concurring.
Nearly all Missouri venue statutes can be readily understood by reading the language of the statutes themselves. By contrast, as this case demonstrates, venue provisions relating to corporations require an understanding of the statutory language, the Missouri business corporations statute, and decisions of this Court. The principal opinion does an excellent job of navigating the twisted currents of prior cases, but I would revisit this Court’s prior interpretations of corporate “residence” for venue purposes to simplify the subject.
Venue in Missouri is statutory, and venue statutes have been with us since the earliest days of the Louisiana territory. See, e.g., Laws of the Territory of Louisiana 1807, ch. 38. The venue provisions at issue in this case are among some 53 statutory sections specifying venue in particular situations.1 The provisions of the general venue statute, section 508.010,2 the section relating to corporations, section 508.040, and the “residence” provision of the Missouri business corporation law, section 351.375, can be read together to be consistent and readily understandable.
The general venue statute, section 508.010, provides in pertinent part:
Suits instituted by summons shall, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought:
(1) When the defendant is a resident of the state, either in the county within which the defendant resides, or in the county within which the plaintiff resides, and the defendant may be found;
(2) When there are several defendants, and they reside in different counties, the suit may be brought in any such county;
(3) When there are several defendants, some residents and others nonresidents of the state, suit may be brought in any county in this state in which any defendant resides;
(4) When all the defendants are nonresidents of the state, suit may be brought in any county in this state;
The venue provision relating to corporations, section 508.040, provides in pertinent part:
Suits against corporations shall be commenced either in the county where the cause of action accrued, ... or in any county where such corporations shall have or usually keep an office or agent for the transaction of their usual and customary business.
The business corporation statute provides in pertinent part, in section 351.375.3:
“The location or residence of any corporation shall be deemed for all purposes to be in the county where its registered office is maintained.”3
The basic problem is that section 508.040 does not use the word “residence,” “resident” or “reside.” However, in 1939, this Court in State ex rel. Henning v. Williams, 345 Mo. *19522, 131 S.W.2d 561, 563-64 (Mo. banc 1939), overruled on other grounds in State ex rel. Webb v. Satz, 561 S.W.2d 113, 115 (Mo. banc 1978), construed the predecessors to sections 508.010 and 508.040 and read the latter provision to refer to “residence” of the corporation for venue purposes. The general venue statute, section 508.010, provides that venue is proper, generally speaking, in the county where a defendant resides, and a corporation resides in a county whei'e it has an office or agent for transaction of “usual and customary business.” Henning, supra.
Thus, in 1943, when the legislature adopted the predecessor to section 351.375, as a part of the general and business corporation statute, the residence of a corporation was already established by statute for venue purposes by this Court’s interpretation of section 508.040.
As noted, the 1943 business corporation statute amendment, which continues to this day, declares that the residence of a business corporation “shall be deemed for all purposes to be in the county where its registered office is maintained.” Section 351.375.3 (Emphasis added.)
Starting with State ex rel. O’Keefe v. Brown, 361 Mo. 618, 235 S.W.2d 304, 306 (Mo. banc 1951), this Court changed the application and meaning of the predecessor to section 508.040 by applying the provision only to cases where corporations are the only defendants. Where a corporation is joined as a defendant with a non-corporate defendant, then the corporate defendant’s residence is governed by the business corporation statute, section 351.375, which provides that the corporation’s “residence” is in the county where its registered office is maintained. See, also, Dick Proctor Imports v. Gaertner, 671 S.W.2d 273, 274-275 (Mo. banc 1984); State ex rel Bowden v. Jensen, 359 S.W.2d 343, 351 (Mo. banc 1962); and State ex rel. Whiteman v. James, 364 Mo. 589, 265 S.W.2d 298, 300 (Mo. banc 1954).
Under current interpretation, the residence in the county where the registered office is maintained applies only if the eorpo-ration is joined as a defendant with non-corporate defendants. This interpretation creates an incentive for a plaintiff to join an individual defendant, in addition to the corporate defendant, where the plaintiff wishes to obtain venue in the county where the registered office is located.
This interpretation produces an anomalous statutory interpretation. If section 351.375 is understood to designate the exclusive residence for venue purposes, then our previous attempts to reconcile the two statutes do not obey the command of the business corporation statute that the residence of a corporation “for all purposes” is to be the county where its registered office is maintained. For venue purposes when the corporation is the sole defendant in a lawsuit, its “residence” is a county where it has an office for the conduct of its usual business, in accordance with section 508.040, and this would conflict with the “all purposes” language of section 351.375.
When we construe sections 508.010 and 508.040, in pari materia, as the Henning case teaches, it is clear that a corporation for venue purposes may have more than one residence; in fact, its residences are those counties where it has offices for the transaction of its usual business. Rather than to hold that the 1943 business corporation statute somehow amended the venue statute, as the O’Keefe, Dick Proctor Imports, Bowden, and Whiteman cases indicate, it would be far better to construe the statutes as being consistent with one another.
Where a corporation is statutorily a resident “for all purposes” of a county where it maintains its registered office, the statute does not make that county the exclusive residence of a corporation. The statute, consistent with the venue statute, simply creates another venue choice— not the exclusive venue residence. A corporation may maintain its offices for the conduct of its business in places other than the county where it maintains its registered office. In fact, the registered office of many corporations is a law firm, accounting firm, or business service firm that provides the corporation the service of maintaining the registered office. This place is often unrelated to the corporation’s office or offices where the corporation conducts its usual and customary business, *196which is the venue statute’s choice as an appropriate place for trial.
Thus, the most logical way to reconcile the venue statutes and the business corporation statute is to hold that a business corporation for venue purposes is a resident of a county where it maintains an office for the transaction of its usual business (section 508.040) and a resident of a county where it maintains its registered office (section 351.375).4 To interpret sections 508.040 and 351.375 as each defining residence for venue purposes not only is logical, but eliminates the strategic choice of joining an individual defendant for venue purposes where, ordinarily, a plaintiff would not otherwise be inclined to do so. This also obviates the insurance company’s argument that it is, in this instance, treated in a disparate fashion: Whether the defendant is a business corporation organized under chapter 351 or an insurance company operating under chapter 379, the fact that it maintains an office in Jackson County would make it a resident there for venue purposes.
Because the principal opinion resolves the issue on the difference between the insurance corporation and business corporation statutes, the Court does not now need to reexamine the question of determining corporate residence under section 508.010. This question is appropriate for a case involving a business corporation where the issue is squarely presented. However, I would reach the issue in this case and hold that Shelter Insurance is properly a resident of Jackson County, as any corporation would be, when it maintains an office there for the transaction of its “usual and customary business.” Since venue of this action is proper in Jackson County, I concur in the Court’s decision.
. In addition to the seven sections of chapter 508, RSMo, there are 46 special statutes cited in Vernon's Annotated Missouri Statutes annotations to Rule 51.01.
. All references are to RSMo 1994 unless otherwise indicated.
.This sentence is one of many in section 351.375, the title to which section is, “Change of address of registered office or agent, how made.” The entire section is devoted to how a corporation may change the address of its registered office.
. As Judge Hyde argued in dissent in State ex rel. Whiteman v. James, supra, 265 S.W.2d at 301, section 351.375 "only adds another office (the registered office)” to those where venue is proper under section 508.040. Accord, State ex rel. Bowden v. Jensen, supra, 359 S.W.2d. at 351 (Storck-man, J., dissenting).