*603OPINION
RICKHOFF, Justice.John Wesley Amunson, appellant, was tried and found guilty of the offense of murder. Punishment was assessed at life in prison. Amunson now appeals the conviction raising six points of error. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for a new trial.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
In his first point of error, Amunson alleges the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. When considering a sufficiency of the evidence allegation, this court must review all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine if any rational trier of fact could have found all of the essential elements of the offense proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). The standard of review is the same in both direct and circumstantial cases. The evidence must be such that a rational trier of fact could have found sufficient evidence of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Kapuscinski v. State, 878 S.W.2d 248, 249 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1994, pet. ref'd).
Although the reviewing court looks at all the evidence, only evidence supporting the verdict is ultimately considered. Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 132 n. 10 (Tex.Crim. App.1996). The purpose for reviewing all of the evidence is to determine what evidence supports the verdict. Id. A reviewing court must ultimately disregard evidence that does not support the verdict. Id.1
When reviewing the evidence, the appellate court is not jury number two. See Moreno v. State, 755 S.W.2d 866, 867 (Tex.Crim.App.1988). The jury as the trier of fact is the exclusive judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight given to the evi dence. See Sharp v. State, 707 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex.Crim.App.1986), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 872, 109 S.Ct. 190, 102 L.Ed.2d 159 (1988). The jurors are also entitled “to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Dumas v. State, 812 S.W.2d 611, 615 (Tex.App.— Dallas 1991, pet. ref'd); see also Kapuscinski 878 S.W.2d at 249. When faced with conflicting inferences, the court must presume “ — even if it does not *604affirmatively appear in the record — that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.” Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d at 133 n. 13 (Tex.Crim.App.1996).
This case involves the murder of an eleven-year old boy on November 11, 1992. The testimony reveals that the victim’s father picked up Amunson, who was hitchhiking, and brought him to their home on November 10th. Amunson told the victim’s father he was on the run from the law.
On the evening of the murder, Amunson made dinner at the house using a knife. Amunson also testified that he examined an antique wheelchair in the victim’s house. The victim was left alone with Amunson when the father went to work at his evening job. When the victim’s body was discovered, it was found that the child’s head was bashed in and a large knife was buried in his back up to the hilt.
The victim’s father testified that the knife found in the boy’s back was one from his kitchen. A board which was broken in two was found lying near the victim with what appeared to be blood on it. There was testimony that the wood had been the backrest of the antique wheelchair in the victim’s home. The medical testimony revealed that the victim had received several blows to the head which could only have been caused by the victim having been struck with a blunt object.
Amunson took the stand in his own defense and testified that he played Monopoly with the child and then left the house. The medical examiner’s office received the victim’s body at approximately 11:40 p.m. The medical examiner testified that the child had been dead for at least thirty minutes, but maybe up to five hours. Amunson claimed to have left the victim’s home at approximately 6:30 p.m. The child’s body was found at 10:30 p.m. by his father, and an officer arrived at the scene shortly thereafter. There was testimony that the father had worked until 10:00 p.m. at Roger Stokes ballpark.
Amunson admitted to having stolen a YCR and a Nintendo from the victim’s home. Anthony Lehman testified that he met Amunson downtown at approximately 10:00 p.m. on November 11,1992. He recalled that Amun-son had told him that he had a VCR to sell and that he needed the money. Lehman’s son-in-law purchased the VCR for $30.00. Lehman testified that Amunson also had a Nintendo to sell.
Amunson left Texas immediately after the murder. He hitchhiked to Florida where he began using the name John Allen Smith. He stated he was on the run for a parole violation and that was why he changed his name. Flight, though not dispositive, can be considered by the trier of fact as an indication of guilt. See Alba v. State, 905 S.W.2d 581, 586 (Tex.Crim.App.1995); Livingston v. State, 739 S.W.2d 311, 330 (Tex. Crim.App.1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1210, 108 S.Ct. 2858, 101 L.Ed.2d 895 (1988); McWherter v. State, 607 S.W.2d 531, 535 (Tex.Crim.App.1980).
In summary, the circumstances indicating Amunson’s guilt include the following facts: Amunson was left alone with the victim on the night of the murder; the victim was last seen alive with Amunson; Amunson admitted to being left alone with the victim on the night of the murder; Amunson stole a VCR and Nintendo from the victim’s home on the night of the murder; Amunson was familiar with the kitchen and the knives kept there; Amunson was aware of the antique wheelchair at the victim’s home; Amunson fled the state immediately after the murder. We hold that the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, supports the jury’s finding that Amunson was guilty of murder beyond a reasonable doubt. We overrule the first point of error.
The Victim’s School Records
In his second point of error, Amunson argues that the trial court erred in refusing to admit the victim’s school records into evidence. At trial, Amunson sought to introduce the victim’s school records into evidence through the custodian of those records. The trial court excluded the school records, stating the records have “really no relevance” and the probative value, if any, did not outweigh the prejudicial effect.
*605Amunson then narrated a bill of exceptions. The bill sets out that the decedent’s father had been reported to the Department of Human Services (“DHS”) for alleged child abuse. There were reports of bruises on the decedent’s arms. The victim stated the bruises were caused by his father.
Amunson argues that exclusion of this evidence was harmful error because it tended to discredit the father’s testimony regarding his relationship with his son. The state responds that the evidence is irrelevant because it does not relate to any of the elements of the charged offense.
Relevant evidence is that evidence which has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. TEX.R.CRIM. Evid. 401; Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 375 (Tex. Crim.App.1990). In order to be relevant, it is sufficient if the evidence “provides a small nudge toward proving or disproving some fact of consequence.” Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 376.
In this case, the defense raised a question as to whether the father, rather than Amunson, committed the offense. There was evidence that the father was the beneficiary of a life insurance policy on the victim, and Amunson testified that he believed the victim was afraid of his father. Specifically, Amunson stated he believed the father became irritated when the victim interrupted the father’s conversation with Amunson, and the victim cowered when the father moved toward him after the victim refused to go to his room. In the DHS report, the victim stated his father would get mad at him for talking back and would hit him a lot when he was mad. This would tend to support Amunson’s testimony regarding the victim showing fear when he refused to go to his room and his father approached him. Hence, the evidence would provide that “small nudge” toward proving or disproving some fact of consequence. Therefore, in the context of this ease, the school records containing the abuse allegations are relevant. However, this does not end our inquiry.
Amunson must show harm from the exclusion of this evidence. See Tex.RApp. P. 81(b)(2). Amunson’s defense is premised on the theory that someone else, possibly the father, was responsible for the murder. Amunson presented evidence that the father was investigated for the murder by a grand jury. During the trial, the father was questioned at length about his repeated invocation of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent before the grand jury. Amunson also was allowed to question the father about the life insurance policy he took out on the boy in 1981. Further, Shirley Schuster, a nurse who worked for a neighbor of the father, testified that the father told her the victim tied him down and that he wanted to get rid of him. Most importantly, she testified to the existence of bruises on the child which was the same evidence contained in the school records.
While the testimony of Shirley Schuster was helpful to the defense theory, there is little doubt such testimony would not be given the same weight as an official investigation of potential abuse by the father only months prior to the child’s death. Furthermore, the statements in the report as to the circumstances under which the father would hurt the child were consistent with Amun-son’s belief that the child feared being hit by the father for refusing to go to his room the night before his murder.
In a case like this, where there is only circumstantial evidence of Amunson’s guilt and a clear motive on the part of the father, we believe the jury is entitled to the benefit of every piece of relevant evidence. We cannot find beyond a reasonable doubt that the error in excluding the school reports made no contribution to the conviction in the instant case. Tex.R.App. P. 81(b)(2). We sustain appellant’s second point of error.
Improper Expert Testimony
In his third point of error, Amunson alleges that the trial court erred in allowing a Sheriff’s Deputy, Debbie P. Donáis, to testify as to the medical condition of the victim. Amunson complains that Donáis was not qualified to testify concerning the lividity *606(pooling of the blood causing discoloration) present in the deceased.
Officer Donáis testified that she was the first officer to arrive at the scene of the murder and described the following:
Q. Officer Donáis, I want you to describe what you saw when you came into the house.
A. I walked in, and the first thing I saw was kind of a little mound with a cover over it. And then the father went ahead and lifted the cover up. And there was a young man. He was on his knees, his head on the ground. And protruding from his back was the handle of what looked like a large knife.
Q. Could you see any injuries on the child?
A. Yes, ma’am.
Q. What did you see, other than the knife?
A. Other than the knife? There were — a large area at the back of the head that was bloodied. He had blood on his face. One eye was partially open. You know, he looked like prior to the incident, in that his back was real clean and his hair looked like it had been freshly washed. And the blood that was in his hair was sort of kind of matted and looked like it was beginning to dry up some.
Q. Did you notice whether or not there was an odor about the child?
A. No, ma’am, there was not.
Q. Did you notice anything about his feet?
A. Yes, ma’am.
Q. Could you tell the jury what you saw?
A. There was just a little bit of lividity in the base of his feet right around his toes.
Q. Could you tell us what lividity is?
(Defense Counsel): Your Honor, I have to object at this time. There are other witnesses that can testify to things such as lividity. I don’t think she has been qualified as an expert on lividity or any other postmortem.
The trial judge sustained this objection. The officer then testified that she had viewed other murder scenes and that she had seen other dead bodies. She also testified that she had received training in crime scene investigation and that she had been taught to look for certain things in dead bodies. The testimony continued in this vein:
Q. And in that, when they teach you to notice those kinds of things, what are some of the things they teach you to notice?
A. They teach you to notice lividity, rigor mortis, the condition of the body, of course, and, you know, some of it has to deal with time factors, as far as the time of death or possible length of time that the person may have been dead.
Q. Now, when we use rigor mortis or lividity, of course those have medical terms. But what is your understanding of what lividity is?
(Defense Counsel): Your Honor, I object to this line of questioning. This officer is not an expert in this field. This is a field of a pathologist in the Medical Examiners Office.
THE COURT: That’s overruled.
THE WITNESS: Okay. My understanding of it is that when a person dies, the blood that’s in the body will pool at the lowest point in the body by gravity. And that pooling causes kind of a bluish tint, almost like bruising.
The witness went on to state, over defense counsel’s objection, that rigor mortis had set in. The witness then explained the basis for her conclusion.
The testimony was admissible under both Tex.R.CRIM. Evid. 701 and 702. The witness testified to both her training and her experience in investigating murder scenes. Thus, her testimony is admissible under 701 because it is based on first hand knowledge. The testimony is also admissible under 702 because of her training and experience. Yohey v. State, 801 S.W.2d 232, 243 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1990, pet. ref'd). Further, the same testimony was given by John Hearn, an investigator with Bexar County Sheriffs Department, without objection. Even if the evidence had been inadmissible, any error in admitting it was rendered harmless because the same testimony was given by another witness without objection. *607Anderson v. State, 717 S.W.2d 622, 628 (Tex. Crim.App.1986). We overrule Amunson’s third point of error.
Hearsay
In his fourth point of error, Amunson alleges the trial court erred in allowing the hearsay testimony of a State’s witness. Specifically, Amunson complains about testimony from Officer Donáis that the father had told her that he had left the boy in another person’s care. The defense attorney objected to the testimony on the basis that it was hearsay. The trial judge overruled the objection because it was untimely.
The defendant must lodge a timely and specific objection in order to complain on appeal about the trial court’s admission of improper testimony. Tex.R.App. P. 52; Tex R.Crim. Evid. 103(a); Armstrong v. State, 718 S.W.2d 686, 699 (Tex.Crim.App.1985); Yohey, 801 S.W.2d at 245. An objection made after the objectionable testimony has been given is untimely, and any potential error is waived. Yohey, 801 S.W.2d at 245. Here, the objection was not made until after the complained-of testimony had been elicited. Nothing is presented for review. Durkovitz v. State, 771 S.W.2d 12, 15 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1989, no pet.). The fourth point of error is overruled.
Out-of-Court Statement
In his fifth point of error, Amunson alleges the trial court erred in allowing testimony in contravention of Article 38.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Amunson also complains of the lack of findings by the trial court on the issue of the voluntariness of the statement.
Amunson filed a written motion to suppress the statement he made to Lt. Bud Baker of the Bexar County Sheriffs Department in which he alleges that the statements made were “involuntary, coerced and/or enticed from the Defendant.” A hearing was held outside the presence of the jury regarding the oral statements made by the defendant. Lt. Baker testified that he went to Florida in December 1992 in order to execute an arrest warrant for Amunson in connection with the murder in this case. Lt. Baker testified that he met the defendant in an interview room in a Florida jail, at which time they read him his rights and explained to him that they were going to take him back to Texas.
The trip began the next morning. Lt. Baker informed the defendant of the reason for the return to Texas and asked the defendant if he would be willing to talk to them about the case. Amunson was not read his rights at this time. The officer testified that they were merely having a conversation and that he was not interrogating him. Amunson told him that on the evening in question he had cooked dinner and played Monopoly with the deceased, that the father had left for work and that he decided it was time to leave. He recalled that it was approximately 6:30 or 7:00 p.m. when he left the victim’s home and that he took a VCR when he left to sell because he needed the money. He later recalled also having taken a Nintendo game which he left under a bridge in a canvas bag. Amunson said that when he left the victim’s house the boy was alive; that he did not kill him. None of the conversation was reduced to writing, except in the officer’s reports.
Following this hearing the Court made these findings:
THE COURT: First of all, the Defendant knew he was under arrest. He was in custody. His rights were read to him on December 7th, 1992 at 9:00 p.m.
Number three, he never stated that he didn’t want to talk to the officers. Number four, he was never promised anything to get him to talk. Number five, there is no evidence the he was harassed or coerced or threatened in any maimer. He was not denied food or drink during the 18 hours on this trip back to Texas.
The Court finds that the statements were made freely, voluntarily without compulsion or persuasion. And finally, the statements are admissible.
Initially, we consider Amunson’s claim that the trial court erred in failing to make findings of fact in compliance with section 38.22, Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Where a trial court conducts a hearing *608pursuant to Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964), out of the jury’s presence, it is proper for the trial court to dictate its findings and conclusions to the court reporter at the end of the hearing. When those findings have been transcribed and made a part of the record without objection, there has been a sufficient compliance with Article 38.22. Parr v. State, 658 S.W.2d 620, 623 (Tex.Crim.App.1983). Accordingly, that portion of Amunson’s argument is overruled.
As to the admissibility of the oral statements, it is important to note that Amunson took the stand on his own behalf. His testimony at trial concerning his connection to the victim was exactly the same as the oral statement he gave to Lt. Baker. Therefore, we need not address the admissibility of the oral statement. An erroneous admission of the oral statement is rendered harmless when the defendant subsequently testifies to the same facts. Here Amunson gave the same facts elicited through Lt. Baker. There is no evidence that the defendant was forced to testify to overcome the impact of anything Lt. Baker said. When the defendant offers the same evidence to which he earlier objected, he is not in a position to complain on appeal. Jones v. State, 843 S.W.2d 487, 493 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1035, 113 S.Ct. 1858, 123 L.Ed.2d 479 (1993); Maynard v. State, 685 S.W.2d 60, 65 (Tex.Crim.App.1985). We overrule Amunson’s fifth point of error.
Witness Reports
In his sixth point of error, Amunson alleges that the trial court erred in failing to strike the testimony of two state’s witnesses in violation of Rule 614, Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence. Amunson complains that he requested the written reports of two officers testifying at trial on behalf of the state.
Officer Donáis stated that she had an opportunity to review her report before testifying. A copy of the report was tendered to Amunson’s attorney. However, he claimed that it was illegible. A second copy was located, but that copy was missing the second page. Officer Donáis stated that the copy that was difficult to read was the one she used to refresh her memory before testifying. Officer Donáis also testified that there was a computer generated copy that was tendered to defense counsel. The officer testified that the difference with a computer generated copy would be a few changes. Defense counsel was provided with the exact copy used by the officer to refresh her memory, a computer generated report with a few differences, and a more legible copy.
Rule 614 of the Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence requires the state to produce “any statement of the witness that is in their possession ...” In this case, there has been no showing that the state failed to produce any statements to defense counsel that was in their possession. Marquez v. State, 757 S.W.2d 101, 102-103 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1988, pet. ref'd).
Officer Stang also testified regarding the investigation of this homicide. He stated that he made a report in this case but was unable to find it. The record shows that there was no report to tender to counsel and thus Rule 614 was not violated. Amunson’s sixth point of error is overruled.
CONCLUSION
Because we sustained appellant’s second point of error, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case is remanded for a new trial.
. The dissent asserts that by reading footnote 10 “mechanistically," we have effectively reverted to a "no evidence" scope of review. The dissent's arguments expand on those raised by Presiding Judge McCormick in his dissenting opinion in Clewis. See Clewis, 922 S.W.2d at 155-56 & n. 7-8 (McCormick, J., dissenting). Although the dissent may disagree with the legal sufficiency scope of review as set forth in Clewis, we are unconvinced that our understanding of footnote 10 is merely “mechanistic.”
Judge Meyers in his concurring opinion in Clewis states that the specific complaint raised by the appellant was that “the Court of Appeals refused to weigh exculpatory evidence in the balance when evaluating the rationality of the jury’s verdict.” See Clewis, 922 S.W.2d at 149 (Meyers, J., concurring). Footnotes 10-13 of the majority opinion in Clewis, therefore, appear to us to be an effort to directly address this complaint by explaining the reasons the exculpatory evidence is not weighed under Jackson. Judge Meyers concludes:
This distinction between the contention that evidence is insufficient to prove a fact and the somewhat different contention that other evidence overwhelmingly disproves that fact is important in the present context because the kind of evidentiary review performed by appellate courts under the rubric established by the United States Supreme Court in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), plainly does not contemplate that a reviewing court consider the probative weight of exculpatory evidence when evaluating the sufficiency of the inculpatory evidence to sustain a criminal conviction.
Id.
The example cited by the majority in footnote 12 further clarifies that the scope of review used in this opinion is logical and consistent with the principles announced by the Court of Criminal Appeals:
The prosecution's sole witness, a paid informant, testifies that he saw the défendant commit a crime. Twenty nuns testify that the defendant was with them at the time, far from the scene of the crime. Twenty more nuns testify that they saw the informant commit the crime. If the defendant is convicted, he has no remedy under Jackson because the informant's testimony, however, incredible, is legally sufficient evidence.
Id. 922 S.W.2d at 133 n. 12.
Therefore, having applied the Jackson v. Virginia standard and scope of review as clarified and explained in Clewis, we find the evidence to be legally sufficient. Our reversal and remand is based on a separate point of error.