business and residential district when it was possible not to so park and leave the vehicle standing.
By parking and leaving the Defendant's vehicle standing upon the left-hand side of a one way roadway.
By failing to remove the Defendant's vehicle from the paved and main-traveled part of a highway outside of a business and residential district when a duty to so act in accordance with the law existed and it was possible to so remove the Defendant's vehicle.
By failing to equip the Defendant's vehicle with at least three fJares, lanterns or reflectors for use during its operation upon a divided highway at any time from a half hour after sunset to a half hour before sunrise when a duty to so equip the Defendant's vehicle in accordance wi,th the law existed and
By failing to display fusses, lanterns, reflectors or flares as required by law when the Defendant's vehicle was stopped for more than ten minutes upon a roadway of a divided highway. . . _
II.
On or about November 13, 1978, Paul ^awater was the agent of tr.e Defendant and while acting in behalf of the Defendant and within the scene of his office and employment, the said Paul Tawater failed to equip tee . Defendant's vehicle for its operation by Johnny Hendricks when a cuty to so equip the vehicle in accordance with the'- law existed apd th&t suc.-failure constituted criminal negligence which caused the vehicle in whxcn the Complainants were traveling to collide with the Defendant s vehicle thereby causing the deaths of the Complainants and further.
That on or about November 23, 2978, Paul Tawater, while acting.as an agent in behalf of the Defendant and within the scope^of bis office and employment, failed to remove the Defendant's vehicle from the paved and main-traveled part of a highway when a duty to act in accordance with the law existed and it was possible to so remove the vehicle anc unat such failure constituted criminal negligence which caused the vehicle ^ in which the Complainants were traveling to collide with the Defer.car.t s vehicle thereby causing the deaths of the Complainants.
AGAINST THE PEACE AND DIGNITY OF THE STATE.
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. Given the context in which I use the phrase “public welfare offenses”, it should be obvious that Judge Clinton, see his concurring opinion, has totally misunderstood the point I attempt to make at this time.
. 1 find that it is rather interesting that the issue of whether a corporation is in fact "a person” may become an issue in the hearings regarding the confirmation of Judge Bork. For an interesting article on this point, see Mintz, “Judge Bork: Trapped by ‘Personhood’? Senate could make it tough for him”, The National Law Journal, August 31, 1987. Mintz has done an admirable job in giving the reader a short history why a corporation is a “person” protected by the 14th Amendment to the federal constitution, and, for this, if no other reason, I highly recommend it to the reader.