dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because it was not reversible error for the trial court to permit the officers to testify regarding the reports by the victim of alleged abuse, and it was not reversible error at the time of this trial to allow the police officer to testify about the steps he proceeded to take in regard to the complaint.
It was not reversible error when the trial court allowed the officers to testify regarding the reports by the victim of alleged abuse. The defense had clearly placed the credibility in issue and the testimony of the officers was proper rebuttal.
At trial, the victim, a retarded man, was subject to serious attack as to his credibility. The trial judge and the Commonwealth Attorney recognized that fact and the trial judge permitted the testimony of the officers because the credibility of the victim as a witness had been challenged. The trial judge admonished the jury in that respect. A similar situation was recognized in Lowery v. Commonwealth, Ky., 566 S.W.2d 750 (1978) and Summitt v. Commonwealth, Ky., 550 S.W.2d 548 (1977) as to credibility, cf. Federal Rule 801(d)(1)(B) and as to prior statements by a witness in Preston v. Commonwealth, Ky., 406 S.W.2d 398 (1966) and Alexander v. Commonwealth, Ky., 463 S.W.2d 334 (1971).
It was also not reversible error for the trial judge to admit the testimony of the officer to explain the reasoning he used as to what steps he proceeded to take in regard to the complaint. Initially, it must be observed that the argument of Bussey is not properly preserved for appellate review. My examination of the record does not indicate that there was any objection to the specific statement now complained of. If Bussey had objected to the particular answer, the trial court could have admon*487ished the jury at the time. Bussey did not object and did not request an admonition. Therefore, the issue is not properly preserved for appellate review. RCr 9.22.
Even if you accept the view of the majority in this particular situation, the claim of error was totally harmless and nonprejudicial. An examination of the record indicates that the trial court carefully considered the defendant’s earlier objections and ruled that the witness could not testify as to the conclusions relating to innocence or guilt. The statement by the police officer may have been unfortunate, but it was simply given as a preface as to why the officer proceeded to pursue the charge as he did. This case was tried in 1987 and at that time an officer could testify as he did about a complaint insofar as it related to the investigation be later conducted. Manz v. Commonwealth, Ky., 257 S.W.2d 581 (1953); See Stallard v. Commonwealth, Ky., 432 S.W.2d 401 (1968). In 1988, a majority of this Court in Sanborn v. Commonwealth, Ky., 754 S.W.2d 534 (1988) concluded that an officer could testify about information furnished to him only when it explained the action that was taken and that the action was at issue in the case. If there is a newly promulgated nuance to the case law, the police officer in 1986 and the trial judge in 1987 had no possible insight as to why the court would extend the rule as it did in 1988. In any event, it is clear that in this particular situation where the credibility of a sole prosecuting witness is under severe challenge, the candid and spontaneous explanation by the police officer as to why he took the actions he did should be welcomed by this Court rather than rejected.
Considering the entire case as a whole, there is no substantial possibility that the result would be any different and the alleged errors are totally harmless. The outcome of this case will not be any different upon an ultimate retrial. Abernathy v. Commonwealth, Ky., 439 S.W.2d 949 (1969).
Even in the retrospect of 1989, the decision of the Court of Appeals was correct and I would affirm it as well as affirm the judgment of the jury and trial court.