dissenting.
I agree with the holding by the Second Court of Appeals, see its cause of Duckett v. State, numbered 2-86-217-CR, and opinion in that cause dated February 17, 1988, that the expert testimony that was given in this cause is the equivalent of a witness passing judgment on the truthfulness of the complaining witness. Because the majority opinion is in conflict with this holding, I respectfully dissent.
In Hopkins, 480 S.W.2d 212 (Tex.Cr.App.1972), henceforth Hopkins, this Court stated the following: “Our principle fear is that the admission of psychiatric testimony will often cause the trial to become not only a trial of the defendant, but also a trial of the witness.” I find that the majority opinion aggravates that concern.
In Hopkins, this Court refused to allow expert psychiatric testimony to be used in determining the credibility of a witness. There being no conflict between Hopkins, and subsequently enacted Tex.R.Crim. Evid., Rule 702,1 I see no reason to depart from the established rule laid down in Hopkins and begin down a road that will allow any “snake oil salesman” disguised as an “expert” witness to peddle his wares in the trial courts of this State, which is what I believe the majority opinion approves of doing. However, see and compare what I stated in the dissenting opinion that I filed in Werner v. State, 711 S.W.2d 639 (Tex.Cr.App.1986). Also see the reasons I gave why I joined the majority opinion of Fielder v. State, 756 S.W.2d 309 (Tex.Cr.App.1988).
The issue before us concerns the testimony of John Brogden, an investigator and social worker employed by the Texas Department of Human Services. Brogden is not a psychiatrist or psychologist. Nevertheless, even though a mere social worker, Brogden professed to being knowledgeable enough to be an “expert” in a topic which is not without controversy among health care professionals. See Note, “The Unreliability of Expert Testimony on the Typical Characteristics of Sexual Abuse Victims,” 74 The Georgetown Law Journal 429, (1985).2
The facts of this cause show that there were no independent eye witnesses to the sexual abuse allegedly inflicted upon the complainant by appellant. A Dr. Robert Casanova testified that the complainant showed no physical signs of sexual abuse.
Thus, Brogden’s testimony was crucial to the State’s case. I believe that to fully understand the harmfulness of Brogden’s testimony, excerpts of his testimony should be highlighted. Brogden’s testimony was loosely divided into three phases.
In the first phase, Brogden testified in general terms about something he labeled as “elements” typically found in child sexual abuse cases. He identified six elements: (1) Access and opportunity: “Where the defendant has the literal abilty to be alone with the child”; (2) Sexual engagement: “Where multiple events of a sexual nature occur”; (3) Conditioning aspects: “Where the offender literally conditions the child to accept the sexual overtures and advances”; (4) Repression: “Forgetting or becoming aggaravated with their dilemma”; (5) Disclosure: “Where the child accidently or purposely discloses the abuse to an adult”; and (6) Suppression-repression: “Where the offender tries to suppress the child’s statement, repression being a psychological defense against upsetting information to the child, where the events are often altered or forgotten.”
*922This Court’s majority opinion accepts the broad assertion that Brogden testified to “Child Sexual Abuse Syndrome.” However, nowhere in Brogden’s testimony does he make any reference to this so-called syndrome. The majority opinion further misleads the reader when it refers to Dr. Roland Summit’s article describing what he characterizes as “Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome.”3 However, in this cause “Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome” was never mentioned by anyone in the trial testimony. Upon close inspection, one can see that there is a large difference between Dr. Summit’s characteristics and Brogden’s elements. After testifying in general terms to these “elements,” Brog-den then continued into the second phase.
In the second phase, Brogden tied his “elements” to the facts of this cause by going through each element and telling the jury he, not surprisingly, saw signs of each element in the complainant’s testimony.4
The record reflects the following which occurred during the State’s case-in-chief and over appellant’s objection:
Q. (Prosecutor): Do you find any of these elements present in this case?
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A. (Brogden): Yes, I find every element present in this case.
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Q. Do sometimes children indirectly-report child abuse?
A. Yes, typically
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Q. Okay, and sometimes do they try to report or to attempt to report sexual abuse through complaining of physical ailments that do not in fact exist?
A. Yes, specially tied to the genitalia.
There is testimony in the record that reflects that the complaining witness’ first complaints were of vaginal itching and not sexual abuse. The record also reflects the following:
Q. (Prosecutor): And have you seen some manifestation of that in this case?
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A. (Brogden): Yes, I have seen that in this case.
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Q. Do you find evidence of access and opportunity in this case?
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A. Yes.
Q. Would you please tell the jury what evidence of that you find in this case?
A. The offender being alone in the home with the child at a time when the mother was away at the hospital; the child was alone in the bathroom and the offender came into the bathroom.
(Objection by defense counsel: “Your Honor, were going to object to this. *923He’s assuming these facts are true. Is — and making — making a statement as to the credibility of whether they are true or not true, we haven’t even had a chance to rebut these whatsoever.”
The Court: I’ll overrule the objection.)
The above is just one example where Brogden in effect testified to the truthfulness of the complainant’s allegations.
I believe that it is important to keep in mind two significant facts:
(1) Brogden, the State’s “expert” witness, was exempt from “the rule”; consequently, he was allowed to listen to the complainant’s testimony, who testified immediately before he did.
(2) On cross examination, appellant was able to elicit inconsistencies in the complainant’s testimony, but what remained consistent is the identity of appellant and the location where the alleged incident took place.
Another example of a direct comment by Brogden on the truthfulness of the complainant is shown by the following excerpt from the record.
Q. (Prosecutor): Now in the case of a young child ... of four years old and who is giving the story of what may have occured during a sexual assault over the course of two years and is consistent on the ... identity of the offender and the sex acts that occured, are they generally pretty consistent about that?
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A. (Brogden): Young children with time lapses of two to three years, post-investigations, typically have some lapses in memories. Typically, they repress certain portions of the sexual abuse and the story isn’t exactly the same as it was but the major portions of the story are the same, the major portions being the identity of the offender, location of the crime, and the major traumatic imprint behavior being those things that seem to bother them. Other things that seem to bother them that are too confusing are repressed and treatment is necessary.
Brogden then continued this type of testimony running through each of the elements and stating how each was represented by the evidence in this case.
Q. (Prosecutor): Did you find some indication of that [sexual engagement] in this case?
A. (Brogden): Yes.
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Q. And what would that be?
A. Specifically intriguing in this particular case is what you find with many young children is what is typically called dry intercourse where the offender is not, in fact, attempting penetration; the offender is basically trying to masturbate by rubbing himself upon the child’s genitalia....
The majority opinion has justified allowing a jury to hear the above type of “expert” testimony, not as substantive proof that the offense occured, but to rehabilitate the impeached child complainant. I must ask: Given the record, what possible rehabilitative function could the above “expert” testimony serve?
Testimony of a young child witness is easily and often impeached because of a young child’s tendencies to give inconsistent statements. See Myers, supra. Based upon the appellant’s cross-examination of the complainant, which produced no unusual inconsistencies, the majority opinion states: “It is fairly clear that most courts do not approve expert testimony describing behavioral characteristics observed in sexually abused children as substantive evidence of abuse.” However, it is common knowledge that anytime that you have a young child witness simple cross-examination will disclose some inconsistencies in the child’s testimony. This leaves the defendant the dubious decision of either not *924cross examining the child witness or cross examining the child witness, thereby allowing the State to pull its “expert” out of the hat to testify that each inconsistency the child gave is typical of a sexually abused child. The majority opinion concludes: “The defense having effectively impeached the complainant’s credibility as a witness, the state was allowed, if otherwise admissible, to solicit the expert information and opinion of Brogden to help the jury understand why S— S— changed her testimony or appeared confused.” (Emphasis supplied.) Brogden’s testimony, however, did nothing to help the jury understand the complainant’s testimony. Rather, its effect was twofold; (1), to assert that the complainant testified truthfully and (2), its use as substantive evidence that the act oc-cured. The rehabilitating facts must meet a particular method of impeachment with relative directness. The wall, attacked at one point, may not be fortified at another and distinct point. See C. McCormick, McCormick on Evidence, at 103 (2nd. Ed. 1972).
In Hall v. Arkansas, 15 Ark.App. 309, 692 S.W.2d 769 (1985), the Arkansas Supreme Court found that an expert’s testimony on the dynamics of child sexual abuse was prejudicial enough to justify reversal of the defendant’s conviction. In Hall, the defendant allegedly sexually abused three young children while baby-sitting them. A psychologist with training in dealing with sexually abused children testified to typical reactions in sexually abused children. The “expert” testified that most child abusers are known to the family and the abuser warns their victims not to tell anyone what had happened to them. The “expert” also testified that children lack the vocabulary to discuss what happened. The court pointed out that much of the “expert’s” testimony was tailored to fit the facts of that particular case. The court also found that some of the “expert’s” testimony could be of help to a jury, i.e., the difficulty children have in putting their experience into words. Nevertheless, the court concluded that “this type of evidence was not of proper benefit to the jury in this case,” and that it was “distractfull[sic] and prejudicial.” (Emphasis supplied.) The court also stated that it was troubled by the fact that the “expert” testimony was not introduced in order to rebut “misconceptions about the presumed behavior of the victim but to prove ... that the circumstances and details in this case match the circumstances and details usually found in child abuse cases.” I find that the “expert” testimony in this cause has the same effect; Brogden’s testimony did nothing to help the jury understand the statements of the complainant, nor was it really offered to do so.
The third phase of Brogden’s testimony consisted of the State going through each inconsistency in the complainant’s testimony.5 I find that there is something fundamentally strange about saying that since the story is inconsistent, it must be true.
The record in this cause reflects the following:
Q. (Prosecutor): Would some of that repression be differences between what you observed on the tape and what you observed [the child] testify [to] ...
A. (Brogden): Yes.
Q. ... to here in court.
A. Yes. Be those major differences.
Q. Okay. Do you find any of those differences in light of what you observed to be not usualftypical] for a child sexual abuse victim?
A. No,_typical
Q. They were typical?
A. Yes.
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Q. Okay. Do you recall Mr. Eakman asking the question of S— S— as to *925whether or not on the tape she said [she was sexually abused] six or seven times?
A. Yes.
The record also reflects that the complainant testified in court that the sexual abuse occured only once.
Q. (Prosecutor): Is that consistent with the repression that you described earlier?
A. (Brogden): Yes, it is.
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Q. Okay. Do you recall Mr. Eakman asking S— S— the question whether anything came out cf the defendant’s penis?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay, and you recall S— S— answered that question, she did not recall anything coming out of his penis?
A. Yes.
Q. That’s inconsistent with what she said about ejaculation on the tape?
A. Right. It is different than what she said on the tape.
Q. Okay. Do you find the [above] inconsistency to be typical of repression?
A. Certainly. Typical of repression, yes.
It is obvious to me that Brogden is simply testifying that all the inconsistencies in the child’s story are typical of a sexually abused child, as he personally perceives such.
Part of appellant’s defense was that he did not sexually abuse the child; rather, according to appellant it was another relative, a female, who sexually abused the child. Brogden testified that “males typically represent 95 to 98 percent” of the child sexual offenders. This in effect is the equivalent of having an expert testify that the defendant’s theory had a 98% chance of being false.
The El Paso Court of Appeals interpreted Rule 702, see fn. 2, ante, in Garcia v. State, 712 S.W.2d 249 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1986, P.D.R. Refused). There the State introduced evidence in the form of testimony of a psychologist to the effect that the complaining witnesses were telling the truth. The court of appeals found that the determination of the credibility of a witness is the sole responsibility of the trier of fact and that the attacks on credibility are best made by rigorous cross-examination. The court gave its interpretation of Criminal Rule 702 as follows: “We do not believe the purpose behind this rule is to permit ‘expert’ opinion on who is telling the truth and who is not.” I agree.
In a long line of opinions from various courts of appeals of this state, the rule laid down in Hopkins, prohibiting expert testimony that directly or indirectly expresses an opinion on the credibility of a witness, has been consistently applied. See, for example, Dunnington v. State, 740 S.W.2d 899 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1987, P.D.R. Refused), henceforth Dunnington, where that court held that the probative value of rebuttal testimony of a purported expert in the field of child sexual abuse was outweighed by its potential for prejudice in invading the province of jury. Also see Tex.R.Crim.Evid., Rule 403.6 In Dunning-ton, the expert testified to the conditioning process to which offenders subject their child victims and reasons for “spousal denial”. The court stated:
“All the aforementioned explanations may be perfectly true. They may have been focused upon by experts in their research. Some effort may have been made to quantify ... these factors. Certainly they have titles such as ‘spousal denial’ and conditioning process. None of this, however, converts the commonplace into the extraordinary. Expert testimony is not justified by the expert’s need to publish his work or the prosecu*926tor’s need to preclude the jury from making up its own mind. It is justified when it enhances the jury fact-finding process instead of abrogating it.”
See also Thomas v. State, 748 S.W.2d 539 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st] 1988); Burke v. State, 642 S.W.2d 197 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th] 1982); Welch v. State, 677 S.W.2d 562 (Tex.App.-Eastland 1984); and Kirkpatrick v. State, 747 S.W.2d 833 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1987).
In Farris v. State, 643 S.W.2d 694, 697 (Tex.Cr.App.1982), this court held that it was reversible error to allow a psychiatrist to testify that a six year old was incapable of fantasizing about the sado-masochistic acts the defendants, who were accused of committing child sexual abuse, allegedly engaged in. This court reasoned that the child’s testimony was impermissibly bolstered because of the lack of any rigorous cross-examination or impeachment that tended to undermine the child’s testimony.
The issue before us in this cause has been before the highest courts of other states, but seldom is it presented in the same context as occurred in this cause. Differences from state to state, with regard to the scope of review and evidentiary requirements, make it most difficult to give an intelligent tally.7
Some states have held that expert testimony cannot be used to show that a child is telling the truth or that a child accurately testified. See, for example, State v. Moreland, 50 Ohio St.3d 58, 552 N.E.2d 894 (1990), (Held, proper to refuse defendant’s proffer of expert testimony that child complainant was susceptible to suggestion and influence from family members); Wheat v. State, 527 A.2d 269 (Del.Superior Ct.1987) (Held, expert testimony in child sexual abuse case which provided a statistical evaluation of complainant’s present veracity following a recantation impermissibly invaded credibility province of trier of fact in “lie detector” fashion and required reversal).
The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals discussed the issue in a thorough manner in State v. Schimpf, 782 S.W.2d 186 (Tenn.Cr.App.1989), henceforth Schimpf. There, the defendant allegedly sexually abused a five year old in three separate incidents. The state offered the testimony of a Dr. Abraham Brietstein, who claimed to be an expert in the evaluation and treatment of sexually-abused children. Brietstein testified to “Child Sexual Abuse Syndrome,” or, in his words, “I make some kind of determination using what I refer to as differentiating criteria” as certain “signs and symptoms and characteristics that are typical of children who have been sexually abused.”
From what was accurately stated in Schimpf, I believe that one can infer that there is no recognized “Child Sexual Abuse Syndrome” that contains consistent elements. Rather, the syndrome is whatever the particular expert wants it to be, based upon elements he himself has created or manufactured, or has plagarized from other’s works.
In Schimpf, Brietstein identified, not six elements as Brogden did, but rather twelve elements8 The court stated:
“We think that Dr. Brietstein’s testimony clearly confirmed that [the child] had, in fact, been sexually abused. Our only difficulty with this is that he confirmed it for a jury deciding defendant’s guilt or innocence rather than for a psychologist deciding how to treat a victim. *927We find that Dr. Brietstein’s testimony invaded the jury’s province by offering testimony which went to credibility. Credibility of a witness is a matter only for the jury ... The jury had no need for his testimony. We daily submit to juries the question of whether unlawful sexual activity has occurred. They routinely return verdicts without the assistance of expert testimony. Crouched in scientific terms as it was, it could only have confused and misled them ... Its admission was error.”
In Commonwealth v. Smith, 389 Pa.Super. 626, 567 A.2d 1080, 1083 (1989), henceforth Smith, that court held that an attorney’s representation was ineffective because he failed to object to testimony of a therapist that a seven-year-old alleged victim of child sexual abuse was, in the opinion of the therapist, telling the truth. The facts reflect that the therapist testified, without objection, that in her opinion the child victim was believable because the case contained characteristics that she had concluded were commonly observed in sexually abused children. Basically, the therapist testified that, according to her “characteristics,” the child’s story was believable. The therapist also explicitly compared the general behavioral characteristics of sexually abused children to the specific behavioral characteristics of the complainant. The court found that the expert testified to the child’s character for telling the truth, and held that by doing so he “usurped the credibility determining function of the jury” and that this infringement upon the “jury’s sacred domain” harmed the defendant because the victim was the linchpin of the state’s case. The court further stated: “We find it unwise to create an exception to the credibility-determining function of the jury in a case in which an alleged child/victim testifies.” The court also held that the jury, taking into consideration the youth of the witness, can make the determination as to the veracity of the testimony and credibility of the witness, without the assistance of expert testimony. The court appears to have been offended that a witness who holds herself out as an expert can take the stand and, under the guise of “rehabilitation”, testify as to the credibility of the complainant. The court stated the following: “To allow such testimony is to permit the unlawful usurpation of the credibility-finding function of the jury. This strikes at the heart of our system of justice.”
In Smith, the Pennsylvania Court further noted that the problem was magnified because the witness was called as an “expert” witness for the state. The Court emphasized that an “expert” will have much more influence on a jury and its members who have had little or no contact with sexually abused children, which I believe is usually the case.
In State v. Black, 537 A.2d 1154 (Me.1988), a case involving the sexual abuse, of a child, a state’s expert witness described certain factors frequently encountered in sexually abused children. The expert then testified she saw these factors present in the alleged child victim, which was obviously an attempt to prove that the child had been sexually abused. The defense objected to the testimony on the ground that there had not been evidence of acceptance in the scientific community on the issue.9 The court held that in the absence of any showing of scientific reliability, the evidence was improperly admitted. It stated: “Whether described in terms of ‘indicators,’ ‘syndromes,’ ‘patterns,’ or ‘clinical features’ the objective of such evidence is to establish on the basis of present conduct that in the past someone has been subjected to a specific trauma. We conclude that the present record fails to demonstrate the scientific reliability of such evidence.” (p. 1157).
I find that at the present time there are too many “syndromes” and no consensus in the mental health community as to what they actually mean or are meant to mean. *928For a listing of many types of “syndromes,” see Werner v. State, 711 S.W.2d 639, 649 (Tex.Cr.App.1986) (Teague, J., dissenting opinion).10
In reference to the “child sexual abuse” syndrome, some of the commonly observed reactions in children who were allegedly sexually abused are anxiety, regression, sleep disturbance, acting out, depression, and nightmares, to name just a few. However, these behaviors are also associated with a wide range of psychological problems that have nothing to do with sexual abuse. “The fact that a child suffers nightmares, regression, and depression says little about sexual abuse. A myriad of other circumstances cause such behaviors.” Myers, supra.
From the above, I have concluded that any benefit to be gained by admitting expert testimony on such speculative psychiatric theories as “Child Sexual Abuse Syndrome” is substantially outweighed by the prejudicial effect it will have on a jury.
Before closing, I must point out that the implications of the majority’s opinion are far reaching and raise many interesting questions, such as the following: Is it now permissible for an “expert” witness to testify that it is typical behavior for a witness, defendant, or victim to tell the truth, and then change their story or totally recant? Can the State now offer “expert” testimony that it is typical for a key state’s witness in an organized crime trial to often recant and change his story? Will the defendant now be permitted to put his “expert” on the stand to testify that the child complainant does not, according to his “test,” show elements typically found in sexually abused children? May the defendant now offer “expert” testimony that there is no generally accepted syndrome in the mental health community and that the State’s “expert” witness is being untruthful if he testifies there is? Is the defendant entitled to call his “expert” witness to testify to the suggestiveness of children and their desire to testify as authority figures tell them to? Must the alleged child victim be forced to listen to the “expert” witnesses? If so, what kind of adverse effect will these dueling expert witnesses have on the child? Moreover, may the defendant in a “pedophile” case now offer “expert” testimony that he or she does not exhibit certain characteristics common to pedophiles? See People v. Ruiz, 222 Cal.App.3d 1241, 272 Cal.Rptr. 368 (1990) (Held, a child sex-abuse defendant was improperly barred from putting an expert on the stand to testify that defendant did not fit the typical pattern of a pedophile). Should an “expert” now be permitted to testify at the punishment phase that the defendant is worthy of probation? Cf. Gonzales v. State, 756 S.W.2d 413 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1988, no P.D.R.).
If the type “expert” testimony that the majority opinion holds in this cause is admissible, then surely “expert” testimony offered by any defendant as to the unreliability of eyewitness testimony is now admissible. Cf. Welch v. State, 677 S.W.2d 562 (Tex.App.Eastland 1984, P.D.R. Refused,) (Held, exclusion of psychologist's testimony as to the unreliability of eyewitness testimony not error). Thus, after today’s majority opinion, it should follow that “expert” testimony that relates to the suggestiveness of a defendant’s in-court or out-of-court identification is now admissible *929evidence. Cf. Pierce v. State, 777 S.W.2d 399 (Tex.Cr.App.1989) (Held, no error in refusing to admit expert testimony regarding suggestiveness of defendant’s lineup).
I believe that any rational individual can conclude from what the majority opinion states, notwithstanding all of its faults, it is actually good news for those unemployed “experts” in this State who have been looking for employment either as State’s or defendants’ expert witnesses.
For the above reasons, I respectfully dissent.
. Rule 702 provides: If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
. In one leading case on expert testimony, the Ninth Circuit remarked that "expert testimony particularly courts a substantial danger of unfair prejudice" because of its “aura of special reliability and trustworthiness.” See United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir.1973).
. Dr. Summit described in his article five characteristics commonly observed in child abuse victims: (1) secrecy, (2) helplessness, (3) entrapment and accommodation, (4) delayed, conflicted, and unconvincing disclosure, and (5) retraction. Summit’s article makes it clear that he intended the accommodation syndrome be used as a “common language" between health care professionals working with sexually abused children. Summit did not intend the accommodation syndrome as a diagnostic device. The syndrome does not detect sexual abuse. Rather, it assumes the presence of abuse, and attempts to explain a child's reaction to it. People v. Bowker, 203 Cal.App.3d 385, 249 Cal.Rptr. 886 (1988). Also see page 11, post. "Child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome” is not the sexual abuse analogue of battered child syndrome, which is diagnostic of physical abuse. Also see Myers, "Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Litigation, 68 Nebraska Law Review 67 (1989); Summit, “The Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome”, and 7 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 177 (1983).
. Several decisions have held that an expert may not describe a particular child because avoiding discussion of a particular child is less likely to confuse the jury. See e.g. People v. Gray, 187 Cal.App.3d 213, 231 Cal.Rptr. 658 (1986); People v. Roscoe, 168 Cal.App.3d 1093, 215 Cal.Rptr. 45 (1985).
. In Commonwealth v. Gibbons, 383 Pa.Super. 297, 556 A.2d 915 (1989), the court held it was error to admit expert testimony regarding inconsistency even though the defendant based his case on inconsistency.
. Rule 403 provides: Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay....
. The Oregon Supreme Court held that if the state offered evidence of a syndrome to rehabilitate a child’s credibility, the syndrome should be subjected to the Frye test, see Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir.1923), for the admissibility of novel scientific evidence. Also see State v. Milbradt, 305 Or. 621, 756 P.2d 620 (1988).
. These are as follows: (1) Consistency; (2) Details; (3) Language; (4) Corroboration; (5) Secrecy; (6) Multiple Incidents: children are more likely to have been actually sexually abused if the contact reportedly occured on more than one occasion; (7) Trauma Level; (8) Show And Tell; (9) Anger (10) Suggestibility; (11) Motive; and (12) Expert’s Conclusion.
. See fn. 7, ante.
. In State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 229 (Minn.1982), that court stated, in reference to the “rape trauma syndrome,” that "these symptoms may at least be reliable indicators that some psychologically traumatic event has occurred, although they do not necessarily indicate that the event was rape.” The Court held that evidence in rape trauma cases is often used to rebut the defendant’s claim that the complainant consented. In these cases there will be no dispute that sexual intercourse occurred, only a question of the underlying nature of the act.
"Sexual abuse, on the other hand, can be a traumatic attack or can continue for years without use of force at all. The symptoms as described to the courts do not reliably indicate anything more than some unfocused behavioral or emotional problems. Unlike rape trauma syndrome, sexual abuse symptoms do not reliably point to any one event, let alone precisely identify that event." See Myers, ante, at p. 449.