OPINION ON STATE’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
PRICE, Judge,delivered the opinion of the Court,
in which BAIRD, OVERSTREET, MEYERS and MANSFIELD, Judges, joined.Appellant was convicted of delivery of a controlled substance. Upon pleading “true” to two enhancement paragraphs, he was sentenced by the jury to 40 years imprisonment. On appeal, his fourth point of error alleged that the trial court committed reversible error when it failed to include a complete definition of “reasonable doubt” in the jury instruction in accordance with Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154 (Tex.Crim.App.1991).1 The Court of Appeals agreed and reversed the conviction, holding that under Reyes v. State, 938 S.W.2d 718 (Tex.Crim.App.1996), the trial judge’s omission of the required definitional jury instruction mandated automatic reversal without a harm analysis. Toney v. State, 942 S.W.2d 750, 751-752 (TexApp.— Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, pet. granted). We granted the State’s petition for discretionary review to determine whether the Fourteenth Court of Appeals erred in this holding.2
In Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. Crim.App.1991), this court abrogated the “reasonable hypothesis of innocence” analytical construct. Id. at 160-161. However, in doing so, we determined that such an abrogation required the adoption of an instruction on reasonable doubt. Id. at 161-162. We reasoned that the requirement of a definitional instruction was implicated by the Supreme Court decisions of Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 75 S.Ct. 127, 99 L.Ed. 150 (1954) and Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Geesa, 820 S.W.2d at 161. Therefore, we set out the following instruction:
All persons are presumed to be innocent and no person may be convicted of an offense unless each element of the offense is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The fact that a person has been arrested, confined, or indicted for, or otherwise charged with, the offense gives rise to no inference of guilt at his trial. The law does not require a defendant to prove his innocence or produce any evidence at all. The presumption of innocence alone is sufficient to acquit the defendant, unless the jurors are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt after careful and impartial consideration of all the evidence in the case.
The prosecution has the burden of proving the defendant guilty and it must do so by proving each and every element of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt and if it fails to do so, you must acquit the defendant.
It is not required that the prosecution prove guilt beyond all possible doubt; it is required that the prosecution’s proof excludes all “reasonable doubt” concerning the defendant’s guilt.
A “reasonable doubt” is a doubt based on reason and common sense after a careful and impartial consideration of all the evidence in the case. It is the kind of doubt that would make a reasonable person hesitate to act in the most important of his own affairs.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt, therefore, must be proof of such a convincing *644character that you would be willing to rely and act upon it without hesitation in the most important of your own affairs.
In the event you have a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt after considering all the evidence before you, and these instructions, you will acquit him and say by your verdict “Not guilty”.
Id. at 162. We ultimately held that this instruction should be submitted to juries in all criminal cases, regardless of whether a request or an objection is made by either party, or whether the evidence is circumstantial or direct. Id.
Consequently, when the trial judge in Reyes v. State, 938 S.W.2d 718 (Tex.Crim. App.1996) totally omitted the reasonable doubt instruction from the charge at the guilt/innocenee phase of trial, we held that the reasonable doubt instruction set out in Geesa created an absolute systemic requirement that could be neither waived nor forfeited. Id. at 720-721. We further held that such a requirement was not subject to a harm analysis under Rule 81(b)(2). Id. at 721.
Nonetheless, only a year later in Cain v. State, 947 S.W.2d 262 (Tex.Crim.App.1997), the subject of a meaningful harm analysis arose within the context of a trial court’s failure to admonish a defendant concerning the deportation consequences of a plea in accordance with Tex.Code CRIM. PROC. Ann. art. 26.13(a)(4) (Vernon 1989). Id. at 263. There we broadly held that:
Except for certain federal constitutional errors labeled by the United States Supreme Court as “structural,” no error, whether it relates to jurisdiction, voluntariness of a plea, or any other mandatory requirement, is categorically immune to a harmless error analysis. Of course, where the error involved defies analysis by harmless error standards or the data is insufficient to conduct a meaningful harmless error analysis, then the error will not be proven harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under Rule 81(b)(2). Hence, it may be true that some kinds of errors (particularly jurisdictional ones) whll never be harmless under the Rule 81(b)(2) test and that some other kinds of errors will rarely be harmless. But, appellate courts should not automatically foreclose the application of the harmless error test to certain categories of error. Where an error is shown to be harmless, it is not a ground for reversal, regardless of the category or label attached to that particular error.
Id. at 264 (footnote omitted). Although Cain did not deal with a reasonable doubt instruction and did not cite to Reyes, its broad language concerning harmless error analysis appeared to at least somewhat limit Reyes. The limitation appeared to be at most indirect, as Cain focused on the harm analysis under Tex.R.App. P. 81, whereas error in a jury charge is usually analyzed under Tex. Code Crim. ProC. ANN. art. 36.19 (Vernon 1981).
These limitations were borne out recently in our plurality opinion of Mann v. State, 964 S.W.2d 639 (Tex.Crim.App.1998). In Mann, the jury was properly instructed on reasonable doubt and the burden of proof in eight different places throughout the charge, but in one paragraph of the charge, the jurors were erroneously instructed, through the unintended omission of the terms “do not,” that they could find the defendant guilty even if they had a reasonable doubt as to one element of the offense. Id. at 641 (plurality opinion). There, we distinguished Reyes, since that case involved a total omission of the instruction on reasonable doubt, and was thus incapable of harm analysis. Id. at 641-642 (plurality opinion). Yet in Mann, since the jury was properly instructed on reasonable doubt and on the burden of proof throughout the charge, except in one paragraph, we held that the error was to be analyzed under the standards set forth in Abdnor v. State, 871 S.W.2d 726 (Tex.Crim. App.1994), Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex.Crim.App.1984), and Tex.Code Crim. Proc. 36.19. Mann, 964 S.W.2d at 642 (plurality opinion).
Harmonizing Geesa, Reyes, Cain and Mann then, if there is a total omission of the instruction on reasonable doubt, such error defies meaningful analysis by harmless error standards. However, if the jury is given a partial or substantially correct charge on reasonable doubt, then any error *645therein is subject to a harm analysis under Abdnor, Almanza, and Tex.Code Crim. Proc. art. 36.19. In the present case, appellant received the following first three paragraphs of the Geesa instruction:
All persons are presumed to be innocent and no person may be convicted of an offense unless each element of the offense is proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The fact that a person has been arrested, confined, or indicted for, or otherwise charged with, the offense gives rise to no inference of guilt at his trial. The law does not require a defendant to prove his innocence or produce any evidence at all. The presumption of innocence alone is sufficient to acquit the defendant, unless the jurors are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt after careful and impartial consideration of all the evidence in the ease.
The prosecution has the burden of proving the defendant guilty and it must do so by proving each and every element of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt and if it fails to do so, you must acquit the defendant.
It is not required that the prosecution prove guilt beyond all possible doubt; it is required that the prosecution’s proof excludes all reasonable doubt concerning the defendant’s guilt.
Here, as in Mann, appellant failed to object to the partial instruction given. Therefore, we hold that appellant must show that he suffered “egregious harm” as a result of this error. See Mann, 964 S.W.2d at 641-642 (plurality opinion). Because the Court of Appeals did not have the benefit of this decision on its first hearing, we vacate the judgment of the court of appeals and remand this cause to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. If the Court of Appeals determines that appellant has not suffered “egregious harm”, it should then address the remaining points of error originally brought before it by appellant.
MANSFIELD, J., files a concurring opinion.
KELLER, J., files an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which McCORMICK, P.J., and HOLLAND, J., join. WOMACK, J., files a concurring opinion in which McCORMICK, P.J., and KELLER and HOLLAND, JJ., join.. Appellant raised three other points of error in the Court of appeals but these were dismissed as moot due to the disposition of point of error four, which was sustained.
. The precise ground for review we granted is as follows: The Fourteenth Court of Appeals erred in holding that it was automatic reversible error for the trial court to fail to instruct the jury in accordance with the judicially mandated definitional instruction on the term "reasonable doubt,” without regard to whether an objection was made by the appellant, and without regard to whether the direct evidence established the appellant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.